The Future of Sentencing Reform:  Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice by Coffee, John C., Jr.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 8 
1975 
The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the 
Individualization of Justice 
John C. Coffee Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John C. Coffee Jr., The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of 
Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361 (1975). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol73/iss8/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING REFORM: 
EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES IN THE 
INDIVIDUALIZATION OF JUSTICE 
John C. Coffee, Jr. 
l. INTRODUCTION 1362 
!I. THE ACQUISITION OF DISPOSITIONAL INFORMATION ••..•• 1374 
A. The Nature of Dispositional Data ............... 1376 
I., Law Enforcement Records .................. 1376 
a. Conviction records ...................... 1376 
b. Arrest records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 1377 
c. Investigative and intelligence reports ...... 1384 
d. Juvenile records ......................... 1385 
2. Educational Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 1388 
3. Clinical Data .............................. 1391 
B. The Acquisition Stage: An Overview ............ 1394 
I. Problems of Data Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1395 
2. Problems of Data Transmission .............. 1396 
3. The Problem of Parity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1398 
Ill. THE AssESSMENT OF SENTENCING INFORMATION •••••••• 1399 
A. The Case Attribute Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1399 
B. The Categoric Risk Approach .................. 1405 
C. The Clinical Prediction Procedure .............. 1415 
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CAsE LAW ••••••••••••••••..•• 1420 
A. Procedural Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1423 
I. The Trend Toward Disclosure ............... 1423 
2. The Right To Require Verification .......... 1425 
3. The Right To Exclude Unreliable Information 1429 
4. Appellate Review of the Decision-Making Process 1435 
B. The Future of Procedural Reform .............. 1440 
C. Substantive Reform: The Roads Not Yet Taken .. 1442 
I. The Concept of Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1442 
2. The Problem of De Facto Discrimination ...... 1445 
D. A Summary and Evaluation .................... 1452 
V. RESTRUCTURING THE SENTENCING PROCESS •••••••..•••• 1452 
A. Increasing the Conduits of Information: The Case 
for a Parallel Pre-Sentence Study by Defense 
Counsel ....................•.......•...... 1454 
B. Circumscribing Data Collection: The Case for Less 
Knowledge ................................. 1458 
[ 1361] 
THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING REFORM: 
EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES IN THE 
INDIVIDUALIZATION OF JUSTICE 
John C. Coffee, Jr.* 
"Here I am an old man in a long nightgown making muffled 
noises at people who may be no worse than I am."1 
Judge Learned Hand on Sentencing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE dilemma of the American sentencing judge is qualitatively unique. Because our system of criminal justice has embraced to 
a degree unequaled elsewhere the rehabilitative ideal that punish-
ment should fit not the crime, but the particular criminal,2 the 
sentencing judge must labor to fulfill the dual and sometimes con-
flicting roles of judge and clinician. Entrusted with enormous discre-
tion, he is expected to "individualize" the sentence he imposes to 
suit the character, social history, and potential for recidivism of the 
offender before him.8 Yet, because of the general absence in our 
• Member, New York Bar. B.A. 1966, Amherst College; LL.B. 1969, Yale Law 
School.-Ed. 
1. Quoted in M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 16 (1972). 
2. For decisions in which American courts have insisted that the sentencing judge 
"individualize" sentences in keeping with the character of the offender, see United 
States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Daniels, 446 F,2d 967 
(6th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 150, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959); 
Commonwealth v. Cater, 396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959). In contrast, European coun-
tries, most notably Great Britain, have remained predominantly influenced by the 
Benthamite concept of finding the appropriate quantum of punishment sufficient to 
deter future commission of the particular crime in question. As a result, the character 
of the offense appears to have remained the central determinant in their sentencing 
decisions. See J. CONRAD, CRIME AND ITS CORRECTION 52-53 (1965): N. WALKER, SEN• 
TENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 26-32, 118-19, et passim (1969); Regina v. Maguire, 40 
Crim. App. 92, 94 (Crim. App. 1956) ("The business of a court is to consider what is 
the proper length of imprisonment to impose for a particular offense'). CJ. A. CROSS, 
THE ENGLISH SENTENCING SYSTEM (1971). 
For excellent general studies of the emergence and growth of the "rehabilitative 
ideal" in American correctional thinking, see AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM,, STRUG• 
GLE FOR JusnCE (1971) (in particular, see chapter three) [hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR Jus-
TICE]; U.S. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 2-5 (1967) [hereinafter 
TASK FORCE REPORT: CoRRECTIONs]; Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilita-
tive Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1968). 
3. In reality, the sentence imposed in any individual case will be the product of a 
variety of considerations, only one of which is the desire to rehabilitate or "treat" the 
offender. A partial list of these other factors would include: (I) the need to protect 
society, (2) the need to deter both the individual defendant and other potential de-
fendants generally, (3) the need (or desire) to "denounce" the violation of important 
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system of meaningful procedures for the appellate review of sen-
tences,4 he is denied standards by which to determine any particular 
sentence or by which to learn what decisions his fellow judges have 
reached in similar situations. 
To facilitate the goal of individualized sentencing, two related 
practices have developed within our criminal justice system. First, the 
use of indeterminate sentences5 has grown up as a means of providing 
the sentencing judge and correctional authorities with the flexibility 
thought necessary to tailor individualized sentences. Second, in order 
to provide the diagnostic information considered essential for mean-
ingful individualization, an elaborate system for the pre-sentence 
investigation of the offender has gradually developed, resulting in a 
far-reaching data-gathering process that requires both considerable 
time and a sizable bureaucratic infrastructure. 6 
social norms, (4) the need to reward the defendant who pleads guilty for his coopera-
tion with the prosecution, (5) the inclination to punish the defendant if the judge is 
particularly revulsed by his actions or character, and (6) the need to maintain some 
degree of equality between the sentences imposed upon higher and lower income 
criminals. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-51 (1968). See also 
M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 106. For an attempt to balance these factors in the 
context of an actual sentencing decision and in the aftermath of the pardon of former 
President Nixon, see United States v. Braun, 382 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
Notwithstanding the multitude of factors that may influence any individual sen-
tencing determination, this article will focus on the concept of individualization as a 
means of achieving rehabilitation both because this theme has subsumed all other 
considerations in the standard literature of corrections and because it has served as 
the chief bulwark of those opposed to sentencing reform. 
4. Criticizing the unreviewable discretion accorded the American sentencing judge, 
an American Bar Association study has concluded succinctly: "[I]n no other area of 
our law does one man exercise such unrestricted power. No other country in the free 
world permits this condition to exist." ABA ADVISORY COMMilTEE ON SENTENCING AND 
REVIEW, ABA PROJECT ON :MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 2 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter ABA 
.APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS]. See also U.S. TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSIICE, PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISIRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS]. 
In fairness, however, it must be observed that appellate review is considerably easier 
to achieve in legal systems, such as Great Britain's, that are chiefly concerned with 
deterrence rather than "rehabilitation," since in such a context• an appellate court is 
faced with the more manageable task of considering the relationship of the sentence 
to the character of the offense, rather than its relationship to the character of the 
offender. 
5. Use of the term "indeterminate sentence" involves a definitional problem, since 
virtually all sentences are indeterminate to some degree beuveen either judicially or 
legislatively established minima and maxima. For a description of the variety of 
"indeterminate" sentences, see ADVISORY CoMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, ABA PROJ-
ECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRlI>llNAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PRO· 
CEDURES 143 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES]. An 
extreme example is California's indeterminate sentence: The sentencing judge commits 
for a legislatively fixed maximum term; the parole authority is free to release condi-
tionally at any time thereafter. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1168, 3041 (West Supp. 1966). 
6. The most detailed descriptions of the mechanics of the pre-sentence inquiry 
are to be found in the standard probation manuals and guidebooks prepared for 
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This article will focus on the mechanics of the individualization 
process: the manner in which dispositional information is collected, 
the quality of the resulting data, and the methodologies employed 
for its communication to and assessment by correctional decision 
makers. This focus is important because another distinctive feature 
of the American criminal justice system is the severity of the sen-
tences it imposes.7 Not only is the average length of sentences im-
posed on American offenders far in excess of that imposed in other 
Western nations, but there is considerable evidence that the average 
length of sentences has increased in direct response to the transition 
from a system of standardized sentences to the "humanitarian" 
system of individualized sentences.8 At the same time, those opposing 
probation officers. These include: DMSION OF PROBATION, ADIIUNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT (1965) (the standard manual 
of federal probation offices) [hereinafter PRESENTENCE REPORT]: NATIONAL COUNCIL ON 
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING (1957) [hereinafter GUIDES FOR SEN• 
TENCING]; P. KEYE, THE PROBATION OFFICER INVESTIGATES (1960). See also ADVISORY COMM, 
ON SENTENCING AND REvmw, ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN• 
DARDS RELATING TO PROBATION 32-40 (Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter ABA PROBATION 
STANDARDs]: Sharp, Presentence Reports, 30 F.R.D. 483 (1961). 
More detacl!ed, empirical descriptions of the operation of the pre-sentence inquiry 
can be found in R. DAWSON, SENTENCING 11-65 (1969); D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY 
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE (1969); C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND 
PARDONS 114-19 (3d ed. 1968); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 14-18, 222-23 (1966); L. ORLAND, 
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT 20-32 (1973); S. RUDIN, H. WEIHOFEN, G. EDWARDS & 
S. ROSENZWEIG, THE LAw OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 73-108 (2d ed. 1973), See also Katkin, 
Presentence Reports: An Analysis of Uses, Limitations and Civil Liberties Issues, 55 
MINN. L. REv. 15 (1970). In addition, excellent descriptions of particular aspects of the 
sentencing process are to be found in the various Institutes on Sentencing sponsored 
from time to time by the various circuit courts of appeals and reprinted in the Federal 
Rules Decisions. 
Finally, overshadowing all other recent empirical studies of sentencing decision-
making, are two major recent works: sociologist John Hogarth's SENTENCING AS A 
HUMAN PROCESS (1971), the first truly quantitative and systematic study of the sen-
tencing process, the findings of which are discussed in the text at notes 169-75 infra, 
and psychiatrist Willard Gaylin's PARTIAL JUSTICE (1974), which focuses principally on 
the disparate attitudes, perceptions, and psycl!ologies among sentencing judges. 
7. More than one half of the prisoners confined in state institutions in 1960 had 
been sentenced to terms of 10 years or more. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra 
note 4, at 17. In the federal system, the average sentence of the prison population 
in 1965 was in excess of 5 years: over 5 per cent of federal prisoners were then serving 
terms in excess of 20 years. Sentences in excess of 5 years are considered rare in most 
European countries. See ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 57. Indeed, 
it was estimated in 1970 that in one year more than 15,000 offenders in the United 
States were sentenced to terms of 5 years or more, while only 150 such sentences were 
given in England. Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 1, at 17, col. 2, quotecl In 
W. GAYLIN, supra note 6, at 23. Both the ABA Minimum Standards and the Model 
Sentencing Act recommend that the maximum authorized prison term be set at 5 years. 
ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 48, 60-61, 86. 
8. Dr. Gaylin reports that the average sentence length for persons committed to 
federal prison "has risen steadily in the last fifteen years, until now it is almost double 
the twenty-eight months it was in 1957." W. GAYLJN, supra note 6, at 23, The trend 
toward longer sentences is, however, less recent than Dr. Gaylin suggests. One of the 
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procedural reform and formalization of the sentencing process have 
chiefly argued that individualization requires that the sentencing 
judge be given unfettered discretion.9 It thus becomes essential to 
ask what justification exists for the immense faith that has been 
placed in the ability of correctional decision makers to individualize 
justice in a rational and equitable manner. 
The "individualized treatment model" of the sentencing process 
has been accepted almost without question for the last generation. 
The universality of its acceptance seems attributable to the con-
vergence of several different forces: the fundamental, democratic 
belief that the uniqueness of each individual must be respected, the 
first modern indeterminate-sentences systems was adopted in Illinois in 1889; in the 
first full-scale study of the Illinois system, it was found that, on the average, prisoners 
sentenced under the indeterminate term statute served longer terms than those serving 
fixed sentences. Bruce, Burgess, Harno &: Landesco, A Study of the Indeterminate 
Sentence and Parole in the State of Illinois, 19 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 
no. I, pt. II, at 67 (May 1928). Today, California is generally recognized as having adopted 
the most extreme form of indeterminate sentencing; its most frequently occurring statu• 
tory sentence is l-to-15 years, and such a term is spi:;cified for even relatively minor 
offenses. Correspondingly, the median time served by California inmates (36 months) 
appears to be the longest in the country, and this median fignre has actually increased 
during recent years. STRUGGLE FOR Jusn:CE, supra note 2, at 91-93. A recent decision, 
In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384 (1975), requires the 
California Adult Authority to fix a maximum "primary" term at the beginning of a 
prisoner's sentence, and thus reduces the degree of indeterminacy in the California 
system. See note 317 infra. 
Two other institutions in which the use of indeterminate sentences seems to have 
been accompanied by longer average sentences are the juvenile court and the exper-
imental "therapeutic" prison. One study of Maryland's experimental Patuxent Institution 
for Defective Delinquents found that some 38 per cent of the inmates remained insti-
tutionalized for a period in excess of the maximum term to which they could have 
been sentenced to a standard prison. Stanford, A Model Clockwork-Orange Prison, 
N.Y. Times, Sept 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 9, 78. Similarly, observers have reported 
that minors committed to prison by the juvenile court typically serve longer sentences 
than if they had been sentenced as adults by a criminal court for the same offense. 
See S. RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAw 157 (1965); Chase, Schemes and Visions: A 
Suggested Revision of Juvenile Sentencing, 51 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 673 (1973). Symptom-
atically, one study has found that juvenile-court judges who identified with the 
"humanistic, social welfare ideology" of the juvenile court tended to send more juve-
niles to institutions and for longer periods than did judges whose orientation was more 
legalistic. See CONTROLLING DELINQUENTS 6, 31-60 (S. Wheeler ed. 1968). 
Although it remains arguable that the relationship that clearly exists between 
indeterminate sentences and lengthier average prison terms is more coincidental than 
causal, some authorities have speculated that, in the process of adopting an inde-
terminate sentence system, many state legislatures have in fact simply added to 
previously specified prison terms a period of indeterminate confinement, thus ensuring 
that indeterminate sentences would be more punitive. See Dershowitz, Indeterminate 
Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 303-04 &: n.17 
(1974). 
9. See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441-42 (1974). In a separate 
opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the majority for rendering the procedural sentencing 
provisions of the statute there at issue a "nullity" by "holding that the Act was in-
tended to preserve 'the unfettered sentencing discretion of federal district judges.'" 
418 U.S. at 452. For fuller discussion of Dorszynski, see text at notes 299-304 infra. 
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clinical theory that criminal misconduct is the product of psycholog-
ical abnormality or malfunction,10 the desire of behavioral and cor-
rectional experts to be free from the interference of lawye!5 and the 
confines of an adversarial system, and the unanimously recognized 
need for some mechanism by which to mitigate the harshness of fixed 
sentences. 
Only recently have critics begun to challenge the liberal rhetoric 
of rehabilitation. In essence, they have asserted that the "treatment" 
label has been invoked to conceal punitive actions that in fact have 
been harsher and more repressive than those tolerated under the 
earlier system of standardized sentences.11 Support for their charges 
can be found in a number of carefully conducted studies revealing 
frequent examples of unjustified disparity in the sentences assigned 
offenders having similar case histories.12 Yet, although a principal 
10. One work, representative of the clinical theory, expresses the view that unlawful 
acts are "signals of distress, signals of failure • • • the spasms and struggles of a 
submarginal human being." K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF P0NISHllmNT 19 (1968). For 
critiques of the medical model and the assumption that crime is the product of psy-
chological defect, see STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 40-45; Frankel, Lawlessness 
in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 31-34 (1971). A report published by the State of New 
York summarizing its correctional policy contains a sympathetic statement of the 
"theory of rehabilitation" and expresses the view that antisocial conduct stems from 
"personal characteristics that impede an individual's ability to function at a generally 
acceptable level." THE GoVERNOR's SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL OFFENDERS, PRELIM• 
!NARY REPORT 300 (1968) [hereinafter REPORT ON CRIMINAL OFFENDERS]. The report 
concedes, however, that the thesis that crime is the product of psycliological disorders 
has come under increasing academic attack, most notably from Professors Cloward 
and Ohlin, whose "theory of differential opportunity" holds that "persons who perceive 
societal obstacles to legitimate fulfillment of goals • • • adopt illegitimate means of 
attaining those goals." Id. at 289. Thus, in this latter vi°'II', illegal acts may reveal not 
a sick person, but a resourceful one who had adapted to the only opportunities per-
mitted him by society. See Cloward & Ohlin, Illegitimate Means, Differential oppor-
tunity and Delinquent Subcultures, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 161 (R. Giallombardo ed. 
1966) [hereinafter JUVENILE DELINQUENCY]. For a brief review of the Cloward and Ohlin 
position and that of other "environmentalist" theories regarding the causes of crime, 
see Chase, supra note 8, at 688-90. 
11. On the popular level this critique has been most notably advanced in STRUGGLE 
FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2: w. GAYLIN, supra note 6; J. MITFORD, KIND AND UsoAL 
PUNISH!lmNT (1973); N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST PoLmCIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME 
CONTROL (1970). The earliest critiques of the deficiencies of the rehabilitative model 
can be found in F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964): Cohen, supra 
note 2; Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 
HARv. L. REv. 904 (1962). One of the first critics to express skepticism about the 
feasibility of acliieving meaningful individualization through the conventional means 
of an in-depth study of the individual offender was Professor Sheldon Glueck of the 
Harvard Law Scliool. See Glueck, The Sentencing Problems, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 
1956, at 15, 19. As a result, Professors Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck ,vere also among 
the first to tum to standardized classification systems-with highly debatable results. 
See notes 207, 211 infra. 
12. A 1974 study by the Federal Judicial Center, in whiclI the 50 judges of the 
district courts of the Second Circuit participated, has provided the most dramatic 
evidence so far of the disparities that exist between the sentencing practices of indi• 
vidual judges. Presented with identical actual pre-sentence reports, the judges assigned 
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target of these critics has been the institution of the indeterminate 
sentence, only a few of them seem prepared to urge the return to a 
system of standardized sentences. Thus, because some degree of inde-
terminacy seems likely to remain a characteristic of most sentencing 
structures,13 the critical question becomes: upon what criteria are 
offenders who have committed similar crimes to be differentiated? 
For some time, the "individualized treatment model" has ap-
proached this question of classification by postulating three basic 
assumptions: 
(1) that the task of classifying offenders is essentially a clinical 
process in which the Ia-wyer's role is superseded by that of the im-
partial behavioral expert; 
(2) that the likelihood of accurate diagnosis, intelligent indi-
vidualization, and, ultimately, rehabilitation increases in propor-
tion to the volume of information that can be collected about the 
offender;14 and 
(3) that the criminal act committed by the offender is a fact of 
only limited diagnostic significance as compared with information 
revealing the basic personality disorders that led to the commission of 
the crime.15 
widely varying sentences on the same facts; the sentences for the same offender ranged 
in some cases from as much as 20 years plus a heavy fine to 3 years and no fine. A 
PARTRIDGE & w. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CmCUIT SENTENCING STUDY 6-7 (1974). The report 
concluded that "considerable disparity exists in a substantial proportion of Second 
Circuit cases." Id. at 21. Other studies include Seymour, 1972 Sentencing Study for the 
Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 163 (1973); Zumwalt, The Anarchy of 
Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 57 JUDICATURE 96 (1973). See also M. FRANKEL, supra 
note I. 
13. For example, both the Model Sentencing Act (published by the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency in 1963) and the Model Penal Code (prepared 
under the auspices of the American Law Institute in 1961) employ the indeterminate 
sentence, but confine it within far narrower limits than the one-to-fifteen year sentence 
customarily assigned in California. 
14. A number of sentencing cases have defended this premise by broadly and un-
qualifiedly asserting that the "sentencing judge's access to information should be 
almost completely unfettered in order that he may 'acquire a thorough acquaintance 
with the character and history of the man before [him].'" United States v. Schipani, 
435 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971). See Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-52 (1949), discussed in the text at notes 224-29 infra. In 
marked contrast, English courts seem to receive pre-sentence reports of relatively 
modest scope. See Meador, The Review of Criminal Sentences in England in ABA 
.APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 4, app. c, at 94, 108-09. 
15. See Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 10, at 453, 457. Many forensic 
psychiatrists and criminologists consider the early childhood experiences of the offender, 
his home life, relationships with parents, and the date of his first encounter with law 
enforcement authorities, to be the decisive factors in any prediction of recidivism. See 
S. GLUECK&: E. GLUECK, PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME 16-17 (1959); GUIDES FOR 
SENTENCING, supra note 6, at 38; Stanford, supra note 8, at 74. Cf. Brancale, Diagnostic 
Techniques in Aid of Sentencing, 23 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 442 (1958). 
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These assumptions, however, have come under increasing attack 
by students of the correctional process. Among the principal ele• 
ments in their critique of the "individualized treatment model" are 
the following: 
(I) clinical techniques for the evaluation of the offender tend to 
err substantially on the side of overprediction;16 
(2) more information does not always assist diagnosis, but may 
confuse it and lead to unintended discrimination based on the 
subject's exposure to record-keeping;17 
(3) the process of distinguishing among individuals on the basis 
of their innate character, rather than their explicit actions, is too 
speculative and subjective to have a substantial impact where basic 
questions of human liberty are involved;18 and 
(4) the aims of deterrence and rehabilitation are sufficiently in-
compatible that the tasks of diagnosing and treating the offender 
should be severed from the criminal justice system and assigned to 
persons who do not have responsibility for determining the length of 
sentence.19 
While the commentators do not universally share all of these 
views,20 one basic precept does underlie this new school of criticism: 
the view that the goal of individualization based upon an under-
standing of the whole person is largely beyond the realistic capa-
bilities of the criminal justice system and often in direct conflict with 
the goal of treating similar offenders similarly. Thus, the prescription 
of these critics is basically conservative: restrict the discretion ac-
corded dispositional decision makers and, by various means, impose 
16. See Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV, 
439, 447 (1974) (concluding that psychiatrists tend "to over-predict dangerousness 
greatly, by a factor somewhere between ten and a hundred times the actual incidence 
of dangerous behavior"); Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: "A Knife That 
Cuts Both Ways", 51 JUDICATURE 370 (1968); Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: 
Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1164-73 (1974); Settle &: Oppe• 
gard, The Pre-Trial Examination of Federal Defendants, 35 F.R.D. 475, 479-80 (1964); 
Steadman, The Psychiatrist as a Conservative Agent of Social Control, 20 SOCIAL PROD, 
263 (1972). See also text at notes 211-17 infra. 
17. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 14. 
18. Thus, Struggle for Justice, probably the most representative expression of this 
new critique, recommends that "the law • • • deal only with a narrow aspect of the 
individual, his criminal act or acts." STRUGGLE FOR JusnCE, supra note 2, at 147. See 
also Allen, The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal 
Justice, 32 SOCIAL SERV. REv. 107, 117 (1958). 
19. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSIICE, supra note 2, at 97-98. 
20. For example, Judge Frankel, who considers that current procedures for indi-
vidualization constitute at best a "dubious process," M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, ch. 3, 
nevertheless maintains that some objective basis for differentiating among offenders 
on their individual merits can be found. Id. at 11. For a similar view and an attempt 
at making a list of such factors, see N. WALKER, supra note 2, at 118. 
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greater standardization on the process by which such decisions are 
reached. 
This new skepticism concerning the correctional system's ability 
to measure character and predict future behavior accurately enough 
to determine fundamental questions of liberty has already led to 
signs of a major division among criminologists.21 Yet, whether at-
tributable to an excessive deference to social scientists22 or simply to 
a preoccupation with the trial stage of the criminal justice system, 
lawyers as a group have avoided serious engagement ·with the prob-
lems of the dispositional stage. This is unfortunate: In a legal system 
in which an estimated ninety per cent of all convictions are the result 
of guilty pleas,23 sentencing and parole are the issues of paramount 
importance to most defendants and constitute their chief impressions 
of the fairness of the criminal justice system. 
Before going further, it is necessary to outline briefly the pre-
sentence investigation that initiates the dispositional process. The 
key document both at this stage and at the later parole stage is the 
pre-sentence report. Its recommendations are generally followed by 
the sentencing judge24 and the extent and scope of its investigation of 
the defendant overshadow subsequent inquiries at the parole or 
custodial classification stages.25 Indeed, the assessments made and 
data collected during the pre-sentence investigation pursue the de-
fendant and become the core of the parole board's case summary file 
on him. As a consequence, misinformation that enters the pre-
21. For a brief dialogue setting forth many of the principal issues in this debate, 
see Nietzel, Psychiatric Expertise In and Out of Court: A Reply to Blinder, 58 JUDI-
CATURE 39 (1974), and Blinder, A Response to Nietzel, 58 JUDICATURE 41 (1974). 
22. Dr. Gaylin, himself a psychiatrist, has theorized that the lawyer's lack of 
familiarity with the social sciences "permits glorification" of the degree of expertise 
underlying the judgments made by social scientists. In reality, he adds, greater knowl-
edge of the fields of behavior and sociology would cause the lawyer to recognize the 
"incredible failure of these disciplines • • • in solving the problems of antisocial 
behavior." W. GAYLIN, supra note 6, at 100. 
23. ABA APPELLATE REVEw STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 60; D. NEWMAN, supra note 
6, at 3. 
24. Carter &: Wilkins, Some Factors in Sentencing Policy, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 
503, 504-05 (1967). Indeed, Dr. Gaylin has concluded in his study of sentencing that 
"[i]n many courts, the probation officer rather than the judge is the sentencer." 
W. GAYLIN, supra note 6, at 13. 
25. Offenders are classified at three principal stages: during the pre-sentence in-
vestigation, during the diagnostic and orientation process on their initial entry into 
prison, and during the pre-parole investigation that may precede release. See R. DAW-
SON, supra note 6, at 242-43. See also Sirico, Prisoner Classification and Administrative 
Decisionmaking, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1229 (1972). The last two inquiries rarely dupli-
cate the factual investigation conducted by the probation officer writing the pre-
sentence report, but instead tend to rely on the pre-sentence report and investigate 
other areas, such as the clinical aspects of the offender's case or his ability to main-
tain himself socially and economically if released on parole. 
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sentence report is likely to have a multiple impact on the offender's 
future. 
In intent and methodology, the pre-sentence investigation has 
been described as an effort to determine "the social credit rating of 
the individual."26 The analogy is accurate: As with investigations 
conducted by credit agencies, the scope of the pre-sentence investiga-
tion is virtually unlimited. The subject's homelife, childhood, edu-
cational and employment history, political and religious attitudes, 
and sexual experiences (particularly in the case of the female of-
fender) are all considered relevant information.27 Chief importance, 
however, is likely to be given to past encounters with law enforce-
ment authorities, including even inconclusive investigatory con-
tacts.28 
To obtain the necessary data, the probation officer is expected and 
empowered to contact all social agencies that have ever dealt with the 
offender and receive full access to their files; these include schools, 
p~ychiatric clinics, welfare departments, and juvenile authorities. In 
addition, he will interview the offender, and possibly his relatives 
or neighbors. In earlier times, reliance was principally placed on 
these oral techniques.29 But, with growing caseloads and the increas-
ing availability of centralized databanks, the probation officer has 
become increasingly dependent on recorded information and in-
creasingly able to delve deeper into the recorded aspects of the indi-
vidual's prior life.80 
In one major respect, the analogy between the pre-sentence report 
26. Wallace, Aids in Sentencing, 40 F.R.D. 433, at 433 (1965). 
27. While the degree of standardization varies, probation manuals typically rec• 
ommend at a minimum that the report contain a separate section dealing with each 
of the following categories: prior record, family history, social adjustment, education, 
marital status, personality traits, attitudes toward probation, and physical and mental 
health. See R. DAWSON, supra note 6, at 35; PRESENTENCE REPORT, supra note 6; GUIDES 
FOR SENTENCING, supra note 6. The Model Penal Code recommends that the pre-sentence 
report have a similarly extensive scope. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7,07(3) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962). 
28. See note 84 infra. 
29. For criticism of this reliance on oral techniques, see Schaffer, The Defendant's 
Right of Access to Presentence Reports, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 674 (1967). 
30. An extensive overview· of the growth and significance of computerized data• 
banks is provided in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DATABANKS IN A FREE SoCIETY 
(A. Westin 8: M. Baker eds. 1972) [hereinafter DATABANKSJ. The study found that 
although computerization of databanks had not generally resulted in an increase in 
the amount and scope of information being collected over the already extensive amount 
of information that manual databanks had acquired, it did greatly enhance the case 
and efficiency with which the information could be obtained. For studies on manual 
databanks and their use in the correctional context, see A. NEmR, DossmR: THE SECRET 
FILES THEY KEEP ON You (1975); ON RECORD (S. Wheeler ed. 1969) [hereinafter ON 
RECORD); Coffee, Privacy Versus Parens Patriae: The Role of Police Records in the 
Sentencing and Surveillance of Juveniles, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (1972). 
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and a private credit report fails: Victims of misinformation in credit 
reports have legal remedies.31 In contrast, in most jurisdictions the 
offender lacks any right to inspect his pre-sentence report and, hence, 
has virtually no opportunity to learn of misinformation.32 In the 
past his principal protection has been the relative inaccessibility of 
most nonessential data concerning him. But today, as the barriers to 
total data access progressively fall, this situation has changed. 
This transition is important, for its occurrence gives one con-
siderable reason to believe that the basic sentencing reform that civil 
libertarians have sought for three decades-disclosure of the pre-
sentence report to the defendant and his counsel-may have become 
obsolete.33 Three critical, but barely noticed, developments may ac-
count for this. First, the growth of computerized and manual data-
banks has intensified existing problems of sentencing misinformation 
by increasing the amount of accessible information, and has created 
new problems because of the tendency of these systems to communi-
cate sensitive data in an incomplete or overly compressed fashion. 
Second, the amount of psychiatric-and clinical information presented 
to the sentencing judge and other dispositional decision makers has 
grown significantly. This development is attributable both to the 
increased accessibility to the probation officer of the records main-
31. The contrast is striking between the protection against injury through misin-
formation afforded the economic status of the citizen by the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-8lt (1970), and the virtual absence of protection in the case of 
the offender, whose vulnerability to misinformation seems far greater. Under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the aggrieved citizen may demand disclosure of the infor-
mation in his credit file, contest and correct errors, require the deletion of informa-
tion over seven years old, record in his file that a dispute over challenged facts was 
not resolved, and, in some circumstances, obtain damages. 
32. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 48-59; Katkin, supra note 6, at 24-25. Courts have 
consistently held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not 
require disclosure of the pre-sentence report. See United States v. Lowe, 482 F.2d 
1357 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
390 U.S. 973 (1968). With the amendment of rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules, of Crim-
inal Procedure to require disclosure in most instances, the constitutional issue has 
become academic, except at the state level. For an excellent discussion of the pros and 
cons of mandatory disclosure, see ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 210-
25; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 524 (1969); Lehrich, 
The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47 F.R.D,' 225 
(1969). Disclosure is recommended in ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra, § 4.4; 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL SENTENCING Acr 
§ 4 (1963). 
33. Ironically, this has taken place just at the moment when widespread adoption 
of mandatory disclosure appears imminent: With the amendment of rule 32(c) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide for mandatory partial disclosure 
of the pre-sentence report in most instances at the federal level, see text at notes 
242-45 infra, it now appears likely that remaining opposition to disclosure at the state 
level will eventually collapse. 
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tained by educational and other welfare agencies,84 and to the emer-
gence of psychiatric court clinics, which provide diagnostic advice 
directly to the sentencing judge for use in the dispositional process.86 
In either case, such information, consisting generally of an apparently 
expert and conclusory assessment of the offender, is markedly differ-
ent from the basically factual information provided in the traditional 
pre-sentence report.36 Finally, the newest development in correc-
tional decision-making has been the formulation of statistically based 
prediction tables that seek to measure an offender's risk of recidivism 
on the basis of the actuarially determined risk that historically has 
been associated with certain pre-selected variables such as a prior 
arrest record, an unstable employment history, or, even more omi-
nously, the existence of relatives having criminal histories.87 
A simple example may reveal the gradations of the problem. 
Assume that a state has a penal statute prescribing a one-to-twenty-
year term for robbery (the intention of the statute being to cover 
both simple robbery and more aggravated cases of armed robbery). 
Assume next that a judge, upon reading a pre-sentence report in a 
robbery case, discovers a reference to the fact that the defendant 
"had a knife" at the time of the robbery and thus assigns a twenty-
year term on the assumption that this was a case of armed robbery. 
Assume finally that the knife in question was in fact only an in-
nocuous penknife.88 For years, critics have employed such an example 
to demonstrate the need for disclosure of the pre-sentence report 
and an opportunity to rebut or explain any facts that might be given 
significant weight in the determination of the sentence. 
34. For descriptions of the increasing amount and accessibility of the personal infor-
mation maintained by such agencies see A. NEIER, supra note 30, at 17-27: Goslin &: 
Bordier, Record-Keeping in Elementary and Secondary Schools, in ON RECORD, supra 
note 30, at 29. See also INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRARY (A. Westin ed. 
1971) [hereinafter INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY). 
35. For analyses of the court clinic see Bendt, Balcanoff &: Tragellis, Psychiatric 
Examination of Alleged Offenders, 58 A.B.A.J. 371 (1972); Campbell, Sentencing: The 
Use of Psychiatric Information and Presentence Reports, 60 KY. L.J. 285, 291•94 (1972); 
Hartman, Social Issues and the Court Psychiatric Clinic, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1969, 
at 37. 
36. While the distinction between "factual" information and diagnostic evaluations 
is important since the latter category clearly requires more sophisticated procedures 
to ensure fairness to the defendant, this distinction, as Professor Campbell has prop• 
erly cautioned, see Campbell, supra note 35, at 287 n.14, should not be overdrawn: 
Other types of information traditionally found in the pre-sentence report, such as 
teacher and employer evaluations, also contain opinions and characterizations and 
use terminology requiring interpretation. 
37. For brief descriptions of these techniques, see W. RECKLESS, THE CRIME PROD• 
LEM 750-51 (4th ed. 1967); TASK FORCE R.El'ORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at '79-82: 
McGee, Objectivity in Predicting Criminal Behavior, 42 F.R.D. 192 (1966). 
38. For a situation in which a small penknife was confused with a weapon to the 
considerable prejudice of the defendant, see D. NEWllfAN, supra note 6, at 223, See 
also Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn, 1974). 
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But now, alter the foregoing hypothetical and assume that the 
misinformation that has influenced the sentencing judge is not a state-
ment of fact, but of opinion: for example, a statement that a school 
psychologist had once years before diagnosed the offender as a "bellig-
erent paranoid." Or, to pose a harder case, suppose the court clinic 
reports that it has diagnosed the offender as "antisocial," a typology 
that implies the individual is unlikely to be easily rehabilitated.39 In 
such cases can it reasonably be expected that the effect of such 
"clinical" judgments will be offset by disclosure? Or, to consider 
another variant, suppose the pre-sentence report states that the de-
fendant's name appears on a list of "dangerous militants" maintained 
by the local police department,40 or that the state's criminal history 
databank has received reports that the defendant has been involved 
in narcotics traffic.41 In each of these cases, the pejorative weight of 
the unsubstantiated statement coupled ·with its lack of specificity is 
likely to make effective rebuttal impossible.42 
The point here is not only that the remedy of disclosure may 
often prove inadequate, but that the process of assessing offenders 
has entered a new era as different from the old era of intuitive 
judgments as electronic data processing was from punched card sys-
tems. The issues associated with these new techniques involve more 
than procedural questions. For instance, the use of psychiatric typol-
ogies for the classification of offenders raises fundamental questions 
about the etiology of crime that have split the profession of psychia-
try: Is the offender "sick" simply because he has committed a serious 
crime? Are there distinct types of criminal illness that require differ-
ent strategies and lengths of "treatment"? Should the type and length 
of incarceration the offender is assigned depend upon a diagnosis that 
other reputable schools of psychiatry would reject? Similarly, the use 
39. Although the number of psychiatric typologies in use seems at times to equal 
the number of practicing forensic psychiatrists, the President's Commission has sug-
gested a standardized classification of offenders as "prosocial," "antisocial,'' "pseudo• 
social," or "asocial." See TASK FORCE REl'oRT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 20-22. 
Within this typology, the characterization of "antisocial" represents a judgment that 
an individual is the most difficult type of offender to rehabilitate. 
40. See text at note 95 infra for a discussion of the use of "status codes" by police 
departments. 
41. See United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971). 
42, Note that one similarity between the statistical and clinical predictive tech-
niques is that "diagnosis" leads directly to "outcome"; i.e., while the expert avoids 
formally recommending a dispositional result, each diagnostic alternative may be 
matched with a specific dispositional recommendation. For example, labeling the 
offender as "antisocial" is clearly a recommendation that probation be denied. In 
consequence, the sentencing judge may be reduced from the role of key decision maker 
to the almost clerical one of matching diagnoses and dispositions. While it is possible 
to argue that the clinician, and not the judge, should be the authoritative decision 
maker, such a re-allocation of authority certainly undercuts the relevance of existing 
procedural remedies, such as disclosure of the pre-sentence report. 
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of prediction tables raises basic jurisprudential issues: Should the 
sentence be based upon such morally neutral (and potentially dis-
criminatory) factors as level of education, past employment history, 
or childhood relationships with parents? Or, phrased differently, 
should any kind of statistical profile be used to determine that an 
offender is a "high risk" case, so long as the same profile is shared by 
a great number of citizens who have committed no crimes? 
Analytically, a distinction must be drawn between those issues 
that relate to the kind and quality of the data used in correctional 
decision-making and those that relate to the underlying assessment 
techniques utilized once this data has been collected. The road map 
for this article follows from that distinction. Part II considers issues 
relating to the kind of information collected and utilized in the 
making of dispositional decisions. Part III focuses on the three 
basic methodologies employed to analyze that data: the "case attri-
bute" system of the caseworker, the actuarial techniques of the 
statistician, and the typological classification systems of the clinician. 
Part IV examines the legal remedies either developing or fore-
shadowed by the current case law in order to measure their effective-
ness against the problems earlier noted. Finally, in Part V, alternative 
configurations to the current structure of dispositional decision-
making will be considered. 
II. THE ACQUISITION OF DISPOSITIONAL INFORMATION 
No technique for the systematic assessment of data can long out-
perform its informational inputs. To the computer scientist, this axi-
omatic truth is known as the" 'GIGO Effect'-Garbage In, Garbage 
Out."43 Nevertheless, one of the least studied areas of the correc-
tional process has been the quality of its informational inputs. Those 
few commentators who have investigated the reliability of the data 
contained in dispositional reports have, however, identified several 
common deficiencies: the offender is regularly portrayed in highly 
stereotyped and superficial terms,44 the reports themselves contain a 
suspiciously high number of pejorative labels and psychiatric expres-
43. DATABANKS, supra note 30, at 300. Another variant of this axiom is "Garbage 
In, Gospel Out," which is intended to express the possibility that the end user will 
assume that data presented in a systematic format (particularly when provided through 
a computer) has been carefully researched and checked. Whatever the over-all accuracy 
of this latter a.xiom (Westin and Baker in general view it skeptically. Id. at 262), it 
may have special relevance to reports tendered by probation officers and other law 
enforcement officials, since, as Professor Skolnick has observed, a "presumption of 
regularity" is given by most recipients of data to reports received from law enforce• 
mentauthorities. J. SKOLNICK, JUsrICE WITHOUT TRIAL 198 (1966). 
44. Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA, L. REV. 282, 302-04 (1971). See also 
M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 34; Settle &: Oppegard, supra note 16, at 479-80. 
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sions45 and are permeated by a vast amount of irrelevant information 
that interferes with both analysis and comparison of the offender.46 
The range of these criticisms indicates that the problem of data 
quality involves a continuum of misinformation, ranging from 
simple factual errors to subtler distortions that result from innuendo 
or ambiguity. The dimensions of this problem emerge more clearly 
by contrasting the kinds of errors present in several cases that have 
attained classic stature in the debate over sentencing reform. 
In State v. Killian,47 a nineteen-year-old first offender received 
the unusually severe sentence of seven-to-ten years after pleading 
guilty to possession of marijuana. Later, it was discovered that this 
sentence was the result of an undisclosed, false statement in the pre-
sentence report that the youth had raped a juvenile girl. Because of 
ambiguities in police records, the defendant had been confused with 
another individual who had been identified as the rapist.48 
In State v. Pohlabel,49 a defendant who stole a checkbook and 
passed seven checks, totaling approximately $1500, received seven 
consecutive terms of three-to-five years each-that is, a total sentence 
of nventy-one to thirty-five years. After eight years in prison, the 
defendant learned that the pre-sentence report described him as "a 
master of deception" who had "spent the greater part of his life in 
penal institutions"50 and who had been sentenced to life in prison 
in another state. In fact, the defendant had previously been convicted 
only once, as a juvenile.51 
Finally, in United States v. Weston,52 a federal judge gave a 
maximum nventy-year sentence to a young female defendant with 
no prior record of a drug-related offense who had been convicted of 
possession of a small quantity of heroin. In doing so, the judge 
explicitly relied on statements made by an anonymous informant 
who had identified the girl as the chief drug supplier for the region. 
Eventually an appellate court reversed, stating that the lurid, but 
45. Sirico, supra note 25, at 1231. 
46. TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 19. This tendency toward 
overinclusion of irrelevant data is even more pronounced at the juvenile court level. 
See s. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 207 (1971). 
47. 91 Ariz. 140, 370 P.2d 287 (1962). 
48. 91 Ariz. at 144-45, 370 P.2d at 290-91. 
49. 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (App. Div. 1960). 
50. 61 N.J. Super. at 247, 160 A.2d at 650. 
51. See also United States v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. 
Magliano, 336 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1964). 
52. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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unsubstantiated, story would have been insufficient to support even a 
search warrant or an arrest. 53 
While the theme of fortuitous discovery of error runs through 
these cases, there are important differences among them. Killian 
involved a simple factual error, which disclosure of the pre-sentence 
report to defense counsel might be expected to correct. Pohlabel, 
however, involved more: a mixture of factual mistake and stylistic 
hyperbole in the characterization of the offender that could have 
remained partially uncorrected even if the pre-sentence report had 
been disclosd. In contrast to these two cases, Weston involved what 
may have been a tale of sheer fantasy; disclosure alone was wholly 
inadequate to rectify this misinformation, since the charges were 
both broad and nonspecific. Only the unusual decision of the ap-
pellate court to require the probation department to corroborate its 
allegations prevented a miscarriage of justice. Thus, once the pre-
sentence report contains not only simple factual errors, but vague 
characterizations and undocumented charges, new problems are 
engendered that the traditional remedy of disclosure is probably 
inadequate to resolve. 
Accordingly, it becomes important to examine the varieties of 
data actually encountered during the pre-sentence inquiry in order 
to measure the adequacy of the traditional remedy of disclosure 
against the kinds of distortion that in fact occur. In this section, we 
will therefore successively consider the following categories of re-
corded information: law enforcement records, educational and wel-
fare agency records, and clinical and psychiatric records. 
A. The Nature of Dispositional Data 
I. Law Enforcement Records 
Law enforcement records constitute the principal source of re-
corded information upon which the pre-sentence report relies.114 At 
least four separate categories of law enforcement records can be dis-
tinguished on a continuum ranging from generally reliable to highly 
speculative: conviction records, arrest records, investigative reports, 
and juvenile records. 
a. Conviction records. Although records of the offender's prior 
convictions clearly constitute the most reliable form of information 
contained in law enforcement files, probation officers neither acquire 
nor verify such information in a consistent fashion. For example, in 
53. 448 F.2d at 631. 
54. The majority of the information contained in the pre-sentence report comes 
from two sources: interviews with the defendant and law enforcement records. R. DAW• 
~ON, supra note 6, at 14. 
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requiring disclosure of conviction records to a defendant, the Third 
Circuit recently noted that "[r]eporting policies are so fragmentary 
that this court has been unable to find any clear statement of the 
policy followed by the states."55 The court further observed that 
"[n]o standards for accuracy are demanded,"56 and that extra-judicial 
sources or telephone inquiries might be utilized to obtain lists of 
prior convictions. 57 The lack of standards for the reporting of prior 
convictions led the court to conclude that it was even possible that 
convictions unrelated to the defendant might be mistakenly attrib-
uted to him. 58 
The information provided by the discovery of a prior conviction 
is often minimal. If the record indicates that the offender has previ-
ously been convicted of assault, the question remains whether the 
underlying incident involved an intra-family dispute, a minor tavern 
brawl, or a serious case of armed robbery that was plea-bargained 
down to the lesser charge of assault. To obtain the supplementary 
information necessary to evaluate the seriousness of prior crimes, the 
probation officer may rely upon such questionable sources as the 
prosecutor's file or the memory of local law enforcement authorities. 
If the prior conviction was in juvenile court, the actual offense may 
remain concealed under the standard statutory labels of "juvenile 
delinquency," "wa)"vard child," or "person in need of supervision."59 
b. Arrest records. Despite the criticisms of model codes and com-
mentators alike,60 arrest records are universally utilized in sentencing 
in the United States.61 Unlike conviction records, arrest records 
55. United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126, 130 n.8 (3d Cir. 1972). 
56. 464 F.2d at 128 n.4. 
57. 464 F.2d at 127-28 & n.4. 
58. 464 F.2d at 129. For a description of an incident in which such a mistaken 
attribution of conviction records occurred, see Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking 
and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 834 n.107 (1975). 
59. Because, prior to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), a lesser standard of proof 
was required in juvenile court, there is also less assurance in the case of a prior 
juvenile conviction that the offender was truly guilty. In general, experts have ex-
pressed "almost universal dissatisfaction with the accuracy of official records on delin-
quency." Erickson & Empey, Court Records, Undetected Delinquency and Decision-
Making, 54 J. CRI11r. L.C. & P.S. 456, at 456 (1963). 
60. See ABA PROBATION STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 2.3, at 37; Hess & LePoole, 
Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
494 (1967). 
61. Virtually all the standard probation manuals agree that an essential element 
of the pre-sentence report is a section discussing prior arrests and law-enforcement 
contacts. See, e.g., P. KEVE, supra note 6, at 77. See also R. DAWSON, supra note 6, at 
27-30. To date, the case law has not placed substantive limitations on the use of 
arrest records in dispositional decision-making. See Jones v. United States, 307 F.2d 
190, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (sanctioning the use at sentencing of an arrest record not 
leading to a conviction). The first signs of a counter-trend are, however, visible in 
the recent case of Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed in notes 
272-75 infra and accompanying text. 
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indicate no more than an encounter with the law. Yet, these records 
are relevant to the pre-sentence inquiry only if they are viewed as 
evidencing the guilt of the defendant. Objections to their use as 
a factor in dispositional decision-making can be summarized as 
follows: Arrest data as currently available are generally incomplete 
or inaccurate; even if the data were updated regularly, their use in-
vites false comparisons and produces discriminatory results; use of 
arrest data initiates the "labeling" process by which marginally 
delinquent individuals are turned into confirmed criminals. 
Whatever probative value arrest records might possess is initially 
undercut by the manner in which data concerning arrests are re-
corded and maintained. Typically, the search for a prior arrest record 
is pursued through the FBI's national criminal-history databank or 
a similar state network, such as the New York State Identification 
and Intelligence System. Yet, as one federal court noted, the FBI 
lacks the capacity to determine systematically the subsequent dis-
position afforded the arrest.62 Thus, if a defendant is subsequently 
exonerated of a charge, or the prosecution dismisses for lack of evi-
dence, this information might well go unrecorded. 
The sheer volume of the ambiguities created by the failure 
to expunge records of arrests not followed by a conviction is best 
illustrated by the FBI's mm statistics. For 1973, FBI records indicate 
over nine million arrests. Of the adults arrested for FBI Crime Index 
offenses, approximately thirty-eight per cent were not convicted of 
the alleged crime or a lesser included offense; of the juveniles arrested 
about half neither had formal charges preferred against them nor were 
referred to juvenile authorities.63 Thus, in 1973 alone, several million 
arrest-only entries were lodged in police files across the country. Esti-
mates of the number of individuals already having a nontraffic arrest 
record range as high as fifty million. 64 One study predicts that 50 
per cent of American males will acquire a nontraffic arrest record at 
62. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court continued: 
"There are no controls on the accuracy of information submitted by the contributing 
agencies." 498 F.2d at 1026. Most criminal record bureaus have not made any attempt 
to segregate or withhold arrest data known to be incomplete or stale. DATADANKS, 
supra note 30, at 387. 
63. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1973, at 84-35 
[hereinafter REPORTS 19x."<]. See DATABANKS, supra note 30, at 387 (estimates 3.5 million 
annual arrest-only entries). In 1974, the FBI's criminal identification files contained 
approximately 19 million sets of fingerprints. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1021 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). 
64. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult 
Offenders, 1966 WASH, U. L.Q. 147. 
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• some point in their lives,65 and that the probability for a black urban 
male may be as high as 90 per cent. 66 
There have also been indications that the information recorded 
in state and federal criminal-history databanks is of dubious reli.;.' 
ability. Professors Westin and Baker have reported that at the time 
the FBI computerized its files, thirty-eight per cent of existing war-
rants were discovered to be outdated or invalid. 67 Similar levels of 
inaccuracy were detected when the New York State Identification 
and Intelligence System computerized its criminal history records. 68 
Mistakes have also been found to occur because of the tendency for 
a single incident to acquire multiple listings as separate entries are 
made at each stage of the criminal prosecution (arrest, indictment, 
conviction, and sentencing) with the result that one offense is magni-
fied into several. a9 
Given the ubiquity of arrest records (and the strong likelihood 
that a far greater number of citizens have committed offenses that 
would support an arrest70), the question must be asked: what do 
arrest records actually measure? Depending on who is being com-
pared with whom, it is at least arguable that they measure not culpa-
bality but differences in the level of police activity and style of 
record-keeping between localities.71 The initial fallacy in the assump-
65. INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
223 (1967) [hereinafter SCIENCE &: TECHNOLOGY REPORT]. The report was made to the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which 
cited the figure as 40 per cent. See PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
Al>MINISTRATION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 237 (1967) [hereinafter 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME]. 
66. SCIENCE &: TECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 65, at 224. 
67. DATABANKS, supra note 30, at 298. 
68. Id. Also relevant in this context was the experience of New York City when 
it sought to update its police intelligence files on suspected extremists and found that 
a high proportion of the data stored was "cryptic" to the point of uselessness. See 
note 93 infra. 
69. P. KEvE, supra note· 6, at 77. 
70. Indeed, whatever the number of citizens who have been arrested or convicted, 
self-reporting studies reveal that the majority of citizens, when given anonymity, will 
admit to the commission of a surprising number of illegal acts. See Chambers &: 
Nakaswa, On the Validity of Offidal Statistics: A Comparative Study of White, Black 
and Japanese High School Boys, 6 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME &: DELINQUENCY 71 (1968); 
Erickson &: Empey, supra note 59. 
71. Styles of police record-keeping can significantly affect the comparative appear-
ance of individuals with identical histories. In general, the practices of different police 
departments with respect to reporting arrest records to the FBI and state databanks 
vary greatly. See Fishman, Expungement of Arrest Records: Legislation and Litigation 
to Prevent Their Use, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 725, 728 (1973). Relevant areas in which 
police practices vary include: whether juvenile records are included on the "rap sheet" 
or kept confidential, see Ferster &: Courtless, The Beginnings of Juvenile Justice: 
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tion that arrest records prove at least some degree of culpability is the 
premise that the police arrest individuals only to initiate criminal 
prosecutions. In fact, most studies of the arrest process have identi-
fied a number of factors motivating the decision to arrest that are 
wholly unrelated to a desire to initiate a criminal prosecution. 
Among these are the desires to maintain respect for the police, pre-
serve an image of aggressive law enforcement, gather evidence 
through arresting the "usual suspects," enforce the arresting officer's 
concept of public morality, punish individuals suspected of other 
crimes, and protect the subject of the arrest.72 One authority has 
estimated that as many as one-third of the total arrests made each 
year are for trifling offenses, such as public drunkenness, in which no 
attempt is made to prosecute the accused. 73 Most important of all, 
there is evidence that once an individual acquires even a single arrest 
record, he becomes "arrest-prone" and is statistically likely to acquire 
a lengthy record of subsequent arrests.74 
An equally serious criticism of the probative value of arrest 
Police Practices and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REv. 567, 571 (1969), whether 
alcoholism, similar disorderly conduct, and vagrancy arrests are memorialized, and 
the extent to which suspicion and dragnet arrests are made. In Menard v, Mitchell, 
430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court noted that in 1961 and 1962, over 6800 per-
sons were arrested for "investigation" in the District of Columbia, of which about 
6000 were released without charges of any kind ever being filed, 430 F.2d at 493 n,39, 
It has commonly been observed that the standards governing police discretion vary 
widely between different police departments. See, e.g., L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE &: 
D. ROTENBERG, DETECI'ION OF CRIME 38-40 (1967) [hereinafter L. TIFFANY], But equally 
important is the fact that police practices will vary even within a single city, with 
more aggressive policies being followed in ghetto and skid-row areas. Id. at xix. See 
also R. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARREsrs 36 (1971); Special Comm. on 
the YDI System of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Staff Report: Juvenile 
Record-Keeping in New York City 77, July I, 1971 (K. McMahon &: N, Dubler eds,) 
[hereinafter YD Study]. Partially as a result of such disparities in police practices, it 
has been estimated that 50 per cent to 90 per cent of American males residing in 
inner city areas have arrest records. See CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 65, at '75, 
Clearly, such statistics should not be taken at face value to indicate that urban males 
engage in more criminal activity than rural males. Indeed, one police administrator 
has estimated that as many as three out of four arrests may not have been based 
on the constitutionally required "probable cause" standard. See M, HOUTS, FROM 
ARREsr TO REI.EASE 24 (1958), cited in Fishman, supra, at 727. 
72, w. LAFAVE, ARREsr 144-52, 437-82 (1965): L. TIFFANY, supra note 71. 
73. Morris, Politics and Pragmatism in Crime Control, 45 F.R.D. 183, 191 (1968), 
Morris estimates that arrests for drunkenness total approximately 2 million a year, 
See also R. NIMMER, supra note 71. 
74. For a discussion of how individuals can become "arrest-prone" simply on the 
basis of a single prior arrest record, see Neier, Have You Ever Been Arrested1, N.Y. 
Times, April 15, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 16. According to expert testimony presented 
in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), a person who has been arrested once tends to accumulate 
additional arrests. The lifetime average for such a White male is 7, and for a Black male, 
12.5. Neier, supra, at 44. In particular, arrest records result from the police practice 
of "rousting," i.e., the process of "rounding up the usual suspects" in order to obtain 
August 1975] Sentencing Reform 1381 
records stems from evidence suggesting that the decision to record 
a police-citizen encounter in the form of an arrest record is highly 
discriminatory in that the status and demeanor of the subject are the 
critical variables.75 The pattern associated with the "suspicion" 
arrest exemplifies this phenomenon. In Gregory v. Litton Systems, 
lnc.,76 a federal district court, noting the disproportionate percentage 
of "suspicion" arrests made in the case of Blacks, held that the use of 
arrest records by private employers was illegally discriminatory.77 
Although Blacks represented only eleven per cent of the population, 
they accounted for uventy-seven per cent of the total arrests made 
annually, including forty-five per cent of "suspicion" arrests.78 Yet 
such arrests rarely, if ever, resulted in prosecutions.79 
Statistics of this kind suggest that at the heart of the problem of 
who acquires an arrest record and who does not is the classic problem 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy: On the premise that the poor or mem-
bers of minority groups are more likely to engage in criminal ac-
tivity, police discretion is exercised more stringently against them, 
and the resulting disparity in arrest records between middle-income 
citizens and members of these groups is then cited as evidence of 
their past criminality in the event they ever reappear in the criminal 
justice system. 
Yet, it is not only the poor or members of a minority group 
leads to crimes. See Lemert, Records in the Juvenile Court, in ON REcoRD, supra note 
30, at 380-81. Thus, once one is identified as a suspect, repetition of the arrest pattern 
becomes foreseeable. 
75. See Pilavian & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 206 
(1964). For official recognition of the discriminatory impact of such practices, see DEFT. 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, REcoRDs, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 
243 (1973) [hereinafter RECORDS, COMPUTERS]. 
76. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). 
77. 316 F. Supp. at 403. 
78. 316 F. Supp. at 403. See also Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), 
modified on other grounds, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
950 (1972) (enjoining the consideration of arrest records in municipal hiring); Menard 
v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 493 & n.38, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Cf. W. LAFAVE, supra 
note 72, at 287-88. 
In asserting that Blacks account for 45 per cent of all annual "suspicion" arrests, 
the Gregory court employed statistics from an abnormally high year. FBI records show 
approximate rates of 45.3 per cent for 1968, REPORTS 1968, supra note 63, at 118, 
44.3 per cent for 1969, REPORTS 1969, supra, at 120 (presumably the most recent sta-
tistics available to the Gregory court), 29.8 per cent for 1970, REPORTS 1970, supra, 
at 131, 28.3 per cent for 1971, REPORTS 1971, supra, at 127, 35.2 per cent for 1972, 
REPORTS 1972, supra, at 131, and 33.9 per cent for 1973, REPORTS 1973, supra, at 133. 
While the court's exact statistic was thus above the average for recent years, the 
court's conclusion that Blacks account for a disproportionate percentage of "suspicion 
arrests" was clearly correct. 
79. One study cited by plaintiffs in Gregory showed that 98 per cent of "suspicion" 
or "investigation" arrests were never prosecuted. Neier, supra note 74, at 45. 
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who may be subjected to a false comparison by the use of arrest 
records. Studies have noted that wide variations exist in the style 
and extent of the records maintained between rural and urban police 
departments, and between middle-income and poverty-area police 
units.Bo .AJ,, a consequence, the danger exists that when dispositional 
authorities attempt to compare the pre-sentence histories of offenders 
on the basis of prior arrest records, they succeed only in comparing 
different styles of police record-keeping. 
A final reason for expunging records of arrests not followed by 
conviction from the pre-sentence report is supplied by the "labeling" 
theorists.B1 These theorists argue that once an individual is labeled a 
"delinquent" or "criminal" not only do future decision makers 
interpret the data before them to confirm and reinforce the pre-
existing label, but the labeled individual himself begins to assume 
the role attributed to him.B2 Indeed, some experimental findings 
suggest that police records play a determinative part in the process 
by which the marginal delinquent matures into the role of a con-
firmed recidivist.B3 
80. Ferster & Courtless, supra note 71, at 571. 
81. Standard sources on "labeling theory" include V. EISNER, THE DELINQUENCY 
LABEL (1969); E. LEMERT, SocIAL PATHOLOGY (1951); Faust, Delinquency Labeling: 
Its Consequences and Implications, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 41 (1973); Payne, Nega• 
tive Labels: Passageways and Prisons, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 33 (1973); Wheeler 
& Cottrell, The Labelling Process, in SOCIETY, DELINQUENCY AND DELINQUENT BE• 
HAVIOR (H. Voss ed. 1970). 
82. Payne, supra note 81, at 34 ("[P]ositive and negative labels often occur before 
and lead to the behavior consistent with that label. • • . [N]egative behavior [is cre-
ated] by negative labels"). The dangers of premature labeling have also been recog-
nized by the President's Commission: "Official action may actually help to fix and 
perpetuate delinquency in the cltild through a process in whiclt the individual begins 
to think of himself as delinquent and organizes his behavior accordingly." CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME, supra note 65, at 80. See also E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 254-56 
(1968). 
Labeling theorists have concentrated on the effect suclt "pre-delinquency" predic-
tions have on the subject's self-image. Other commentators have emphasized the cor-
responding effect of suclt predictions upon the behavior of decision makers and have 
suggested that officials tend unconsciously to use suclt labels to distinguish the offender 
from the "ordinary" citizen and so deal with him more harshly. See note 107 infra 
and accompanying text. 
The dangers of labeling have begun to receive some judicial recognition. In Mer-
riken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the district court found that the 
circulation of certain educational records relating to a drug prevention screening 
program created "the risk that the • • • Program will operate as a self.fulfilling 
prophecy in whiclt a cltild labeled as a potential drug abuser will by virtue of tlte 
label decide to be that which people already think he or she is anyway." 364 F. Supp. 
at 915. Based upon this and certain other dangers relating to record-keeping and the 
lack of adequate disclosure of the risks, the court enjoined the creation and circu• 
lation of the records at issue. 364 F. Supp. at 919-20. 
83. Sociologists Gold and Williams studied two groups, each consisting of 35 indi-
"iduals, over an extended period. Both groups, cltosen and "matclted" from a sample 
of 847 individuals, had similar backgrounds and had committed similar crimes, but 
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In defense of the present use of arrest records in sentencing, two 
arguments can be raised: first, the enlightened judge gives little, if 
any, weight to arrest-only entries;84 and, second, although a single 
arrest record may be meaningless, a lengthy string of such records is 
persuasive evidence of criminality. The first argument would seem 
to fall of its mm weight-if "arrest-only" records are not considered 
by decision makers, their exclusion from the pre-sentence report 
should have little negative effect on legitimate law enforcement 
interests. Moreover, the premise that arrest records are inconse-
quential is inconsistent with the express numerical weighting given 
a prior arrest in prediction tables now used by dispositional au-
thorities85 and with the evidence of the devastating impact arrest 
records have when discovered by potential employers in the private 
sector.86 
The second argument ignores the statistical evidence that a single 
arrest leads to multiple arrests because the individual becomes 
"arrest prone": If a subject's record shows only arrest entries and not 
convictions, this may indicate not recidivism, but a pattern of selec-
tive law enforcement. Moreover, if arrest reports are intermixed with 
the members of one group had acquired police records while the members of the 
other group had not. Subsequently, members of the first group committed a greater 
number of crimes than members of the second group. As a result, the tentative con-
clusion was drawn that the experience of apprehension and the attendant labeling 
accultured the latter group to the role of delinquency. Gold &: Williams, National 
Study of the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 3 (1969). Cf. 
R. ROSENTHAL 8: L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1968) (research involving 
student performance and official expectations). 
84. See E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING 44-45 (1961). Edward Green's 
study, researched in 1957, was limited to practices in one court (the Philadelphia Court 
of Quarter Sessions). A statistically more sophisticated study undertaken by The Wash-
ington Law Review in 1971 of superior court judges in the State of Washington con-
cluded that "the number of [the defendant's] prior arrests (particularly felony arrests) 
rather than convictions" was "an influential element" in the sentence assigned. See 
Comment, Discretion in Felony Sentencing-A Study of Influencing Factors, 48 WASH. 
L. REv. 857, 871 (1973). Indeed, no factor was identified as having a higher positive cor-
relation to a decision to incarcerate than the number of defendant's prior felony 
arrests. Id. at 869. 
85. For a description of such a table see McGee, supra note 37. While such tables 
are still infrequently used by sentencing judges (as opposed to parole boards), they 
appear to have been devised in part as an attempt to codify existing informal stan-
dards for the assessment of the offender. 
86. See Schwartz &: Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROB. 133, 
134-38 (1962) (showing, on the basis of a survey, that avo-thirds of the potential 
employers questioned would not consider a prospective employee with a single arrest 
for assault even where the arrest was followed by an acquittal). While it is arguable 
that judges are able to ignore what private employers evidently cannot, the burden 
of proof clearly should rest on those making such an argument. In some jurisdictions, 
the sentencing judge is required in cases of serious crimes to receive a report on the 
offender's prior arrest record before passing sentence. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM, PRO. LAW 
§ 390.10 (McKinney 1971). 
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records of convictions, exclusion of the arrest records would hardly 
blind the judge to the offender's past history. Only where the arrest 
reports stand alone without subsequent convictions are they likely to 
affect materially the assessment of the offender, and it is exactly in 
such a case that the inference of guilt is most unfair.87 
c. Investigative and intelligence reports. Investigation of the de-
fendant's activities for information that can be used to impute 
criminal behavior may encompass records even less reliable than 
arrest records. Police files contain large amounts of anecdotal and 
evaluatory information, gathered either in the course of investiga-
tions of specific crimes or by intelligence units. Probation guide-
books and official manuals exhort the probation officer to consult 
such sources to learn the defendant's "general reputation" in the 
community.88 A recent survey of the criminal-history databanks 
maintained by state and federal authorities found a "virtually un-
limited concept of what personal information should and would be 
collected"89 in such files: "[I]nformation was regularly collected on 
such intensely private matters as the subject's finances, day-to-day 
movements, sex life, associates, and political beliefs."00 Indeed, in 
Menard v. Sax be, the court of appeals found: "If the form is correct, 
87. This does not mean that only convictions should be discussed in the pre• 
sentence report. Some exceptions should be noted: the defendant may have confessed, 
or overwhelming evidence may have existed to support the charge, but the defendant 
was not prosecuted because of a more serious pending prosecution against him. In 
addition, some offenses, such as prostitution, may ordinarily go unprosecuted. What 
should be excluded is not specific information of involvement in a prior crime (if 
such information could be presented in reliable form and the defendant given an 
opportunity to rebut), but rather the neutral fact of the offender's prior arrest, Thus, 
information in organized crime files should be available if it can be substantiated. At 
present, with the exception of organized crime files, it seems unlikely that criminal• 
history information is preserved with sufficient specificity to meet this standard. 
88. Paul Keve, a leading authority on probation work, defends the practice as 
follows: 
It seems to be generally accepted that the prior record section should include 
discussion of unofficially known delinquent or antisocial tendencies. In a great 
many cases you will hear tales of probable unlawful conduct which has not been 
officially tagged as such. The police will tell you of times that they have had 
strong reason to suspect your defendant but could not quite pin anythmg on him. 
A store owner, a neighbor, or a landlord may tell of times when your man 
cheated, fought, stole, or did other dishonest or disorderly things when no actual 
arrests were made. These need to be reported here and no apology needs to be 
made for the fact they are not official or completely verified reports. 
P. KEvE, supra note 6, at 77. Another leading probation manual recommends a similar 
procedure and advises the probation officer to ask local police officials about the defen-
dant's general reputation. PRESENTENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11. 
89. DATABANKS, supra note 30, at 245. 
90. Id. Similarly, the director of the New York State Identification and Intelli-
gence System has reported that his agency had "carte blanche" to search the files 
of other state agencies for information it considered pertinent. Gallatti, The New 
York State Identification and Intelligence System, in INFORM,\TION TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 34, at 45. 
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the FBI will place in its criminal files virtually any information from 
local agencies arguably related to criminal activity."91 
Because such files are not primarily concerned with actual inci-
dents (as arrest records at least are), the information and assessments 
contained in them have a tendency toward vagueness and are often 
not substantiated by specific detail.92 On examination years later, 
much of this information can only be characterized as "cryptic."93 
As in the case of arrest records, practices vary ·widely from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction;9"' thus, the amount of adverse information re-
corded about an individual in such files may be as much a function 
of his exposure to the record-keeping process as it is a function of his 
own conduct. Methodologically, the information acquired is regu-
larly recorded without editing or verification. 
The latest and perhaps most ominous development in the area 
of police records has been the computerization of raw investigatory 
reports and the resulting creation of "status" codes. In their study of 
the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, Professors Westin and 
Baker found that police intelligence data in that city had been com-
pressed into single-word labels, such as "militant," "homosexual," 
and "mental."95 The initial impression received by an official using 
a computer terminal to ascertain an individual's background might 
thus consist of a pejorative and ill-defined conclusory label that was 
totally devoid of factual substantiation. 
d. Juvenile records. Juvenile police records represent the ex-
91. 498 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted). 
92. Acknowledging these criticisms, the Fourth Circuit has ruled that allegations 
of criminal activity should not be included in a pre-sentence report unless referable 
to an "official record," apparently meaning arrest and conviction records. Baker v. 
United States, 388 F.2d 931 (1968). In Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 
the court construed 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970) as precluding the FBI from maintaining 
in its central criminal-file records of encounters with law enforcement agencies that 
did not result in arrest. 498 F.2d at 1029-30. 
93. When in 1973, after pressure from civil liberties groups, the New York Police 
Department undertook to curtail its intelligence files on political extremists, it dis-
covered that its "public security matters" files had burgeoned to include 1,220,000 
entries. After review, over 80 per cent of these names were deleted, because, according 
to First Deputy Commissioner William Smith, the references to them were either out 
of date or "so cryptic as to be useless." N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1973, at 70, col. 2. 
94. Some cities, such as Milwaukee and Detroit, have regular procedures for the 
reporting of field interrogation reports, while others do not. See L. TIFFANY, supra 
note 71, at 73-80. See also LAFAVE, supra note 72. 
95. DATABANKS, supra note 30, at 80-87, 98-99. In 1971, some 600 individuals were 
listed under the designations "militant," "activist," and "mental" in the files of the 
Kansas City Police Department. Id. at 85. These files were accessible to law enforce-
ment officials using a regional computer network that operated throughout much of 
Kansas and Missouri; during 1970, inquiries to this databank averaged 8000 a day. 
Id. at 81. A related system is in operation in New Haven, Connecticut. Id. at 98. 
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treme example of an all-inclusive approach to data collection.Do Be-
cause pre-delinquency statutes eliminate the need for a triggering 
criminal offense,97 the individual police officer is generally free to 
record in the form of an arrest or similar record virtually any activity 
or attitude that he deems to be "misconduct" on the part of a 
juvenile.98 One commentator has estimated that about half the cases 
before the juvenile courts of a large metropolitan county involved 
behavior that would not be criminal in the case of adults.DD Yet the 
police files recording such instances of "misconduct" are not kept 
confidential (as are juvenile court records) and are generally available 
even years later to both juvenile and adult authorities.100 
Symp.tomatically, the attempt to increase the scope of police 
records in the case of juveniles has been accompanied by a substan-
tial deterioration in the quality of the data recorded. Efforts designed 
to identify the first sign of incident delinquency have resulted in the 
overloading of police record systems; more data is collected than can 
be intelligibly stored, assessed, or transmitted. An illustration is sup-
plied by a 1971 official study of New York City's procedures for 
handling juvenile police records. Examining a system in which over 
50,000 police reports (known popularly as "Y.D. cards") were annu-
96. For descriptions of the unique character of juvenile police records, see A. NEIER, 
supra note 30, at 48-56; Coffee, supra note 30; Lemert, Records in the Juvenile Court, 
in ON REc:oRD, supra note 30, at 355; Note, Juvenile Police Record Keeping, 4 CoLUM, 
HUMAN RIGHTS L. R.Ev. 461 (1972). 
97. Under a variety of descriptions-"person in need of supervision," "wayward 
child," "beyond parental control''-many juvenile court statutes make justiciable con-
duct that would not be criminal if committed by an adult. See S. Fox, supra note 
46, at 38-42. 
98. For a critique of the kinds of data justifiably recorded and preserved in police 
files under such statutes, see Note, California's Predelinquency Statute: A Case Study 
and Suggested Alternatives, 60 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1163, 1170-'14 (1972), See also Note, 
supra note 96, at 467. 
One report, a detailed examination of the process by which juveniles acquired 
police records in New York City, stated that "[r]egardless of offense, if the child was 
disrespectful or defiant, he was more likely to receive a card." YD Study, supra note 
71, at 28. As that report emphasized, the absence of substantive standards governing 
the record-issuance decision invited selective law enforcement and made comparisons 
among juveniles based on such data highly unreliable. Id. at '11-79. 
Several commentators have found that the pre-delinquency threshold of attention 
authorized by pre-delinquency statutes has particularly discriminated against the 
female juvenile, since it permits the police and the judiciary to focus on sexual activ-
ities that would be ignored in the case of a male. See, e.g., Gold, Equal Protection 
for Juvenile Girls in Need of Supervision in New York State, 17 N.Y.L.F. 5'10 (1971). 
99. Morris, supra note 73, at 191. Nearly one-half of the over 50,000 Y.D. cards 
issued in New York in 1969 were "issued for behavior which, exercising discretion 
differently, might not have been administratively acted upon.'' Hanna, Zeitz &: Ferns, 
A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of YDl Cards Issued in 1969 in YD Study, 
supra note '11, app. A, at 41. For example, if a juvenile were disrespectful, he might 
receive a Y.D. card for a "dropped gum wrapper.'' YD Study, supra, at 80-31, 
100. R. DAWSON, supra note 6, at 28-30. 
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ally filed with respect to various forms of juvenile "misconduct," the 
study found that only 60 per cent of the records examined contained 
a specific statement of the alleged misconduct.1ll1 Moreover, in order 
to simplify data handling, the information first recorded by the 
observing police officer was later condensed by record clerks into 
simplistic coded offense categories such as "harassment," "disorderly 
conduct," and "loitering." These vague categories often encompassed 
both serious and trivial offenses.102 When the data were disseminated 
by the police to probation officials, it was generally only this latter 
code that was released; often, in fact, only the number of past police 
reports on file would be requested by probation officials.103 , As a 
result of this fragmentary transmission of data, the study con-
cluded, a false equation was easily drawn by dispositional authorities: 
A "spate" of such reports was equated with a "trouble-oriented 
child,"104 although it was equally likely that these reports indicated 
only that police were keeping a "tight rein" on a specific area or 
that the youth's attitude "grated on the police."105 The result was 
"sloppy decision-making."106 
These findings underscore a problem that pervades the use of 
police records not leading to a conviction. Without providing dis-
tinctive information, such records reinforce what some criminolo~ 
101. Coffee, supra note 30, at 583. The author was attorney for plaintiffs in a law-
suit, Cuevas v. Leary, Civ. No. 70-2017 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 21, 1970), challenging the 
manner in which Y.D. data was disseminated to a variety of public agencies, including 
the probation department. Following the Y.D. Study (which was conducted by the 
Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council pursuant to a stipulation in Cuevas 
in order to investigate the principal allegations in the complaint), the lawsuit was 
settled on the basis of a final stipulation that, among other restrictions, denied access 
to Y.D. reports to probation officers conducting pre-sentence studies. 
102. The nature of this distortion deserves a further word. Assume a police officer 
observes a group of teenagers, some of whom are annoying a girl. Because no prosecu-
tion is intended he files a report (known as a "Y.D. card") on each juvenile as a warning 
measure. A coding clerk would subsequently review the police officer's one-sentence 
summary and decide under which offense code to characterize the incident. Because 
the offense code chosen by him is often the only information transmitted to the 
probation officer preparing a subsequent pre-sentence report, his choice between 
an innocuous code (i.e., "throwing snowballs," "annoying a passerby") and more 
serious categories (i.e., "assault," "harassment," or one suggesting sexual molestation) 
could cause serious distortion. The New York study found that, as with arrest records, 
the results of follow-up investigations were seldom disseminated to the same persons 
who received the original report. Also, 18 per cent of all Y.D. cards issued were issued 
simply on the complaint of a citizen without police observation or investigation. YD 
Study, supra note 71, at 28. 
103. Cf. YD Study, supra note 71, at 54, 76-77. For a full discussion of the deficien-
cies in the Y.D. system's procedures for handling data, see Coffee, supra note 30, at 
578-89. 
104. Y.D. Study, supra note 71, at 77. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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gists have termed the "we-they fallacy": the idea that the offender 
is somehow markedly different from the ordinary citizen.107 Once 
enabled by such flawed records to conceive of the offender as either 
"sick" or a "habitual" criminal, the decision maker may then deal 
with him far more severely than he would an "ordinary" citizen. 
2. Educational Records 
Recent years have seen an explosive growth in the amount and 
scope of data that public school systems maintain with respect to their 
former pupils.1°8 Concomitantly, the accessibility of this data has 
been .augmented by trends toward the computerization and centrali-
zation of educational records.109 While the school records of the of• 
fender do not appear to be consulted by probation officers with 
the same frequency as police records, probation manuals are unani-
mous in their insistence that the probation officer elicit the offender's 
"student behavior record" and any related "adjustment" data.110 
In contrast to police records, the information found in school 
records is typically more intimate and anecdotal in content,111 and 
107. Porterfield, The "We-They" Fallacy in Thinking About Delinquents and 
Criminals, in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND MODERN PENOLOGY ryv. Lyle &: T. Horner eds. 
1973). See also Szasz, Some Observations on the Relationship Between Psychiatry and 
the Law, 75 AMA ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 297 (1956). 
This "we-they" distinction is also perpetuated by another common aspect of both 
juvenile police records and educational records: the tendency for such records to include 
"pre-delinquency" predictions. Often, based only on a trivial incident or on a tenuous 
assessment of the juvenile's personality, the probation officer, teacher, or police officer 
will include in his report a prediction that the juvenile is a "pre-delinquent" who 
should be watched closely. Thus, in Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 
1973), the label "potential drug abuser" was applied to students, based largely on the 
highly unscientific methodology of distributing questionnaires that asked students and 
teachers to identify students who made "unusual or odd remarks" or who made "un-
usual or inappropriate responses during normal school activities." 364 F. Supp. at 916, 
For a description of the various other means by which such predictions arc made 
and memorialized, see A. NEIER, supra note 30, at 36-47. 
108. See Goslin &: Bordier, supra note 34. To understand the sheer volume of data 
concerning a student, gathered during his progress through the public school system, sec 
N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF Enuc., MANUAL ON PUPIL REcORDS 31 (1967) [hereinafter N.Y. 
STATE MANUAL] (advocating a "record philosophy" of "uninterrupted accession" of 
information about the student from the beginning of his school life). 
109. See Goslin &: Bordier, supra note 34, at 60; Privacy, The Collection, Use, and 
Computerization of Personal Data, Joint Hearings on S.3418, S.36:J!J, S.3116, S.2810, 
S.2542 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Privacy and Information Systems of the Senate 
Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judidary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, 195 (1974) (statement of S. Sallctt, 
Senior Associate, National Comm. for Citizens in Education) [hereinafter Joint Hear-
ings]. 
110. See P. K.EvE, supra note 6, at 103. Keve adds that no other information is as 
"vital" in the case of the juvenile defendant. Cf. GUIDES FOR SENTENCING, supra note 6, 
at 77. 
lll. Anecdotal records (i.e., a sketchy note by a teacher that Johnny seemed "dis-
turbed" one morning, or an accusation that he "molested" a female student) present 
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(at least in the case of the adult offender) far more stale. While such 
considerations do not appear to have given pause to probation 
professionals, educational authorities have begun to express serious 
reservations about the use of such data outside educational channels. 
They have pointed out that such records regularly contain highly 
tentative and contradictory personality evaluations of the student 
that may often include unverified or anonymous accusations of seri-
ous charges.112 One study has found that "thousands of children 
have been labeled as 'predelinquents' in school," and that such 
characterizations have been transferred to police criminal-informa-
tion systems.118 Because of the unparalleled quantity of raw data 
contained in student records, it seems highly unlikely that either 
the probation officer or the sentencing judge is in a position to eval-
uate the information acquired from school files. 
One national conference of educators, convened to consider the 
problems of school record-keeping, has strongly urged that under 
no circumstances should a student's complete file be made available 
without his informed consent. Under their proposed guidelines, 
access would be limited to "verified information of clear impor-
particularly acute problems in the case of educational data. Goslin and Bordier found 
that anecdotal records were permanently preserved (although not necessarily on the 
student's "permanent record form'') in the vast majority of schools they surveyed. Goslin 
&: Bordier, supra note 34, at 7. In addition, in approximately 43 per cent of the cases 
they studied, juvenile court probation officers always had access to the student's entire 
file, including such raw data. Id. at 56. Given the interest of probation manuals in 
locating the earliest date of "criminal activity" in an offender's past as an indicia of 
his potential for recidivism, see GUIDES FOR SENTENCING, supra note 6, at 38, such reports 
may well be given an interpretative gloss never intended by their authors. 
ll2. See A. NEIER, supra note 30, at 17-27. Neier cites instances of the same child 
being given absolutely contradictory personality assessments by different teachers. Id. 
at 21. The clearest statement of the dangers of describing the "whole child" in per-
manently preserved records is to be found in GUIDEUNES FOR THE COLI.ECIION, MAINTE-
NANCE AND DISSEMINATION OF PUPIL RECORDS (1970) [hereinafter PUPIL-RECORD GUIDE· 
LINES], a report prepared by a national conference of educators and related juvenile 
authorities convened under the auspices of the Russell Sage Foundation in 1969 to 
consider the "ethical and legal aspects of school record-keeping." The report em-
phasized the considerable range in the reliability of the data preserved by school 
authorities: "The total set of student personnel data extant in a school at a given 
time ranges from tentative uncorroborated reports on alleged student behavior to 
highly stable information. To illustrate: on one end of the continuum a memo may 
contain a report or allegation that a particular student molested a child, disrupted a 
class, or wept for several hours yesterday; at the other extreme records will show that 
a student has completed grade five • • • • These differing kinds of data require 
differing arrangements for security and access." Id. at 20. 
113. Joint Hearings, supra note 109, at 195 (statement of S. Salett, Senior Associate, 
National Comm. for Citizens in Education). In Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 
(E.D. Pa. 1973), the court expressed considerable doubt about the "confidentiality" of 
educational records that labeled certain students as "potential drug abusers," 364 F. 
Supp. at 920, and noted that such records might eventually come to the attention of law 
enforcement authorities. 364 F. Supp. at 916, 
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tance,"114 and even such restricted access would be preconditioned 
upon the total file of available information being periodically evalu-
ated, updated, and summarized by a committee of school profes-
sionals.115 This compromise makes sense and should serve as a model 
for the resolution of similar problems in the case of welfare data.110 
Neither welfare nor school records are as inherently pejorative as 
police records, and completely foreclosing access to this data might 
cut off a source of redemptive information. However, without in-
ternal editing and evaluation prior to release, the records of any 
agency possessing parens patriae powers are likely to be ambiguous 
and potentially misleading. 
Unfortunately, in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act of 1974,117 Congress has not followed this approach and has 
instead taken an all-or-nothing course. As a condition of the receipt 
of federal funds, all educational institutions must refuse to release 
student records when consent has not been obtained from the stu-
dent or his family,118 unless the student's file is subpoenaed or its 
disclosure is ordered by a court.119 Because of the breadth of this 
exception, the Act promises to have at best limited relevance in the 
ll4. PUPIL-REcoRD GUIDEUNES, supra note 112, at 20. This category would include 
"systematically gathered teacher or counselor ratings and observations, and verified 
reports of serious or recurrent behavior patterns." Id. The guidelines limited the 
availability of even this information to agencies exercising a subpoena power, id, at 
26; yet it is difficult to see why the amount of data available to the probation officer 
should hinge on the procurement of a subpoena. 
115. Id. at 20-21. Except for significant information that could be verified, "uneval• 
uated data" would be destroyed on an annual basis. Id. at 21-22. The conference further 
recommended that even verified information be purged once it becomes dated, Id. at 
24. See also N.Y. STATE MANUAL, supra note 108, at 32-33. Recently, New York City 
bas gone even further, providing parents with an opportunity to challenge and, if 
successful, expunge inaccurate data in school files. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1973, § 4, 
at 11, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
116. Welfare data may contain equally intimate information developed by• case• 
workers through home visits. Such data is generally obtained through "social service 
exchanges," which serve as clearing houses and keep track of an individual's contacts 
with all social agencies. Clearance of the offender's name through such an exchange 
is considered an essential procedure by the federal probation manual. PRESENTENCE 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-21. Welfare databanks appear to include an even greater 
breadth of information, much of it "soft" evaluative information, than do educational 
records, and welfare agencies seem willing in many instances to serve as information 
clearinghouses for other public agencies. See Note, Computerization of Welfare 
Recipients: Implications for the Individual and the Right to Privacy, 4 RUTGERS J. 
COMPUTERS & L. 163, 170-76 (1974). 
Moreover, welfare data, particularly information that an offender has failed to 
support his family adequately, may elicit strongly negative, moralistic reactions from 
some judges. See United States v. Holder, 412 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1969). 
117. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (Supp. Feb. 1975). 
118. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(b)(l) (Supp. Feb, 1975). 
119. 20 u.s.c.A. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975). 
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context of sentencing and parole. If the offender should dare to 
withhold his consent, the probation officer can simply request a 
subpoena from the sentencing court. A more intelligent approach 
to the problems of student records would have been to condition 
the receipt of federal funds upon the adoption of a program for the 
periodic review and updating of verifiable- student data and the 
destruction of stale and unreliable records. Such a program would 
ensure that unreliable information, denied to most other decision 
makers, both public and private, would not remain available to the 
sentencing judge. 
3. Clinical Data 
Psychiatric information about the offender reaches the sentenc-
ing judge either pursuant to a referral to a court clinic120 or to an 
outside psychiatrist, or through the probation officer's discovery of 
pre-existing psychiatric evaluations in the files of public agencies.121 
A dilemma, however, surrounds the use of clinical data: On the one 
hand, it has been observed that judges tend to greet psychiatric rec-
ommendations with an attitude approaching total deference.122 On 
the other hand, the consensus of recent commentators has been that 
the recommendations of the examining clinician are often based on 
little more than casual impressions or clinical hunches.123 Charac-
120. The existence of a specialized court clinic remains the exception rather than 
the rule. See Note, Sentencing: The Good, The Bad and the Enlightened, 57 KY. L.J. 
456, 485 (1969). For general descriptions of the operations of court clinics, see sources 
cited in note 35 supra. In addition to court clinics, specialized multi-state databanks 
for psychiatric records now exist; in general, probation officers have access to such 
records. See A. NEIER, supra note 30, at 76. 
121. Again, use of a pre-existing report raises the problem of staleness. Equally 
important, however, is the question whether the pre-existing report is addressed to 
the principal issue confronting the sentencing judge-the dangerousness of the de-
fendant. The point has been repeatedly made that psychiatric data or evaluations 
tendered in answer to one question (e.g., competence to stand trial, or general social 
adjustment) are misleading if taken as an answer to a different question (e.g., potential 
for violence or recidivism). See Bendt, Balcanoff &: Tragellis, supra note 35, at 371; 
Rosenberg, Competency for Trial: A Problem in Interdisciplinary Communication, 
53 JUDICATURE 316 (1970), 
122. See, e.g., Vann, Pretrial Determination and Judicial Decision-Making: An 
Analysis of the Use of Psychiatric Information in the Administration of Criminal 
Justice, 43 U. DET. L.J. 13, 24 (1965). Professor Dawson has found that parole will 
seldom, if ever, be granted in the face of an adverse psychiatric report. Dawson, The 
Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 253. 
123. Consider the following evaluation by an experienced medical commentator: 
"Too often conclusions given are the result of impressions, intuitions and even 
hunches • • • • The most superficial details seem to suffice to support a decision." 
Meyers, The Psychiatric Examination, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 431, at 431-32 (1963). 
See Roberts, Some Observations on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965 
WIS. L. REv. 240, 243 (noting that "minimal psychiatric evaluation" is often presented 
as a full evaluation). 
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teristically phrased in a style of exaggerated overstatement,124 these 
recommendations have exhibited a significant tendency to err on 
the side of overprediction.120 
A variety of theories have been offered to explain the poor qual-
ity of the clinical reports provided to the courts. Medical commen-
tators have been particularly critical of the reports submitted when 
the patient is referred (as typically occurs) to an outside clinician.126 
The independent clinician usually has had little experience in the 
area of forensic psychiatry and even less in dealing with the mem-
bers of the low-income and minority groups who populate the 
criminal courts. Accordingly, it has been suggested that outside clini-
cians are predisposed to diagnose such patients as abnormal merely 
because they differ significantly from the clinician's usual clientele.127 
The relatively recent development of court clinics, designed to 
serve the judicial decision maker, has not abated criticism: On exami-
nation, observers have found that the constant pressure of heavy 
caseloads has led to the use of assembly-line methods and hasty inter-
views that have ultimately resulted in stereotyped descriptions.128 
While medical commentators have stressed the need for minimal 
diagnostic standards to govern the professional adequacy of clinical 
recommendations made to courts,129 formulation of such procedures 
seems only a partial answer. Standing alone, such procedures are not 
in themselves sufficient because of both the tendency for the lay 
diagnosis fiy the sentencing judge to control later findings, and the 
communications-gap that frequently arises between the judge and 
the clinician. Each of these two factors merits a brief analysis. 
Empirical studies have indicated that a low percentage of the 
offenders who come before the court are referred for psychiatric 
124. See Comment, The Language of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Study 
in Sound and Fury, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 195 (1970), 
125. See Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 
TRIAL, Feb.-March 1968, at 29, 33; Meehl, Psychology and the Criminal Law, 5 U. RICH, 
L. REv. 1, 26 (1970), Cf. Campbell, supra note 35, at 315; Settle & Oppegard, supra 
note 16, at 480. For a survey of recent literature critical of the reliability of psychiatric 
diagnoses see Nietzel, supra note 21. 
126. See, e.g., Heller, Mental Health and Criminal Behavior, 40 F.R.D. 417, 421 
(1965). 
127. Id. at 420-21. 
128. Id. at 421. See also Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Pro-
ceedings, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 383, 385 (1962); Rome, Identification of the Dangerous 
Offender, 42 F.R.D. 185, 186 (1966). 
129. Dr. Heller, for instance, recommends the following as minimal standards: at 
least two lengthy interviews with the subject alone coupled with two joint interviews 
with the subject and his family, a battery of tests, and an evaluation conference in 
which all members of the clinical staff would participate, Heller, supra note 126, at 
421-23. These standards appear to be seldom satisfied under current practice, 
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study.130 The referral decision generally will be based on the judge's 
personal perceptions of what behavior is "normal," and such percep-
tions are unquestionably influenced by the social and economic 
background of each judge. Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect 
a disproportionate referral of offenders whose backgrounds are dif-
ferent from that of the typically middle-to-upper-income judge. On 
referral, the examining clinician will often receive the file contain-
ing the probation officer's preliminary findings and the police and 
educational records, the reliability of which has been criticized above. 
Indeed, the very fact of referral is apt to be interpreted by the clini-
cian as persuasive evidence that the subject is mentally ill.181 Given 
the time and caseload pressures under which the clinician must 
operate, the initial lay diagnosis by the referring judge may prove 
decisive-the psychiatrist may perform only the descriptive function 
of attaching the appropriate clinical label to the alleged symptoms 
recognized by others.182 
The clinician may have a far different conception of the signifi-
cance of the label he has attached to the offender than does the 
court that receives his diagnosis. The literature of sentencing is 
filled with admissions by experienced and sensitive judges that they 
are uncertain as to the substantive meaning of much of the psy-
chiatric information presented to them.183 Psychiatric terminology 
can be highly pejorative, carrying connotations that sound ominous 
to the layman. In addition, random surveys have shown that psy-
chiatrists would apply labels indicating neurosis to a high percentage 
of the general population.134 Thus, dispositional decision makers 
130. In 1969 only five per cent of all defendants in Massachusetts, a state that made 
early use of the court clinic, were referred for psychiatric evaluation. Campbell, supra 
note 35, at 292. 
131. See also Mechanic, Some Factors in Identifying and Defining Mental Illness, 46 
MENTAL HYGIENE 66, 69 (1962). 
132. See also id. at 69-70; Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally 
Ill in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 509. While these 
studies focused on the civil-commitment process, it is likely that the diagnosti-
cian in the sentencing context typically assumes that referral by a public agency is 
conclusive of illness. 
133. See, e.g., Murrah, The Dangerous Offender Under the Model Sentencing Act, 
45 F.R.D. 161 (1967). 
134. A study conducted in Manhattan in the early 1960's concluded that only 18.5 
per cent of the individuals surveyed appeared free of significant symptoms of mental 
pathology. L. SROLE, T. LANGER, s. MICHAELS, N. OPPLER s, T. RENNIE, MENTAL HEALTH 
IN THE METROPOLIS 138 (1962). Arguably, such a study also demonstrates the tendency 
toward overprediction noted earlier. See text at note 125 supra. See also Lanham, Psy-
chiatric Diagnostic Services, 54 F.R.D. 307, 309 (1968) (noting that 75 per cent of the 
patients referred to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia for diagnosis 
were classifiable as suffering from psychiatric disorders). See also text at notes 211-17 
infra. 
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may be drawing false comparisons between the offender who is 
referred for examination and diagnosed as neurotic, and the of-
fender who is not referred and is incorrectly assumed to be "normal.'' 
In short, the current dialogue between clinician and sentencing 
judge leaves too much unsaid.135 Even if the report of the examining 
clinician were disclosed to defense counsel, it would remain impreg-
nable because its basic assumptions, methodology, and theoretical 
foundations are seldom set forth.136 To ensure both judicial compre-
hension and an opportunity for effective rebuttal by defense counsel, 
the report must be communicated in a form that is "attackable.''187 
At a minimum, this would require both expansion and standardi-
zation of the psychiatric report to cover such areas as methodology, 
interview procedures, and a statement of the major diagnostic factors 
relied upon. In addition, it has been suggested that the initial report 
should include a comparative evaluation of the offender in terms of 
such categories as motives, capacity for self-control, need for treat-
ment, and character assets.138 Upon disclosure of such a report, de-
fense counsel should be permitted to submit written questions de-
signed to inquire into the degree of certainty behind the diagnosis, 
the adequacy of the procedures employed, and to determine if any 
redeeming information knmvn to defense counsel would alter the 
original diagnosis. This type of dialogue might be time-consuming, 
but, given the communications problems inherent in psychiatric re-
ports, it seems to be the only alternative to the in-court cross-exam-
ination of the clinician. 
B. The Acquisition Stage: An Overview 
Several problems seem to reappear throughout the data acquisi-
tion stage, regardless of the type of information sought. Analytically, 
most of these problems can be grouped under one of three headings: 
135. The chief communication problem faced by the clinician stems from the fact 
that he is seldom told what the court wants to know: Is he to evaluate competency to 
stand trial, the need for commitment, or latent tendencies towards violence? Cf. l3endt, 
Balcanoff &: Tragellis, supra note 35 (discussing the protocols used to alleviate this 
problem in Massachusetts). 
136. For example, it is generally recognized that there exist divergent schools of 
thought within the psychiatric profession that would produce different diagnoses on 
the same facts. See Roberts, supra note 123, at 244. Disclosure is without meaning or 
effect if such differences remain hidden. 
137. Campbell, supra note 35, at 312. I rely on Campbell for much of the procedure 
recommended at this point. See also Bendt, l3alcanoff &: Tragellis, supra note 35 (dis• 
cussing the need to create formal protocols to govern communications between courts 
and clinicians). 
138. Campbell, supra note 35, at 318-20. 
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(1) problems of data quality, (2) problems of data transmission, and 
(3) problems of parity. 
I. Problems of Data Quality 
In assessing the character of the data assembled during the pre-
sentence investigation, two deficiencies stand out. First, a significant 
amount of the information collected is irredeemably stale: Ancient 
police reports, records of juvenile misbehavior, and educational or 
clinical estimates of the adolescent personality are notable examples. 
All such information ignores the simple truth that, while individuals 
change over time, records remain static. The consequence is the 
appearance of a "Gresham's Law of Information": The bad infor-
mation drives out the good simply because it is easier for the pro-
bation officer to rely upon any prior adverse record than to conduct 
his O"Wn independent investigation of the offender's current status.139 
A second and more important deficiency is the absence of any 
recognition that a record may be adequate for one purpose and woe-
fully inadequate for another. For example, unevaluated anecdotal 
data may be of legitimate use to school officials who maintain 
day-to-day supervision over the individual and yet be highly mislead-
ing when used by dispositional decision makers who are likely to be 
far less familiar with the individual. 
In general, the picture is one of an elaborate data-gathering 
process in which no more than a limited effort is made to ensure 
the reliability of the information collected.140 The basic impression 
that emerges is of a pressure to extrapolate adverse conclusions about 
the offender from relatively tenuous informational resources. The 
reasons for this tendency are less certain. Some commentators have 
emphasized the basically accusatorial orientation that sometimes 
surrounds the pre-sentence inquiry141 and have suggested that the 
probation officer's outlook is distorted by his "role commitment" to 
law enforcement.142 An alternative explanation may lie in the ten-
139. YD Study, supra note 71, at 77. The study found that because recorded 
information was more "accessible," it was "easier and quicker to rely on what purports 
to be a past 'record' than to discover the relevant information from other sources, 
such as interviews with the defendant, his family and those who have continuing 
contact with him." Id. 
140. For a similar conclusion, see R. DAWSON, supra note 6, at 13. 
141. A study of pre-sentence reports prepared for Michigan courts reached the 
following conclusion: "The approach is definitely investigative rather than diagnos-
tic •••• To some professional social workers who viewed this practice, the function 
of the investigators appeared 'prosecutory' with little effort to 'diagnose or make a 
case analysis ••• .'" D. NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 15. 
142. See Hazelrigg, An Examination of the Accuracy and Relevance of Staff Percep-
tions of the Inmate in the Correctional Institution, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 204 (1967) 
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dency of probation guidebooks and manuals to stress the investiga-
tive nature of the probation officer's job, while more or less explicitly 
suggesting that questions of data reliability and interpretation should 
be left to the dispositional decision maker.148 
2. Problems of Data Transmission 
The information collected in the data-gathering process is com-
municated to the court or parole board in an often incomplete and 
sometimes cryptic fashion. Again, this tendency seems partially attrib-
utable to a preoccupation with adverse information. An obvious 
example is the dependence upon FBI arrest records, which generally 
lack information as to subsequent dispositions. Use of such files 
without an attempt to obtain the ultimate disposition of the re-
corded incident evinces an intolerable indifference to the possibility 
of redeeming information.144 Even where dispositional information 
is readily available, some studies have detected a tendency for pro-
bation workers to focus only upon the accusatory information.14G 
A second factor responsible for the fragmentary character of the 
information presented to the dispositional authority is the pressure 
for compression of complex information into simplified evaluatory 
labels. In order to manage large quantities of information efficiently, 
data-handling systems (particularly when computerized) have a ten-
dency to oversimplify by eliminating narrative detail.146 Classic ex-
(an empirical examination of the manner in which the "role commitment" of proba-
tion officers operating in a custodial setting produced "stereotyped perceptions" of 
the offenders with whom they dealt). See also M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 84, 
143. Perhaps the leading example of this tendency is Paul Keve's book, The Proba-
tion Officer Investigates, which justifies tender of unsubstantiated accusations on the 
ground that in the aggregate they show the "aura of reputation" surrounding the 
offender. Keve advises that where the information consists only of rumor and hearsay, 
it should still be included, but should be carefully labeled as such. P. KEvE, supra 
note 6, at 77. This compromise-i.e., include doubtful information but express skep• 
ticism-ignores the probability that the ultimate dispositional authority (be it judge 
or parole board) will assume that the probation officer has already determined that 
the information presented in the pre-sentence report is reliable before including it. 
144. Obtaining up-to-date dispositional information from local courthouse or police 
files (at least those within the same state) would not seem to pose insurmountable 
obstacles and is apparently regularly accomplished in Arizona. See Lobel, The Arizona 
Total Criminal Justice Information and Communications System, IO JURIMETRICS J. 95, 
97 (1970). 
145. Thus, the YD Study found that the results of follow-up investigations con• 
ducted with respect to a YD report were rarely communicated to, or requested by, 
probation officers. YD Study, supra note 71, app. A. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 585-
86. Judge Frankel has reported that probation officers tend to consult only the prosecu-
tion and not defense counsel in their pursuit of dispositional information. M. FRANKEL, 
supra note I, at 28-34. 
146. See Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1041 
n.29 (1971). Some commentators have pointed out that the problem of stereotypical 
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amples of this form of unintended technological distortion were 
discovered in the Y.D. Study. Because of imprecise coding, incidents 
of widely varying character were often found to have been equated 
in their significance. A minor scuffle and a serious assault might each 
have been assigned the same vague, overlapping classification code 
of "harassment." Because, in general, only single-word codes were 
communicated to the probation officer, the information ultimately 
reaching the decision maker was usually imprecise.147 
In short, a consequence of overcompression can be the reduction 
of dissimilar events and incidents into basically fungible units of 
data. Once data are made fungible, the final step is simply to count 
the number of units. Several recent studies of juvenile court prac-
tices have thus discovered that probation workers often engage in 
a practice known as "frequency counting"-police reports on an 
individual are simply counted rather than examined.148 For example, 
a statistical analysis conducted as part of the Y.D. Study found a 
one hundred per cent correlation between the existence of four or 
more prior Y.D. reports on a juvenile and a decision by the proba-
tion officer to refer charges for court action;149 probation officers 
frequently would call police-record custodians and ask only for the 
number of prior reports on a juvenile.150 A 1972 study of Texas 
juvenile-court practices produced similar findings and concluded 
coding did not originate with the computer, and is also prevalent in manual record-
keeping systems. See, e.g., DATABANKS, supra note 30, at 264-66. The basic point is 
that, whether manual or computerized records are involved, the attempt to transmit 
sensitive information in coded form generally involves the loss of important detail. 
Moreover, the translation of raw data into coded categories not only requires extreme 
condensation, but involves an important information-processing stage that is generally 
unsupervised that may involve the making of key evaluative decisions by persons 
who have no contact with the observer who provided the raw data. 
141. Coffee, supra note 30, at 583-85. The procedures used for the coding of Y.D. 
information are not unique, but rather present a paradigm of the problems involved 
in the transfer of information. Another example is the experience of the armed forces 
in using coded discharge numbers, known as "SPN" or "SDN" numbers, which were 
printed on a serviceman's discharge papers. Some 530 different numbers were used; 
such coded numbers might indicate that a serviceman was a "homosexual," a "bed-
wetter," or was discharged for such vague reasons as "criminalism," "unsuitability," or 
"sexual perversion." For example, in 1973, some 21,000 servicemen were discharged 
with coded numbers indicating that they suffered from "character or behavior disor-
ders," The codes, though not disclosed to the former servicemen, were readily made 
known to public agencies and personnel departments of employers. No narrative de-
scriptions of allegations supporting these stigmatizing descriptions were preserved. 
A. NEIER, supra note 30, at 78-80. Thus, rebuttal was effectively impossible. 
148. Copeland, Juvenile Delinquency "Referrals" and Their Effect on Dispositions, 
1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 296 (1972); Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. CruM. 
L.C. &: P.S. 173, 180 (1967). 
149. Coffee, supra note 30, at 586-87. 
150. Cf. YD Study, supra note 71, at 54, 76-77. 
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that the number of prior police reports on a juvenile was the deter-
minative factor in the court's decision to grant or deny probation, 
outweighing even the seriousness of the prior charges.161 Yet this 
study also found the same high level of error and ambiguity in the 
substantive content of the juvenile police reports as was detected 
in the Y.D. Study.152 Thus decision makers in both instances were 
left to count the number of prior reports against some adminis-
tratively determined cut-off level in a system that blurred the dis-
tinctions between a police-citizen encounter and proof of guilt. 
Such "frequency counting" is, however, only one example of dis-
tortion caused by overcompression of sensitive information. Another 
example, reported by Professors Westin and Baker, is police depart-
ment "status codes" on individuals, which consist of terse conclusory 
labels, such as "militant" and "homosexual."163 Still another exam-
ple is the use of single-sentence psychiatric evaluations. In all these 
practices there exists a process of gradual reification: first, a label 
is applied to a complex fact pattern, then, somewhere in the data-
transmission process, the label becomes increasingly divorced from 
the factual summary until ultimately it alone is communicated to 
the dispositional decision maker. 
3. The Problem of Parity 
In practice, sentencing determinations appear to be basically 
comparative: Offender X is measured against offender Y in order to 
determine the appropriate disposition. But, because the theoretical 
goal of individualized sentencing presupposes that each individual 
offender is to be understood in his own unique terms, the pre-
sentence investigator is told to portray his subject in almost novel-
istic detail.154 The consequences of this divergence between theory 
and practice are important. 
A theory that emphasizes maximum data collection may aggra-
vate the danger of false comparisons by magnifying the disparities 
in exposure to record-keeping among individuals. Variations in the 
151. Copeland, supra note 148, at 309-10. Copeland found that juveniles committed 
to institutions averaged 6.4 prior referrals, those placed on suspended commitment, 5,1 
prior referrals, and those given only probation, 2.92 prior referrals. Id. at 307. See also 
Terry, supra note 148, at 180. 
152. Copeland estimated that 46 per cent of the "referrals" that dealt with actual 
violations of the criminal law (as opposed to behavior problems) were "unprovable," 
Copeland, supra note 148, at 309. The content of the referral reports ranged from a 
simple notation that a prior "referral" had been made to a lengthy statement, Id. at 
305. 
153. See text at note 95 supra. Cf. note 147 supra. 
154. See note 158 infra. 
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degree to which an individual's prior conduct will give rise to acces-
sible records depend upon such factors as styles in record-keeping, 
geographic location, selective law enforcement, and the tendency of 
benevolent institutions to pre-select certain individuals for more 
careful observation. Unless the subjects of the inquiry all share an 
equal ~xposure to record-keeping, individuals with identical pasts 
may appear differently. Thus, fairness to the record-prone individual 
requires a normative theory that subordinates the goal of acquiring 
all available information to the need for parity. In turn, the goal 
of parity requires standardization of the types of information brought 
to the attention of the decision maker.155 So long as the reality of 
sentencing practice emphasizes the comparative differences among 
offenders, the uniformity and evenness of the pre-sentence inquiry 
are critical variables. Unfortunately, as we shall next see, these are 
the very variables ignored by the current dominant approach to the 
processing of dispositional information. 
III. THE AssESSMENT OF SENTENCING INFORMATION 
Beyond the problems relating to the quality of the data included 
in the pre-sentence report is the overriding issue whether the present 
pre-sentence report system constitutes an effective and impartial 
means for the communication of essential information from the 
probation department to the dispositional authority. In this section, 
we will look first at the dominant approach to the presentation of 
sentencing information, the social worker's "case attribute" method, 
and then at currently utilized statistical and clinical alternatives. 
A. The Case Attribute Method 
In essence, the "case attribute" approach analogizes the proba-
tion officer to the social worker investigating a client. In the belief 
that facts which may initially seem irrelevant will possess clinical 
significance when viewed in the proper context, the case attribute 
approach asks the pre-sentence investigator to develop and present 
155. Clearly, it would be irrational to allow the comparative appearance of two 
offenders to depend on the relative zeal of their respective probation officers in fer-
reting out prior instances of misconduct. Yet exactly the same "uneven" inquiry re-
sults where individuals are investigated equally, but do not share the same degree 
of exposure to record-keeping. Explicit criteria need to be developed to exclude 
nonessential adverse information that is not approximately equally accessible with 
respect to all offenders. Rather than prejudice the record-prone individual, it seems 
fairer to disregard most pre-conviction data, such as juvenile police reports and 
arrest records, on the ground that such information is fundamentally "uneven," even 
though these records might possess diagnostic significance for the analysis of a single 
offender, standing alone. 
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all the" attributes" of his client in a full-scale profile.158 At its worst, 
this approach amounts to little more than a cut-and-paste technique 
in which every available report or document concerning the subject 
is quoted without regard to internal consistency.157 More typically, 
the probation officer is asked to present a consistent view by adopting 
a novelistic approach to his subject. Standard probation manuals 
exhort the probation officer to portray his subject in vivid, flesh-
and-blood terms in order to make the offender "come to life."11l8 
It is highly questionable whether the average probation officer 
is competent to make the subjective evaluations required by this 
technique.159 According to Judge Marvin Frankel, a "simplistic con-
ventionality" permeates the typical pre-sentence report: If the of-
fender attends church, he is assumed to be a safe risk; if he lives 
with a woman to whom he is not legally wed, he is assumed to be 
amoral and a higher risk.160 Similarly, the probation officer accepts 
156. For a fuller definition of the "case attribute" system see W. REcKLESS, supra 
note 37, at 97-99. Professor Dawson has found that this same desire to collect "every 
piece of relevant information" about the offender, regardless of whether such informa-
tion is regularly available about other offenders, also persists at the parole board level. 
R. DAWSON, supra note 6, at 251. 
157. G. GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 113-14 (1959). Mr. Giardini, Superintendent 
of Parole Supervision for the Pennsylvania Board of Parole, noted that a result of 
such unintegrated pre-sentence reports is the frequent inclusion of contradictory 
statements. 
158. The following representative advice comes from the official federal manual 
on the preparation of pre-sentence reports: "[F]acts alone do not give an account of a 
living person-his character and personality in action. People in the report must come 
to life. Instead of giving an accumulation of cold facts the report should rather 
present a true, vivid, living picture of the defendant." PRESENTENCE REPORT, supra note 
6, at 3. This exhortation to deal "vividly" with what arc highly subjective concepts 
in order to make the portrait of the offender "come to life" has often been repeated 
in remarkably similar language. See P. K.EVE, supra note 6, at 77; Kennedy, The Pre-
Sentence Investigation Report Is Indispensable to the Court, FED. PROBATION, April• 
June 1941, at 3; Sharp, supra note 6, at 484; Wallace, supra note 26, at 437. For a 
skeptical view of whether the subtle nuances sought by such recommendations arc 
meaningful to the decision maker, see Glueck, supra note 11, at 16. 
It cannot be ignored that another reason for the popularity of the case attribute 
system is the professional enhancement it gives to the status of the probation officer. 
Its insistence that the probation officer perform the roles of clinician and novelist in 
describing the offender elevates the probation officer from clerical to "professional" 
stature. 
159. Some of the pre-sentence report deficiencies noted by critics may also result 
in part from the inability of many probation officers to devote the amount of time to 
a report required by the case attribute approach. The President's Commission has 
recommended that a full-time probation officer handle no more than ten pre-sentence 
reports a month. TASK FoRCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 18, As the report 
points out, many probation officers handle substantially more than this number each 
month. 
160. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 34. With obvious restraint, Dr. Gaylin has ex• 
pressed similar criticism: "In actuality, pre-sentence reports are not very good. Those 
that I have inspected would not have been very highly valued in a department of 
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at face value charges passed along to him by the prosecutor, while 
seldom, if ever, consulting defense counsel.161 
A more fundamental criticism of the case attribute approach has 
come from the social scientists who have attacked the assumption 
that the inclusion of all accessible information about the offender 
assists analysis. They have argued that the vast array of detail fre-
quently included in dispositional reports chiefly serves to confuse 
decision-making.162 The Task Force on Corrections of the President's 
Commission summarized the essential elements of this critique: 
Presentence reports in many cases have come to include a great deal 
of material of doubtful relevance to disposition in most cases. The 
terminology and approach of reports vary widely with the training 
and outlook of the persons preparing them. The orientation of many 
probation officers is often reflected in, for example, attempts to pro-
vide in all presentence reports comprehensive analyses of offend-
ers .... In many cases this kind of information is of marginal rele-
vance to the kinds of correction treatment actually available or called 
for. Not only is preparation time-consuming, but its inclusion may 
confuse decision-making.1aa 
When the decision maker is seeking to make comparative judg-
ments about offenders, overinclusion of information poses a con-
siderable danger to those defendants who have received a relatively 
sociology." W. GAYLIN, supra note 6, at 99. For studies critical of the probation 
officer's ability to perceive impartially the offender, see sources cited in notes 141-42 
supra. 
161. M. FRANKEL, supra note I, at 28. Similarly, there is evidence that correctional 
and probation officials rarely listen to or accept the offender's version of certain critical 
facts. See Project, supra note 58, at 835-37. 
162, In Sentencing as a Human Process, Professor Hogarth concluded after con-
siderable empirical research that the pre-sentence report was often not an "effective 
medium of communication" because of its length and complexity. J. HOGARTH, supra 
note 6, at 390. He writes: "The difficulty arises from the fact that the human mind 
has a very limited capacity to deal with a large body of information." Id. at 391. 
Professor Dershowitz has reached a similar conclusion, Dershowitz, Character Tests 
for Law Students, 58 A.B.A.J. 815, 819 (1972), as has the President's Commission. TASK 
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 14. As a computer scientist has phrased 
it, decision makers suffer not so much from the lack of relevant information as from 
an "overabundance of irrelevant information." Ackoff, Management Misinformation 
Systems, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 34, at 264-, 265. Cf. Stuart, Aftermath 
of Apprehension, Social Scientist's Response, 3 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 13, 21 (1969). 
163. TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis added). This 
theme of confusion because of informational overload appears to have been corroborated 
by a number of empirical studies. See W. RECKLESS, supra note 37, at 751; Schuessler, 
Parole Prediction: Its History and Status, in READINGS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 
598 (D. Dressler ed. 1964-) [hereinafter READINGS]. In one of the better known of these 
experiments, experienced parole administrators were unable to outperform either 
inexperienced laymen or random selection when seeking to predict future parole vio-
lators on the basis of undigested case summaries. See Grant, Various Uses of Prediction 
Procedures, in READINGS, supra, at 607, 608-10. 
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more thorough examination of their past lives. While differences in 
the depth of the pre-sentence inquiry may have a decisive impact 
on the relative appearance of different offenders to the sentencing 
judge, this variable of comparability has been ignored by the case 
attribute technique. A study by sociologist Yona Cohn164 of pre-
sentence reports submitted in a New York court illustrates both the 
inadequacy of the pre-sentence report as an instrument for the com-
parative evaluation of offenders and the discretion given the pro-
bation officer to introduce or withhold significant data. Cohn dis-
covered that certain findings in the pre-sentence report, such as the 
probation officer's evaluation of the offender's personality and his 
home life, were more important determinants of disposition than 
the severity of the actual offense. Yet, in a high proportion of the 
several hundred cases Cohn surveyed, the probation officer's report 
was silent on these factors.165 In summary, she found a general spot-
tiness evident in the pre-sentence reports: A probation officer might 
focus on a sensitive factor in one case, and then ignore it altogether 
in the next.166 As a result, she concluded that "the probation officer 
was unaware of the importance of the criteria he was actually us-
ing. "167 The unevenness noted by Cohn flows in part from the em-
phasis placed upon a novelistic approach-word pictures of each 
individual defendant are inherently unstandardized and noncom-
parable.168 
164. Cohn, Criteria for the Probation Officer's Recommendations to the Juvenile 
Court Judge, 9 CRIME & DEUNQUENCY 262 (1963). 
165. Id. at 268-69, 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 273-74. Another study conducted in Northern California lrns also con-
cluded that probation officers tend to communicate information in highly individual 
ways, each tending to base his recommendations on different types and amounts of 
information. Carter, The Presentence Report and the Decision Malting Process, 4 J. 
RESEARCH CRIME &: DELINQUENCY 203-11 (1967). Cf. J. HoGMnr, supra note 6, at 249. 
The study further concluded that, once a tentative decision was reached by the proba• 
tion officer, the officer seemed to utilize only such additional data in reaching a 
recommendation as confirmed his original conclusion. See notes 171, 174 infra. Cf. J. 
HocARnr, supra, at 249. A similar study by British researchers (in which a rep• 
resentative sample of probation officers was tested to see which of various pre-selected 
items of information would influence their recommendations) also reached the disturb-
ing conclusion that the "way in which probation officers seek and utilize information 
in the course of making decisions is more a characteristic of the officers rather than 
the nature of the information." Wilkins &: Chandler, Confidence and Competence in 
Decision-Making, 5 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL, 22-35 (1965), quoted in R. HOOD &: R. SPARKS, 
KEY IssuES IN CRIMINOLOGY 164-67 (1970). Because the sentencing judge has been found 
to rely heavily upon the recommendations made by the probation officer, see note 24 
supra, it has been suggested that variations in sentencing may frequently reflect varia-
tions in the style and approach of different probation officers. R. HOOD &: R. SPAil.KS, 
supra, at 165. 
168, See also TASK FORCE: CoRREcnoNs, supra note 2, at 15. One critic of the case 
attribute system has suggested that its entire process of information-gathering is mis• 
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Ultimately, the central question involves the behavior of the 
sentencing judge or other dispositional decision maker: What is 
their reaction to the wide scope of data communicated to them by 
the case attribute approach? Only recently, with the publication of 
Sentencing as a Human Process by the Canadian sociologist John 
Hogarth, has this question been directly addressed. Hogarth's find-
ings, based on the most extensive empirical investigation of the 
sentencing process yet conducted, are striking. First, he rejects the 
"a priori hypothesis that the pre-sentence report will lead a magis-
trate to come closer to the probation officer's view of the case."169 
In fact, not only do many judges fail to assimilate its contents, but 
they often react negatively to it, and "in doing so obtain a picture 
of the offender which is opposite to that communicated to him by 
the probation officer."170 According to Hogarth's findings, judges 
tend to interpret the data contained in the pre-sentence reports selec-
tively in order to support whatever preconceived attitude they bear 
toward the offender.171 Thus, because each judge is apt to react 
differently to the same data, he concludes, "The notion that magis-
trates can sentence better if they know 'all about' offenders has been 
shown to be a myth."172 In the hands of a judge with a punitive 
penal philosophy, the pre-sentence report serves not as a means of 
individualizing justice, but as a device "to justify sentences that 
would appear punitive if based solely on the offense."173 
guided because it ignores the needs of the decision maker: "Correctional agencies, like 
other social agencies, have two main concerns: keeping case records and making deci-
sions. Both represent ••• expenditures of time and money, but the two activities have 
little influence on each other. The information-collectors are busy describing the whole 
person. The decision-makers are busy trying to cope with a multitude of pressures in a 
field where little systematic study or body of facts is available." Grant, supra note 163, 
at 609-10. 
169. J. HOGARTH, supra note 6, at 261. 
170. Id. 
171. Hogarth states: "It seems that the degree of pathology seen in certain areas 
of the offender's life is associated with selective interpretation of data in the interests 
of resolving conflict which may arise between the facts of the case and what the magis-
trate would like to do by way of sentence •••• The attitudes and penal philosophies 
of magistrates appear to function as filters through which information is perceived 
selectively." Id. at 276. Professor Hogarth's findings seem to confirm a hypothesis 
offered by Professors Hood and Sparks of Cambridge University, who earlier opined: 
"We suggest that it is primarily differences in the way in which information is cate-
gorised and perceived, especially in cases of intermediate gravity where there is obvi-
ously more room for disagreement, which explains disparity in sentencing." R. Hoo» 
&: R. SPARKS, supra note 167, at 159. 
172. Id. at 390. 
173. Id. at 390-91. Judges may have a tendency to use psychiatric evidence to enable 
them to mete out strong sentences about which they would othenvise feel guilty. 
Cf. Szasz, supra note 107, at 310-13. For a discussion of the process by which the proba-
tion officer may help the judge to rationalize a sentence that the judge already wishes 
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Hogarth's conclusion that the pre-sentence report is seldom "an 
effective medium of communication" should not be surprising. His 
specific findings concerning the selective use of sentencing data have 
been foreshadowed by a generation of more generalized research by 
psychologists who have studied the cognitive process by which con-
flicting items of information are resolved. Basically, they have agreed 
that decision makers interpret data so as to emphasize those items 
of information that reinforce their preconceptions and minimize 
those items that conflict.174 This view is applied by Hogarth to the 
sentencing context in the following manner: The sentencing judge 
forms an initial impression of the defendant either at trial or imme-
diately after the issue of guilt is determined; at this point, he has 
identified in his mind the principal issues that will affect his dispo-
sitional decision. Only thereafter is he given the pre-sentence report, 
at a time when his judgment is already substantially predeter-
mined.175 
In summary, the case attribute technique is an impressionistic 
approach, the methodology of which is ill-suited to any practical 
evaluation of the relative risks that different offenders pose. Although 
it has few proponents among those who have studied it in operation, 
it remains (and is likely to remain) the predominant technique for 
the communication of dispositional data. Why? Chiefly because it 
alone offers the participants the illusion that they are dispensing a 
truly individualized form of justice.176 
to impose, and of the possibility that the probation officer may attempt (consciously or 
unconsciously) to anticipate the judge's own attitudes in his pre-sentence report, sec 
A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JusnCE 124-25, 137 (1967), quoted in R. Hoon &: R. SPARKS, 
supra note 167, at 166. 
174. Both the theory of cognitive dissonance, as postulated by Professor Festinger, 
and several related theories (the influence of which are acknowledged by Professor 
Hogarth) suggest that the human mind has an innate drive to maintain consistency 
between its pre-existing attitudes and the information it receives. Consequently, the 
mind interprets information selectively so as to conform as much as possible to its pre• 
existing attitudes. See L. FESI'INGER, A THEORY OF CoGNmVE DISSONANCE (1957); c. 
HOVLAND, I. JANIS &: H. KELLY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953); M. Ror.EACII, 
THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND (1960). For an excellent recent summary, sec H. SCIIR0DER, 
M. DRIVER & S. STREUFERT, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING (1967). 
175. J. HOGARTH, supra note 6, at 229-31. 
176. Gordon Tullock has written that the rehabilitation model of the correctional 
process persists in the face of the mounting critical evidence that it simply does not 
work chiefly because it permits society to maintain a "pleasant" image of the correc• 
tional system. Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 36 Pun. INTEREST 103, 110 
(1974). A quite similar observation has been made by Dr. Gaylin, who writes that the 
continued belief in the "conventional kind of treatment" of the offender "represents 
that massive denial that occurs with frustration." Rather than face despair, society, in 
his view, insists on pretending that an "inadequate" system is "effective." W. GAYLIN, 
supra note 6, at 100. 
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B. The Categoric Risk Approach 
If the major deficiency of the case attribute method is its unscien-
tific dependence on an impressionistic portrayal that cannot be 
compared with other such reports, an obvious alternative would be 
to develop a standardized rating system. Typically, proponents of 
such an approach have urged that it be accomplished as follows: first, 
on the basis of the statistical relationship between a given criterion 
and tabulated recidivism rates, preselect the criteria that are to be 
employed; second, collect only such data as bears on the chosen cri-
teria; and finally, measure each offender in terms of these uniform 
standards. 
The essence of this approach-the "categoric risk" technique-
is to assume not that the facts of each case are unique, but that the 
risk of recidivism is relatively uniformly distributed within groups 
sharing similar characteristics.177 As a result, an individual's risk 
level is to be measured on the basis of his membership in certain 
"population groups." Methodologically, this involves the creation of 
a prediction table that classifies the offender on the basis of various 
social, educational, psychiatric, and criminal-history categories. Each 
category carries a risk level that has been predetermined on the basis 
of empirical studies of the subsequent careers of selected offenders 
who shared the same demographic characteristics.178 Social scientists 
have long argued that the cumulative efficiency of using multiple 
predictive factors and then reducing the results to a numerical rank-
ing would consistently outperform the "separate, isolated impres-
sions" that dispositional decision makers gain from reviewing the 
merits of each case.179 
177. Stuart, supra note 162, at 21. 
178. For an excellent capsule description of the methodology and issues surrounding 
the use of categoric risk prediction systems, see R. HooD &: R. SPARKS, supra note 167, at 
119, 182-86. The authors emphasize that the accuracy and reliability of prediction 
tables "depends entirely on the quality of information which is available about 
offenders," which they find to be "very low," id. at 85, largely because of haphazard 
record-keeping and the uneven availability of information. See also Katkin, supra 
note 6, at 21. 
179. See W. RECKLESS, supra note 37, at 751. See also M. FRANKEL, supra note I, 
at 113-14; M. PAUL'lEN &: S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 113-14 (1962). 
While prediction tables do outperform the results of decision-making based on 
clinical evaluations or intuition, the expectations of their proponents have generally not 
been confirmed when the results obtained from such tables have been reviewed by 
independent researchers. In 1971, the British Home Office sought (as an intended pre-
lude to implementing a probation-prediction system) to analyze systematically the 
results obtained by all major earlier attempts. That study reluctantly concluded: 
"(O]ne of the chief reasons why, although many prediction tables have been con-
structed and much has been written about them, they have still been put to rela-
tively little use may be that for practical purposes their real predictive power is 
usually rather low." F. SIMON, PREDICI'ION METHODS IN CRIMINOLOGY 14 (1971). After 
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In assessing a prediction table, three questions must be asked. 
First, what is really being measured? Second, does this system dis-
criminate unjustifiably against those who are either young, members 
of minority groups, or poor? Third, is it in any event justifiable to 
assign individuals to prison on the basis of morally neutral charac-
teristics that are shared by a great number of individuals who have 
committed no crime? These questions come into clearer focus once 
we examine a typical prediction table. The following "base expec-
tancy table" has been reported to be in current use by the California 
Youth and Adult Corrections Agency and has a maximum score of 
seventy-six; a score of fifty-three or above represents a seventy-five 
per cent chance of success on parole:180 
Factors Points 
An arrest-free period of five years or more . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
No history of opiate use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Two or less jail commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
The charge is not checks or burglary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
No family criminal record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
No alcohol involvement related to offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Not first arrested on auto theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Six or more consecutive months of work for one employer . . . . 5 
No aliases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
First imprisonment under this serial number ........... , . . 5 
Favorable living arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Few prior arrests (zero, one or nvo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
On a brief inspection, it is evident that the foregoing scale can 
produce some strange results: an alcoholic without a single prior 
arrest who passes bad checks could start off behind a previously 
convicted murderer. Similarly, a first offender (in terms of prior 
convictions) who has a prior history of arrests (including an arrest 
reviewing the results of some 40 prediction systems, the report found that it was 
"rare to achieve a correlation of more than .40 between the predicted and observed 
probability of recidivism," id. at 156, and that while such tables could be used cffcc• 
tively to select "small groups of good or bad risks," id., "the accumulated evidence 
suggests that for a large middle range of offenders, it is unlikely that future criminal 
behavior can be predicted to a useful extent from a knowledge of past history." Id. 
at 158. Such research, it concluded, had reached "a point of diminishing returns." Id, 
180. McGee, supra note 37, at 195. For other examples of sentencing tables, sec 
Institute on Sentencing for United States District Judges, 35 F.R.D. 381, 403-04 (1964); 
Stern, Courts and Computers: Conflicts in Approaches and Goals, 58 JUDICATURE 222, 
226-27 (1974); Vondracek, Urban &: Parsonage, Conceptualization and Development 
of a Computer Assisted Diagnostic and Prescriptive System for Juvenile Delinquents, 
4 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS &: L, 86 (1974). 
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for auto theft), and a relative with a criminal record, could already 
be below the important seventy-five per cent success threshold. 
The obvious importance attached by this system to prior arrests, 
coupled with its relative indifference to convictions, indicates that 
the table ultimately measures not the dangerousness of the offender, 
but the relative likelihood that the individual will later come 
to the attention of the criminal justice system. Thus, the alco-
holic who writes bad checks, and thus poses a relatively minor threat 
to society, but who is more susceptible to being apprehended than 
other offenders, may be evaluated more severely than an offender 
previously convicted of violent crimes. Although factors such as 
prior arrests or relatives with a criminal record may not indicate 
individual culpability, they do serve as a fairly accurate measure of 
whether an individual will again come to the attention of the crim-
inal justice system, in part, because these same factors influence 
future police discretion. 
Efforts to design a predictive scale that can identify violent or 
dangerous offenders have not succeeded in producing satisfactory 
statistical relationships.181 For a number of critics, the attempt to 
discover criteria that ·will identify "dangerousness" represents the 
pursuit of a "non-question"-an attempt to define an inherent state 
that they doubt exists.182 In their view, external factors such as the 
rate of unemployment or intense situational pressures are far more 
likely to determine whether an individual becomes a recidivist than 
any internal character deficiency.183 
Even more important than the question of what the statistical 
profile can or does measure is the fundamental question of the 
fairness of its use. The most vulnerable aspect of prediction tables 
is their tendency to assign much higher risk levels to offenders who 
are either young, Black, or poor,184 as opposed to those who are 
middle-aged, White, or middle-class. Many of the factors used in 
181. See McGee, supra note 37, at 196. See also Murrah, supra note 133, at 168. 
A recent summary of the lack of success encountered by researchers attempting to 
predict "dangerousness" is set forth in Morris, supra note 16, at 1164-73. See also 
Diamond, supra note 16. Recently, one federal judge has even found the term "dan-
gerous" as used in the federal dangerous offender statute, 18 U.S.C. 3575(£) (1970), 
to be unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 885-86 
(1974). 
182. See generally Morris, Politics and Pragmatism in Crime Control, 45 F.R.D. 
183, 194 (1968); Diamond, supra note 16, at 447-52. Cf. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra 
note 2, at 78-82. 
183. See Schuessler, supra note 163, at 606. 
184. Proponents of the prediction table have frankly admitted that it adversely 
affects offenders in these categories. See G. GIARDINI, supra note 157, at 138; W. REcK-
LESs, supra note 37, at 98-99. But see Project, supra note 58, at 877 n.329. 
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these tables (for example, level of education, period of unbroken 
employment, legal status of relatives) distinguish the fortunate from 
the unfortunate, but involve no element of personal culpability. 
Indeed, at least one table in use places significant weight on "eco-
nomic information," thus expressly separating the poor from the 
rich and middle-class.185 While it would certainly be unacceptable 
to assign a higher risk level according to race, such criteria in-
directly approximate this result.186 
Prior to 1973, prediction tables constituted at most a footnote 
to any discussion of the problems of dispositional decision-making. 
185. See Stern, supra note 180, at 226-27. The "behavior profile index rating" table 
described by Stern, recently instituted in juvenile court to determine pre• and post• 
trial incarceration, also penalizes the juvenile if a neglect petition has even been filed 
against his parents. A similar theme of "guilt by association" runs through those 
tables, such as the California table discussed in the text at and following note 180 
supra, which penalize the offender if a relative has a criminal record. Outside the 
context of sentencing, courts have been quite willing to find unconstitutional any 
practice by a state agency that involves "guilt by association." See, e.g., St, Ann v. 
Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding unconstitutional the suspension of a stu-
dent because of actions of a relative). For a further discussion of this case, sec note 
196 infra. 
186. In the development and testing of the United States Board of Parole's Salient 
Factor Score, the status of being Black was found to correlate with many of the social 
and economic factors used by the Board to predict parole failure. Project, supra note 
58, at 877 n.329, The experimenters who desigued the Salient Factor Score decided 
not to include race as a factor in classifying offenders partially on "ethical" grounds 
and partially on "mathematical" grounds (since there was a "substantial" degree of 
overlap between race and the other criteria chosen), Id. However, if socioeconomic 
factors having a known high correlation with membership in a particular racial 
group are used, the result achieved will be substantially the same as if race were 
itself used as a factor. In reply to this, it has been argued that the Salient Factor 
Score does not have a discriminatory impact in terms of prison populations since both 
the highest risk and lowest risk groups have apparently somewhat more White than 
Black members on a proportional basis (while Blacks are disproportionately present 
in the middle groups). Id. Two points must be made with respect to this argument: 
First, it is at least arguable that the issue whether a screening device has a discrim-
inatory impact upon a protected class should be judged in terms of its effect on the 
ability of that class to obtain the highest classification. In other words, if the highest 
classification on the Salient Factor Score (i.e., the "Very Good" rating, which results 
from nine to eleven point score) were to a material degree disproportionately White, 
this showing of adverse impact is not necessarily rebutted by demonstrating that the 
lowest classification is also disproportionately White. Second, even if the Salient Factor 
Score does not have a discriminatory impact on the prison population, it docs not 
follow that it will not have a discriminatory impact on the quite different popu-
lation that comes before the sentencing judge. In part because of the impact of plea 
bargaining (which favors the wealthier defendant who has retained experienced pri• 
vate counsel) and the lesser likelihood that middle-class defendants will receive a 
prison term, the racial breakdown of the population of offenders at this stage of 
the criminal process more closely resembles the general population than docs the 
racial breakdown of the population of offenders who are actually imprisoned, In 
short, it seems a likely hypothesis that the population of offenders facing sentencing 
will experience much of the same discriminatory impact as does the general popu-
lation when such racially sensitive criteria as level of education, arrest records, and 
marital status are applied to it. 
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But in that year, the United States Board of Parole adopted a 
"Guideline Table" for parole-release decisions that in essence 
amounts to the formalized use of a prediction table on a national 
scale.187 Under this guideline system, two classifications are made 
with respect to each offender: (I) the actual offense committed by 
the offender is ranked on an "Offense Severity" scale,188 and (2) the 
offender is classified into one of four "risk" groups, depending on 
the rating he receives on a "Salient Factor Score."189 As the following 
abbreviated diagram of the Guideline Table190 shows, each of these 
two scales represents an axis on a matrix that the Board of Parole 
uses to determine191 the range of months within which an inmate 
may be released on parole: 
SALIBNT FACTOR ScoRE 
Offense 
Severity Very 
Rating Good Good Fair Poor 
Low 6-10 8-12 10-14 12-16 
months months months months 
Moderate 12-16 16-20 20-24 24-30 
months months months months 
Very High 26-36 36-45 45-55 55-65 
months months months months 
Using this matrix, an offender who has committed a crime of 
"very high" severity may serve a term as short as 26 months or as 
long as 65 months, depending upon his Salient Factor Score. The 
Salient Factor Score is, in turn, determined by weighing nine pre-
selected personal characteristics of the offender, including such ra-
cially sensitive but morally neutral factors as level of education, past 
employment history, and marital status.192 The impact of the Salient 
187. A comprehensive discussion of the Board's Guideline Table and Salient Factor 
Score is contained in Project, supra note 58, at 822-33. The governing regulations are 
set out at 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.57 (1974). 
188. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974). There are six severity ratings ranging from "low" to 
"greatest." 
189. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974). 
190. The full table is set out in 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974). 
191. While the guidelines are not mandatory and a "clinical evaluation of risk 
may override" the indicated prognosis that the table yields, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(e) (1974), 
recent Board of Parole statistics indicate that between BI and 89 per cent of all 
parole release decisions were within the guideline ranges. Project, supra note 58, at 
869 n.293. 
192. The Salient Factor Score has eleven points. Any score above eight yields a 
"Very Good" parole prognosis rating; a score of six, seven or eight results in a "Good" 
rating. Scores of four or five are rated "Fair"; scores less than four indicate a "Poor" 
parole prognosis. One point is lost if the offender does not have the equivalent of a 
high school diploma; another point is forfeited if he has not had verified employment 
(or full-time school attendance) for at least six months during the past two years. 
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Factor Score on persons who lack a middle-class background can be 
severe, even if they are first offenders. For example, an unmarried 
offender who lacks the equivalent of a high school diploma and does 
not have the requisite prior employment history has already lost 
three points and cannot obtain the most favorable "risk" category 
rating even if he has no prior arrest or conviction record.108 In 
contrast, an offender of middle-class background who has a history 
of prior convictions will lose only two points if he has never been 
incarcerated and at most four points if he has.104 
Two facts quickly become evident upon even a brief examination 
of the Guideline Table: First, its aim is incapacitation, not rehabili-
tation, since it relies exclusively upon "static" factors that exist at 
the time of the offender's conviction and ignores such variables as 
progress toward rehabilitation while in prison;105 and, second, in 
seeking to rank offenders in terms of their marginal risk of recidi-
vism, the Salient Factor Score relies at least as much on information 
relating to the social and economic status of the offender as on 
information relating to his prior misconduct. 
This reliance upon morally neutral criteria in an area where 
human liberty is at stake underscores two earlier-noted issues: can 
the use of such criteria be justified if it selects a disproportionate 
number of minority group members, and to what extent is it justi-
fiable to classify offenders on a basis other than their actual conduct? 
With respect to the first of these questions, the proponents of 
predictive indexes can argue that sentencing inevitably involves 
the making of probabilistic determinations and that their techniques, 
having been scientifically validated, are demonstrably more accurate 
than any other procedures developed to date. Yet, in a system of 
Other factors employed (single marital status, history of drug use, number of prior 
incarcerations and, in particular, young age at first commitment) are also dispropor-
tionately possessed by Blacks in comparison with Whites. See Project, supra note 58, 
at 877, n.329. The factors employed by the Salient Factor Score are enumerated at 
28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974). 
193. Such a defendant can receive at most 8 points and will therefore receive a 
"Good" rather than a "Very Good" classification, See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974), The 
difference for such an offender in the case of an offense of a "Very High" severity rating 
will be a delay of 10 months in the date of earliest parole eligibility (36 months as 
opposed to 26 months for a "Very Good" rating) and of nine months in the date of 
assured release on parole (45 months versus 36). 
194. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974). 
195. Variance from the indicated time ranges is authorized "for cases with good 
institutional adjustment and program progress." 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(b) (1974), On the 
other hand, since the Salient Factor Score is based on the assumption that progress 
toward rehabilitation cannot be realistically judged, it is uncertain to what extent 
this authority is actually used. 
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justice that prides itself on· the irrelevance of social, racial, or eco-
nomic status, predictive efficiency is neither the sole nor the para-
mount consideration. Some safeguards are then needed to minimize 
the discriminatory impact of criteria that, unlike a prior conviction 
or other evidence of misconduct, do not possess independent moral 
authority. While the price paid for such safeguards may be the loss 
of some predictive efficiency (although, as will be discussed later, 
less restrictive alternatives to the use of racially sensitive criteria 
may be available), the ugly alternative is a form of individualization 
increasingly based on status rather than on conduct. 
This then raises the second and more troublesome issue: Even 
apart from the discriminatory impact of such criteria, should there 
not be some limit placed on the ability of the state to classify 
offenders on the basis of factors relating to status rather than to 
conduct?196 Carried to the extreme, this emphasis on status would 
196. It is, of course, possible to argue that constitutional prohibitions on the 
punishment of "status" exist. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Such 
cases, however, seem concerned with (and thus only provide a remedy for) individuals, 
such as drug addicts or vagrants; who fall into certain disfavored social categories. 
To challenge the more generalized use of neutral socioeconomic criteria, at least where 
the use of such criteria does not produce a racially discriminatory impact, it seems 
necessary to find a principle of greater utility than that afforded by Robinson and its 
progeny. One alternative might be the use of what has been termed the "personal guilt" 
doctrine. In Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), the Supreme Court first enun-
ciated the idea that punishment must be based on "personal guilt": "In our juris-
prudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on 
conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or con-
duct to other concededly criminal activity ••. , that relationship must be sufficiently 
substantial to satisjy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 367 U.S. at 224-25 (emphasis added). 
See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 68 (1968); St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1974). 
Concededly, the "personal guilt" requirement is a principle of substantive crim-
inal law and not of the law of corrections. According to traditional doctrine, the 
issue at sentencing is not whether the individual is to be punished, but to ,what 
extent, and, in answer to this latter question, it is permissible to consider factors 
relating solely to his status in so far as they offer a probabilistic guide to his future 
behavior. In short, the requisite relationship between punishment and personal guilt 
can be said to exist by virtue of his criminal conviction. Yet is this relationship 
between punishment and personal guilt "sufficiently substantial" (in the Scales ter-
minology) if the actual length of sentence depends more on the offender's status than 
on the criminal act for which he was convicted? Viewed in this light, the approach 
of the Fifth Circuit in St. Ann seems particularly interesting. Starting with the prem-
ise that "punishment must be founded on an individual's act or omission, not his 
status, political affiliation or domestic relationship," 495 F.2d at 425, the Fifth Circuit 
then utilized the less drastic means doctrine to consider whether a compelling gov-
ernmental interest existed (because of the lack of reasonable alternatives) to justify 
an "inroad upon the theory of personal guilt." 495 F.2d at 428. By analogy, this 
same form of analysis could be used in situations in which the relationship between 
the actual crime and the sentence imposed seemed insubstantial. For an examination 
of the manner in which a court could inquire if reasonable alternatives to classifi-
cation based on status existed, see text at notes 341-48 infra. 
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not only abandon the individualized-treatment model's preoccupa-
tion ·with rehabilitation, but would also reject any consideration of 
the proportionality of the offense committed by the offender (in 
terms of its severity) to the length of his incarceration.197 Thus, in 
a jurisdiction employing an extreme indeterminate sentencing struc-
ture (such as the one-year-to-life sentence frequently assigned in 
California), a reliance on factors relating primarily to status rather 
than conduct could create (in the absence of a principle of propor-
tionality) a system of almost Calvinistic predestination in which the 
offender would be classified as either among the "elect" or the 
"damned."198 If one acknowledges that there is something funda-
mentally unfair about one offender serving a twenty-year sentence 
for a crime for which another offender serves only three years (where 
each offender is similarly situated, except for factors relating exclu-
sively to their respective social and economic status), then one is forced 
to concede that some balance must be struck between efficiency and 
fairness that may result in denying the state the right to classify the 
197. Recent commentators on the philosophy of punishment have generally 
agreed that punishment that is imposed in order to incapacitate the offender cannot 
be justifiably increased on the basis of predicted dangerousness beyond, in Norval 
Morris' phrase, the maximum "deserved by the last crime or series of crimes for 
which the offender is being sentenced." This limitation Morris terms the "principle 
of desert." N. MoRRis, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73-77 (1974). Both Morris and 
the American Friends Service Committee, which wrote Struggle for Justice, are in 
agreement that offenders will, understandably, be unable to accept sentencing dis-
parities based on the offender's "similarity to an imprecisely defined group of people, 
some of whom seem to have behaved in a like manner in the past." N. MoRRis, supra, 
at 35. Here, however, they part company: Morris uses the principle of desert only to 
establish a maximum on the imposition of punishment and would thus apparently 
permit the consideration of categoric-risk factors to justify clemency; the authors of 
Struggle for Justice insist upon mandatory fixed sentences. Compare id, at '75 witli 
STRUGGLE FOR JumCE, supra note 2, at 144, 148. Without endorsing the rigidity in• 
herent in the position of the American Friends Service Committee, I believe that 
Professor Morris' confidence in the "principle of desert" to establish a satisfactory 
maximum boundary may be misplaced, since there is still relatively little evidence 
(with the notable exception of the state of California) that sentencing judges have 
accepted a principle of proportionality between the severity of the crime and the 
length of the punishment. Thus, this article proposes that fairness requires that 
the classification of offenders within the maxima and minima suggested by Pro• 
fessor Morris be accomplished primarily by reference to the actual conduct, rather 
than the status of the offender. Admittedly, the distinction between conduct and 
status blurs at the margins, but it possesses a fundamental and perceivable equity, 
which the offender can understand and accept. Such an emphasis on conduct also 
seems compelled by the limited predictive powers that prediction tables and similar 
screening devices have exhibited to date. See F, SIMON, supra note 179; Diamond, 
supra note 16. 
198. The Board of Parole's Guideline Table is not subject to this criticism, how-
ever, since the result of balancing the Salient Factor Score against an Offense Severity 
rating is to incorporate the concept of proportionality between the offense and the 
sentence into the Table. The California base-expectancy , table, discussed in the text 
at note 180 supra, however, does not appear to have explicitly recognized such a 
limitation on categoric-risk sentencing. 
August 1975] Sentencing Reform 1413 
offender on the basis of the most accurate system available to it. 
So long as any predictive system yields a material number of false 
positives, the concept of fairness should not be equated with that 
of predictive efficiency (the goal of reducing to the minimum possible 
the total number of false positives), since the concept of fairness 
seems necessarily broader in that it requires that we look beyond the 
total number of false positives and consider the relationship between 
those offenders who are selected to receive incremental punishment 
for a given crime and those who are not.199 
Assuming then that efficiency· must to some degree be sacrificed 
to fairness, what is the watershed between a "fair" and an "unfair" 
prediction system? Perhaps the answer lies in the fundamental 
premise that the criminal law is ultimately dependent upon concepts 
of personal responsibility.200 It is exactly such concepts that are 
199. To illustrate, assume two prediction tables, one of which is 75 per cent 
efficient (meaning that 25 per cent of those it identifies as recidivists are false posi-
tives) and operates virtually exclusively on the basis of socioeconomic information 
about offenders, and the other of which is only 65 per cent efficient but operates 
principally on the basis of factors relating to prior misbehavior of the offenders. 
Assume further that the first table will treat many youthful first offenders more 
severely than multiple offenders because their y~uth makes them statistically more 
likely to commit further crimes. In contrast, the second table will generate a higher 
number of false positives, but, proportionally, more of these false positives will be 
individuals who share a lesser entitlement to clemency because of their prior trans-
gressions. Although this example may seem extreme, its point is that the concepts 
of fairness and predictive efficiency can point in divergent directions. 
An appropriate balancing of the competing principles of fairness and accuracy 
cannot be accomplished in the abstract, but two considerations seem to stand out: 
First, what level of accuracy is obtainable? Even though prediction devices may be 
relatively more accurate than intuitive decision-making, they may still be highly 
inaccurate in an absolute sense. Thus, the role to be accorded concepts of fairness 
as a constraint upon the use of such devices should depend on the absolute level 
of predictive efficiency obtainable. For example, if a prediction table could be shown 
to be 95 per cent effective, the concept of fairness among offenders might deserve 
only a modest role. Conversely, if prediction tables are able to achieve only a 40 
per cent correlation between actual and predicted results (which may be their present 
level of efficiency, see note 179 supra), then concepts such as equality and relative 
blameworthiness deserve a much greater role, since otherwise we are faced with the 
worst possible combination: a prediction system that is both "unfair" and inaccurate. 
Second, what cost is incurred in terms of loss of predictive efficiency by recognizing 
a principle of fairness? Assuming that the trade-offs benveen efficiency and fairness 
can be quantified, it seems likely that most would agree that, in the example given 
above, since the loss of predictive efficiency is slight, the less efficient table, which 
does not prejudice the young first offender, is preferable. 
While questions involving the appropriate trade-offs between fairness and accu-
racy may on occasion present seemingly intractable problems, the considerations out-
lined above could at least be weighted and evaluated by appellate courts on a class 
action basis without the expenditure of judicial time that a case-by-case review of 
individual sentencing determinations would require. 
200. For a modern reaffirmation of the role of personal responsibility in the juris-
prudence of the criminal law and, in particular, its importance in the assignment 
of punishment, see H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSmILITY ch. VII et passim (1968). 
Basically, Professor Hart maintains that whatever the underlying purpose of punish-
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ignored by categoric risk prediction systems that focus not on the 
likelihood of recidivism by the individual in question, but on the 
base-expectancy rate for the various groups to which he belongs. 
The distinction between predictions based on past conduct of the 
individual and predictions based on his group status is premised on 
the root concept that punishment must be proportional to what the 
individual has actually done.201 To abandon this distinction is to 
stray perilously far from the moral foundation of personal respon-
sibility that underlies the criminal law. To summarize: Sentencing 
does involve the making of probabilistic determinations, but to the 
degree that the basis for assessment depends not on what the indi-
vidual has done, but rather on what others allegedly similarly situ-
ated have done, the offender can legitimately complain that the 
punishment imposed is unfair. 
Serious methodological problems also surround the use of pre-
diction tables.202 For example, it is never certain that the factors 
ment (e.g., whether a deterrent theory or a retributive theory is employed) the con-
cept of personal responsibility remains important and should inhibit us from treating 
men as "alterable, predictable, curable or manipulatable things." Id. at 183, While 
his arguments cannot possibly be summarized in this article, it is worth noting that 
Professor Hart suggests that the requirement that "like cases be treated alike" is 
"infringed • • • when the ground for different punishment for those guilty of the 
same crime is neither some personal characteristic of the offender connected with the 
commission of the crime nor the effect of punishment on him." Id, at 24, It is 
difficult to see how, for example, the offender's status as an unmarried person, which 
is considered by the Salient Factor Score, would satisfy either of these preconditions 
for variation of punishment. 
201. Norval Morris has recently suggested that not only is prediction based exclu-
sively on the individual's prior conduct (an "anamnestic" prediction in his phrase-
ology) the only fair method of classification for parole selection, but it is increasingly 
becoming the most precise and efficient method of prediction, See N. MORRIS, supra 
note 196, at 31-34. 
202. The various methodological issues concerning the use of particular prediction 
tables are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say, however, that consid-
erable debate has been engendered over such issues as whether prediction tables have 
cross-cultural validity, whether they become stale over time so that an undetected 
"shrinkage" in predictive power occurs, and whether, in particular, subjective criterfa 
that involve the use of judgment (such as the attitude of the offender) can legitimately 
be built into such tables. See Laulicht, Problems of Statistical Research: Recidivism 
and Its Correlates, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 163 (1963). One system using such subjec-
tive criteria is the juvenile court "behavior profile index rating," discussed in note 
185 supra. A child who claims to be blameless receives five adverse "points," while a 
youth deemed "remorseful'' receives but one. Stern, supra note 180, at 226, The extent 
to which a probation officer is able to judge "attitude" in a manner consistent with 
that of his fellow officers is open to considerable doubt. See Prigmore, An Analysis of 
Rater Reliability on the Glueck Scale for the Prediction of Juvenile Delinquency, 54 
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 30 (1963). The culmination of the trend exemplified by the predic-
tion table would be the automation of the process of deciding what form of "treat-
ment" to prescribe for a given diagnosis. Already, some computerized applications of 
the prediction table approach have been put into use so as to produce not only a 
statistically based "diagnosis," but also a suggested form of treatment. See Vondracek, 
Urban & Parsonage, supra note 180, at 94-97. 
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isolated by the statistician as bearing a positive correlation with 
recidivism are as narrowly limited as possible. More discriminating 
criteria may exist.203 Another problem is that, despite their seem-
ingly automatic precision, prediction tables are subject to manipu-
lation by administrative personnel and can cloak highly discretionary 
decisions.204 Finally, the ranking of offenders in different risk cate-
gories according to slight numerical differences in their scores can be 
misleading. No attributes have. yet been discovered that sharply dif-
ferentiate outcome groups; distinctions can be made only in terms 
of marginal probabilities. For example, the earlier noted California 
base expectancy table yields a bottom seventeen per cent, of which 
only forty-six per cent will fail on parole within the prescribed time 
period.205 Characterizing any offender as being at the bottom of this 
scale is thus misleading since the actual probability is that he will 
not fail on parole. Arguably, a minimal prerequisite for use of such 
a table is that it yield outcome groups having significantly different 
probabilities of success or failure. 
In summary, the categoric risk technique has certain virtues: it 
encourages uniformity of treatment, simplifies data-handling, and 
outperforms clinical techniques. But, notwithstanding its increasing 
acceptance, a legal framework has not yet been created in which the 
competing considerations of fairness and efficiency can be balanced. 
C. The Clinical Prediction Procedure 
Those criminologists who favor clinical classification methods 
203. Cf. Dershowitz, supra note 162, at 816. For example, suppose a false positive 
factor (such as, hypothetically, a period of four or more months unemployment during 
the year preceding arrest) showed a 60 per cent correlation with failure on parole 
within two years. Conceivably, 75 per cent of the persons sharing this false positive 
factor might also share an undetected true positive factor (again, hypothetically, they 
are hard drug users). Thus, out of a sample group of 100 offenders (all sharing the 
false positive factor), 75 would be hard drug users and 25 would not. If 60 out of 
these 75 fail on parole, it would be possible to conclude that all persons sharing the 
false positive factor faced a 60 per cent risk of failure. 
204. See, e.g., Project, supra note 58, at 837-38 (describing an instance in which 
administrative personnel manipulated the Salient Factor Score by ignoring an offender's 
juvenile convictions). 
205. McGee, supra note 37, at 195. See also Schuessler, supra note 163, at 603. Of 
those rated only "Fair" by the Salient Factor Score, 60.8 per cent are expected to 
succeed on parole. "Good" risks were found to have a 77.4 per cent chance of success. 
Project, supra note 58, at 875. Such percentages are, however, somewhat misleading. 
As the British Home Office study concluded, "simple criteria like reconviction or parole 
violation are very inadequate measures of a person's criminality. To define 'success' 
and 'failure' as the absence or presence of reconviction is to distort a complex situation 
and treat cases which are not extreme risks as though they were; chances of accurately 
predicting the real risks are thus prejudiced." F. SIMON, supra note 179, at 157. Use of 
such an "over-simplified criterion," it added, is "to dichotomize what is really a con-
tinuous scale." Id. 
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have criticized the statistical prediction approach for its failure to 
provide any etiological explanation of why or how an individual 
becomes a recidivist. Without such an explanation, the clinician has 
argued, rehabilitation is unlikely since the individual offender's 
pathology has not been diagnosed. Accordingly, clinical approaches 
have begun by developing theories to explain the underlying psycho-
logical abnormalities that cause an individual to commit crimes, and 
have then proceeded by constructing over-all typologies of offenders 
within which the individual offender may be classified.206 
Recent years have witnessed a steady proliferation of typologies, 
each favored by a different school of clinicians.207 Nevertheless, there 
exists compelling evidence that among all the means of differentiat-
ing offenders, clinical prediction is the least satisfactory. Three rea-
sons for this are chiefly cited by critics: First, in comparative tests, 
clinical methods have never been able to match the predictive effi-
ciency of statistical prediction tables;208 second, the assumption that 
underlies most typologies-that the offender is psychologically ab-
normal, or at least significantly different from the average citizen200-
206. See generally Toch, The Care and Feeding of Typologies and Labels, FED, 
PROBATION, Sept. 1970, at 15. See also note 219 infra. 
207. TASK FoRCE REPORT: CoRRECTioNs, supra note 2, at 20. The Task Force made 
an attempt to set forth and develop a consensus typology. See id. 
Probably the best known clinical classification scheme is that developed by Eleanor 
and Sheldon Glueck as a result of their studies of delinquent boys in Massachusetts. 
From these studies, extending over several decades, they constructed the Glueck 
Social Prediction Index, which emphasizes such highly subjective factors as "cohesive-
ness of the family," "affection of the father for boy," and "supervision of boy by 
mother" in order to determine the risk of recidivism. See S. GLUECK &: E. GLUECK, 
supra note 15. Although the Gluecks also attempt to develop statistical relationships, 
their technique exemplifies the principal problem with any clinical classification sys-
tem: its criteria are generally far more vague than those employed by the statistician 
so that different clinicians employing the Glueck system might give different ratings 
to the same individual. See Prigmore, supra note 202, at 40, See also Voss, The Predic• 
tive Effidency of the Glueck Sodal Prediction Table, 54 J. Cru:llf, L.C. &: P.S. 421 (1963). 
208. In an often-cited work, Paul Meehl, a psychologist, reviewed some 27 empirical 
studies that contrasted the predictive success of clinical and statistical methods; in 17 
of those studies, statistical methods were found to be significantly superior; in no study 
did a clinical approach outperform a statistical technique. P. MEEHL, CUNICAL VERSUS 
STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954). A more complete survey in 1966 produced the same 
results: out of 40 comparisons made, the clinical mode was never able to outperform 
the statistical. Dershowitz, supra note 162, at 819. See also Meehl, supra note 125. 
209. Morris, supra note 73, at 194. In opposition to the psychiatric view that 
recidivism is largely the product of an innate personality disorder, sociologists have 
in increasing numbers adopted "situational" interpretations, arguing that fully "nor• 
ma!'' individuals who find themselves frustrated by such societal obstacles as poverty 
or racism may rationally adopt illegitimate means of attaining their goals. See R. 
CLOWARD 8: L. OHLJN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY 145-49 (1961). Under the theory 
of differential opportunity, espoused by Cloward and Ohlin, the delinquent youth is 
apt to be not the weakest, most dependent member of the group, but a perceptive, 
adaptable leader. Cf. Chase, supra note 8, at 688-89. 
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is subject to substantial dispute;210 and, fuially, clinical tests have 
shown a marked tendency to overpredict, that is, to classify too high 
a percentage of individuals as dangerous.211 
Illustrative of the tendency toward overprediction is the experi-
ence of The Patuxent Institution for Defective Delinquents, a model 
Maryland prison for "nonpsychotic" inmates administered along the 
lines of a mental hospital. Under Maryland's Defective Delinquent 
statute,212 an offender who is legally sane may be referred to Patuxent 
for psychiatric evaluation and, if diagnosed a "defective delinquent," 
may be committed for an indeterminate period until deemed cured 
by Patuxent's Board of Review (a majority of which is composed 
of psychiatrists and related medical personnel). Statistically, 85 per 
cent of those referred for psychiatric evaluation have been diagnosed 
as defective delinquents.213 Furthermore, one survey has revealed 
that 38 per cent of all Patuxent inmates were being held beyond the 
terms of their original criminal sentence.214 In the 18 years that it 
has operated, only 115 out of a total of 985 inmates committed to 
Patuxent have been released as cured.215 
210. Dr. Howard Rome, Professor of Psychiatry at the Mayo Graduate School, has 
criticized the "folk-belief ••• that all unlawful violent behavior is a direct product 
of mental disease." Rome, supra note 128, at 189. No "simple test for the presence of 
so-called abnormal characteristics" is adequate, he states, for the same reason that 
makes the use of prediction tables so problematic: whatever the variable identified as 
having influenced the life-histories of persistent offenders, there will be a sizable 
number of nonoffenders who share the same characteristics. Id. at 188. 
211. Surveying the literature of clinical attempts at prediction, Professor Dershowitz 
has concluded: 
[P]sychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors; inaccurate in an absolute sense, 
and even less accurate when compared with other professionals, such as psychol-
ogists, social workers and correctional officials; and when compared to actuarial 
devices, such as prediction or experience tables. Even more significant for legal 
purposes, it seems that psychiatrists are particularly prone to one type of error-
overprediction •••• Indeed, our research suggests tliat for every correct psychi-
atric prediction of violence, there are numerous erroneous predictions. 
Dershowitz, supra note 16, at 377. The Glueck Social Prediction Table in particular 
has been criticized for its tendency to overpredict. See Prigmore, supra note 202, 
at 191. See generally Diamond, supra note 16. 
212. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, §§ 5-9 (1957). 
213. Stanford, supra note 8, at 71. 
214. Id. at 78. Seventy-five per cent of those sentenced to original terms of five 
years or less have been held beyond what would otherwise have been the expiration 
date of their sentence. Id. 
215. Id. at 80. Another 332 have won release against the recommendations of the 
psychiatric staff through recommitment hearings. Id. Approximately 22 per cent of 
Patuxent's inmates have been committed for crimes not involving any act of violence. 
Id. at 72. Although there has been a remarkably low rate of recidivism among those 
released on the recommendation of the psychiatric staff, one commentator has observed 
that "Patuxent apparently achieved this happy result by releasing almost no one." 
Burt, Of Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane," 123 U. PA. 
L. REv. 258, 287 (1974). 
Another example of psychiatric overprediction is chronicled in two studies of the 
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The Patuxent experience indicates an attitude far more cautious 
than even the most conservative of parole boards. Although the 
broad definition of "illness" employed by many forensic psychiatrists 
is at least partially responsible for this,216 the tendency toward over-
prediction seems to have a more fundamental source. The vastly dif-
ferent outlooks of the medical and legal professions appear to be 
at the crux of the problem: To a physician seeking to diagnose a 
disease, the possibility of overprediction (that is, treating for a 
disease not present) may seem more desirable than the danger of 
not responding to possible symptoms of the disease. In contrast, 
lawyers (and, to a lesser degree, probation officers and social scien-
tists) recognize that their task involves a delicate balancing of indi-
vidual rights against the self-protective needs of the state. In short, 
the physician's orientation is to search for illness while the lawyer 
prides himself on his ability to be able to evaluate impartially the 
competing claims in any dispute. Because the psychiatrist tends to 
focus only on the benefits of treatment to the "patient," use of the 
medical analogy leads to the dmvngrading of the individual's own 
preference for liberty.217 
To date, there has been general dissatisfaction with most attempts 
to construct a standardized clinical typology of offenders.218 Despite 
growing doubts as to their reliability, some states have utilized such 
typologies as a screening device in the parole release decision.210 
aftermath of Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966): Steadman &: Halfon, The Bax• 
strom Patients: Backgrounds and Outcomes, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 876 (1971); 
Steadman &: Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Bax-
strom Patients 1966-1970, 129 .AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972). But see Allen, Book Review, 
73 MICH. L. REv. 1517, 1525-27 (1975). 
216. See Lanham, supra note 134, at 309. 
217. See Note, Police Initiated Emergency Psychiatric Detention in Michigan, 5 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 581, 589 (1972). 
218. The President's Commission concluded that most such attempts failed "to 
view data in a sufficiently complex fashion and to classify subjects" in a manner that 
was "relevant" to treatment. TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 22. C/, 
S. RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW 105-06 (1965). 
219. Since 1961, the California Youth Agency has made increasingly extensive use 
of a clinical typology in determining when to release or grant limited probation status 
to juveniles assigned by California courts to its custody. The typology postulates seven 
states of personality integration and operates on the premise that juvenile crime is 
the result of arrested development at one of the earlier of these stages. In part because 
of its considerable complexity, the typology initially received substantial attention and 
acclaim. See, e.g., TASK FoRcE REPORT: CoRRECTioNs, supra note 2, at 22. However, a 
study by a team of social scientists suggests that the vagneness of the classifications, 
the absence of explicit behavioral criteria, and the methodological laxness in the 
rating of individual offenders rendered the California typology a highly dubious basis 
upon which to justify treating individual offenders differently. See Beker &: Heyman, 
A Critical Appraisal of the California Differential Treatment Typology of Adolescent 
Offenders, 10 CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1972). 
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Practical experience with these classification systems has led to 
charges that their convoluted categories are often manipulated by 
the clinician to buttress what in reality are merely intuitive judg-
ments.220 When this occurs, the damage is not that intuitive judg-
ments are made, for these are frequently inevitable, but that a mis-
leading aura of certainty has been created by the clinician in order to 
defend his position as the indispensable expert.221 
In summary, neither the dominant approach to the presentation 
of sentencing information (the case attribute method) nor current 
alternatives (the statistical and clinical approaches) present acceptable 
models for the sentencing process. To the extent that the dependence 
of the categoric risk approach upon racially sensitive factors can be 
reduced, and the role of status-dependent criteria minimized without 
commensurate loss of predictive efficiency, the categoric risk ap-
proach unquestionably represents the most preferable alternative. 
It alone is capable of ensuring consistency of performance. Indeed, 
short of its outright adoption, it may still offer an effectiv~ means 
to facilitate appellate review. Even if exising prediction tables have 
too discriminatory an impact to be used properly in the initial sen-
tencing determination, they could still serve as a means of filtering 
out cases in which unjustifiably severe sentences have been assigned. 
For example, if a given sentence exceeded the average sentence as-
signed for a particular offense, the appellate court could utilize such 
a table to consider whether the offender posed a greater-than-average 
risk of recidivism .. If he did not, the burden would then fall on the 
lower court to explain what factors made the particular sentence 
appropriate.222 Before discussing possible reforms, how~ver, it is 
first necessary to examine some of the recent trends in the case law 
of sentencing. 
220. See, e.g., Beker &: Heyman, supra note 219, at 21. 
221. See Dershowitz, supra note 16, at 371. Dershowitz's view is that clinicians have 
frequently and deliberately pre-empted the court's role on the assumption that they 
alone are competent to deal with questions involving an individual's state of mind. 
222. Such a compromise would provide a means for filtering out frivolous appeals 
and would limit the number of sentencing' cases that appellate courts would have to 
consider. This does not mean, however, that the sentencing judge should be requir~d 
to explain his sentence only in the exceptional case. Ideally, findings of fact should be 
required in every sentencing determination as in every nonjury trial. 
Undeniably, the use at the appellate stage of prediction tables that employ racially 
sensitive variables may be seen by minority group members as unfair, since it merely 
delays the moment at which a biased filtering device is employed. But the advantage 
of such a two-step procedure is that the primary sentencing determination would be 
conducted in what was, at least on the surface, a racially neutral manner, and some 
defendants would be provided with a means of obtaining sentence reductions. Such 
tables might also be utilized on appeal by an individual who has received the average 
sentence for the crime in question but who could show that he posed little or no 
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW 
An almost schizophrenic quality has characterized the develop-
ment of the constitutional law of sentencing over the past quarter 
century. Two separate and seemingly contradictory lines of cases are 
discernible, each traceable to one of two historic decisions handed 
down in rapid succession by the same bench of the Supreme Court 
in the late 1940's. First, in Townsend v. Burke,228 the Court ruled that 
due process is violated when a defendant is sentenced on the basis of 
material misinformation. Then, in the following year, the Court was 
faced in Williams v. New York224 with a sentence of capital punish-
ment explicitly based on allegations in a pre-sentence report that 
were only partially disclosed to defense counsel.225 Declining to 
extend the Townsend precedent, the Court rejected the due process 
challenge, which it saw as leading to the imposition of trial-type 
standards at sentencing.226 
The scope of the Court's holding in Williams has long been 
debated: Did it hold only that hearsay evidence might be received at 
sentencing, or did it deny the defendant any constitutional right to 
risk of recidivism under such tables. The suggestion made in the text that such a pro• 
cedure be followed by the appellate court only when the sentence exceeds the 
average length for the crime is intended to prevent the appellate decision from simply 
replacing the primary sentencing determination with the results dictated by the pre-
diction table. 
223. 334 U.S. 736 (1948). In Townsend, the sentencing judge had apparently misread 
the section of the pre-sentence report dealing with the defendant's prior criminal 
record and, reading his error into the record, confused arrest records with prior con• 
victions. See 334 U.S. at 739-40. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the defendant's procedural rights at sentencing 
(which the following analysis does not purport to provide), see Pugh &: Carver, Due 
Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mepa to McGautha, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 25 (1970). 
224. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
225. Despite the jury's recommendation of a sentence of life imprisonment, the 
trial judge imposed the death sentence. 337 U.S. at 242. This decision was based on a 
lengthy pre-sentence report that stated that the defendant was se.-..:ually maladjusted 
and had been the perpetrator of a series of other unsolved violent crimes. While the 
report itself was never disclosed to defense counsel (nor was disclosure requested), the 
judge alluded at sentencing to its principal contents by stating that he "had informa• 
tion" that the defendant had been "identified" and had "confessed" to a series of 
other crimes. See 337 U.S. at 244. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, defense counsel relied on the confrontation 
clause of the sixth amendment to assert that hearsay evidence could not be received 
at sentencing, Speaking for the Court, Justice Black responded that such hearsay 
information was necessary if the "modern penological policy" of individualized sen• 
tences geared to the rehabilitative needs of the offender were to be attained, 337 U.S. 
at 249-50. An insistence on trial-type standards for the receipt of information at sen• 
tencing, he argued, would prove more injurious than beneficial to most defendants, 
since it would also foreclose the receipt of redeeming information. 
226. 337 U.S. at 246-47. 
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inspect or challenge the information used at sentencing?227 Because 
of the sweeping language in the majority opinion emphasizing the 
importance of "individualized" sentences and the role of the pre-
sentence report in fashioning such sentences, the dominant tendency 
has been to cite Williams for the broad proposition that disclosure 
of the pre-sentence report is not compelled by the fourteenth amend~ 
ment, since it might disrupt the "rehabilitative purposes" of the 
sentencing process.228 The practical consequence of this interpreta-
tion of Williams has been to place the convicted defendant in the 
anomalous situation of having a right without a remedy: entitled by 
Townsend to a sentencing decision free from misplaced reliance on 
inaccuracies in the pre-sentence report, yet denied access to that 
report by the prevailing gloss placed 1;1pon Willia.ms. From time to 
time, if a sentencing judge revealed his confusion on the record and 
clearly relied on incorrect information, an appellate court would 
rediscover the latent principle of Townsend and require a resentenc-
ing.220 The judge who sentenced -in silence, however, seldom met 
reversal on appeal in the federal courts. 
After Williams, the law of sentencing remained strangely static 
in contrast with the rapid pace of constitutional developments in 
other areas of the criminal law.280 By the 1970's, however, the 
227. Because disclosure of the pre-sentence report was never actually requested by 
defense counsel in Williams, some cases and the majority of the commentators have 
taken the view that the Williams holding was necessarily limited to the question 
whether pre-sentence reports containing hearsay could be used at all. So construed, 
Williams would deal with only the use, not the disclosure, of such reports and would 
hold only that hearsay evidence might be received. Williams then would othenvise be 
silent on the question of what procedural rights were available to defendants who, 
unlike defendant Williams, sought to challenge the accuracy of the pre-sentence report. 
See Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968); Cohen, supra note 2 (sum-
marizing the viewpoints of recent commentators). Cf. Marano v. United States, 374 
F.2d 583, 585 n.3 (1st Cir. 1967). 
228. See, e.g., United States v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. 
Gross, 416 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1013 (1970); Cook v. Willing-
ham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968); Powers v. United States, 325 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 
1963). A second, more restrictive interpretation of Williams is that the sentencing 
judge is not required to conduct a hearing or permit cross-examination. In Specht v. 
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, a consistent 
champion of disclosure, read Williams to hold "that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not require a judge to have hearings and to give a con-
victed pe,:son an opportunity to participate in those hearings ..•• " 386 U.S. at 606. 
Since Justice Douglas has repeatedly urged amendment of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to require disclosure, his position in Specht seems best interpreted as re-
jecting a constitutional requirement of trial-type hearings. Such a position would be 
consistent with such cases as Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which hold that informal hearings will satisfy due process 
requirements. 
229. See United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970). 
230. Some important precedents were, however, established. During the 1960's, the 
Court decided that the provision of counsel was constitutionally required at sentencing, 
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justification of "rehabilitative purpose" had lost much of its persua-
sive power: In Morrissey v. Brewer,231 Gagnon v. Scarpelli,282 and 
Wolff v. McDonnell,238 the Court ·wrote a detailed code of procedures 
to govern parole and probation revocation proceedings and prison 
disciplinary hearings, despite the claim that such procedures would 
interfere with the rehabilitative functions of the parole board and 
prison authorities. Potentially even more destructive of the tradi-
tional immunity of these authorities from judicial review are recent 
decisions of three circuit courts holding that a parole board is con-
stitutionally required to supply a written explanation, sufficiently 
specific to permit appellate review, of the reasons for its refusal to 
grant parole.284 
reasoning that sentencing was a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecution. Mcmpa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968), (applying Mempa 
retroactively). In addition, in a decision with potentially enormous ramifications, the 
Court held in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), that in juvenile-court waiver 
hearings, counsel must be permitted to examine the pre-sentence report and be given 
an opportunity to rebut all "materials which are susceptible to challenge or impeach-
ment." 383 U.S. at 563. While Kent did not discuss the procedural means counsel 
might employ, it emphasized that is was "precisely the role of counsel to 'denigrate' 
[the probation report]," and added that "[t]here is no irrebutable presumption of 
accuracy attached to staff reports." 383 U.S. at 563. Certain "ex parte analyses" from 
the probation staff were excluded from this rule of mandatory disclosure, subject to 
the requirement that "secret information" could not be relied upon. The significance 
of, Kent is limited, however, by the uncertain degree to which it is based on statutory 
grounds. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 600. Still, Kent was cited with approval in In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which was expressly based on constitutional grounds. 
Both Kent and Mempa (which dealt with a combined sentencing and probation 
revocation hearing) are typical of other sentencing cases of the 1960's, in that the 
Court was prepared to establish clear procedural standards only after it had first 
distinguished the case before it from the typical sentencing situation. See Daxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
231. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
232. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Gagnon, the Court also indicated that counsel must be 
appointed at parole revocation proceedings where there are "substantial reasons which 
justified or mitigated" the parole violation. 411 U.S. at 790. This function of mitigating 
admitted violations places the attorney in a role that is inconsistent with the "reha-
bilitative model" of the dispositional process, for it recognizes that the dispositional 
decision maker needs the assistance of the attorney in organizing and presenting dis• 
positional data. In short, the Gagnon case implies (as did Kent) that the attorney's 
role is not limited to disproving the fact of a violation, but extends to the process 
by which the decision maker evaluates the character of the offender. 
233. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The due process requirements established by Wolff for 
prison disciplinary hearings at which "good time" credit could be lost were minimal 
(basically consisting of notice and a hearing), but show the Court to be unwilling 
to view prison administrators as functioning benevolently in the "best interests" of 
the inmates. In sum, the decision appears to represent at least the partial abandonment 
by the Court of the "rehabilitative model" as applied to issues of prison administration. 
234. See Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Brad-
ford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. ll636 
(U.S. June 2, 1975) (No. 74-1287); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. 
Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 
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The result of these innovations in the law of probation and 
parole has been to make the absence of similar procedural protec-
tions at the sentencing stage appear to be an increasingly isolated 
anomaly. Moreover, as we shall next see, it is an anomaly that shows 
growing signs of decay. Although for the moment the rule of non-
review still remains largely intact, a series of lower court cases has 
established specific procedural protections that can no longer be 
reconciled with the traditional immunity of the sentencing judge. 
In the selective tour that follows, we shall seek chiefly to measure the 
latent potential for change that exists in recent case law against the 
earlier outlined critique of the sentencing process. 
A. Procedural Reform 
I. The Trend Toward Disclosure 
Using a variety of techniques, a number of appellate courts have 
begun to require disclosure of at least some portion of the pre-
sentence report. The most frequently utilized method has been to 
require partial disclosure or at least summarization by the sentencing 
judge of those portions of the pre-sentence report dealing with 
allegations of prior criminal conduct. Some courts have required 
disclosure only of conviction records,235 while others have ordered 
that all references to prior criminal activity be· disclosed.286 Another 
approach has been to place on the sentencing judge the burden of 
justifying nondisclosure.287 
Those courts requiring only partial disclosure have, however, 
restricted the Townsend holding in an important respect. Neither 
Townsend nor the most significant of its progeny, United States v. 
U.S. 1015 (1974); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974). These cases are 
discussed in the text at notes 304-10 infra. With the decision of the Supreme Court 
to review Bradford, a final resolution of this issue appears imminent. 
235. See, e.g., United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1972). 
236. See, e.g., United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Baker, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968). Cf. United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1121 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). A troublesome question is whether sum-
marization of the report is sufficient. Compare United States v. Carden, 429 F.2d 1126 
(8th Cir. 1970), with United States_ v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972). Picard 
required full disclosure to the defendant himself as well as to defense counsel on the 
theory that only the defendant would know whether there existed information to 
rebut or mitigate the information contained in the pre-sentence report. 
237. See United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 
932 (1971). Both Bryant and United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1972), re• 
jected the notion that a judge could adopt a uniform policy of nondisclosure. The 
Seventh Circuit has ruled that reports from the prosecutor's office must always be 
disclosed to defense counsel. See United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110· (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). Cf. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1231 n.26 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
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Malcolm,238 make any distinction between material misinformation 
about a defendant's criminal history and other forms of material 
misinformation. Yet those courts that have limited disclosure to 
criminal records seem to have assumed that a defendant can be 
prejudiced only upon the basis of a mistake in his prior criminal 
history. This assumption ignores the significant reliance a sentencing 
judge may place upon incorrect diagnostic or social-history infor-
mation.239 
A second deficiency inherent in the approach taken by these 
courts involves the ease with which their requirements may be 
evaded. At present, a sentencing judge may deny disclosure, even in 
those circuits otherwise requiring it, simply by disclaiming reliance 
upon undisclosed information.240 This tactic is obviously subject to 
abuse and presents an easy alternative for the overworked judge. At a 
minimum, a disclaimer of reliance upon nondisclosed information 
should be coupled with an express statement on the record of the 
factors considered in rendering the sentence. Moreover, if the sen-
tencing judge considers the undisclosed information sufficiently 
immaterial so as not to require rebuttal, its contents might neverthe-
less be summarized on the record to ensure that the sentence has not 
been influenced by material undisclosed information.241 
To a still uncertain extent, both of these deficiencies appear to 
have been incorporated in the recent amendment to rule 32(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which now requires (at the 
federal level) partial disclosure of the pre-sentence report. Rule 32(c) 
238. 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970). 
239. See United States v. Holder, 412 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1969) (trial judge placed 
primary reliance on such information). An important factor relied upon by the judge 
who assigned the death sentence in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), was 
undisclosed information indicating the defendant to be of "a morbid sexuality." 337 
U.S. at 244. 
Another unresolved ambignity in Townsend is whether the defendant must show 
actual reliance by the sentencing judge upon the misinformation. Some courts have 
interpreted Townsend restrictively to apply only to the situation in which the sen• 
tencing record on its face contained a clear error of material fact (such as a confusion 
of arrest and conviction records) and not to situations in which the record contained 
unsupported material allegations that the defendant sought to challenge. See, e.g., 
United States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 301 F.2d 782, 784 (3d Cir. 1962). Some recent 
decisions have stated that the "possibility of misinformation" is sufficient to state a 
claim under the Townsend principle. See, e.g., United States v. Janice, 464 F.2d 126 (3d 
Cir. 1972). Another recent case, United States v. Trevino, 490 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1973), 
requires that actual reliance be shown-an almost impossible task if the court fails 
to provide a statement of the factors relied upon in imposing the sentence. 
240. United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 1969). See 
note 239 supra. 
241. In United States v. Carden, 428 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970), the Eighth Circuit 
urged the adoption under its supervisory power of a procedure by which the sen• 
tencing judge would summarize on the record all material facts relied upon. 
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compels disclosure of the pre-sentence report upon request, unless 
the disclosure would in the court's opinion: (1) reveal a "diagnostic 
opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilita-
tion" ;242 (2) compromise confidential sources; or (3) "result in harm, 
physical or othenvise, to the defendant or other persons."248 In such 
cases, the court must summarize all "factual information" that is to 
"be relied on in determining sentence" and permit the defendant or 
his counsel to comment thereon.244 Accordingly, when the informa-
tion in question falls under an exception, the sentencing judge will 
apparently remain able to disclaim reliance on information he does 
not want to hear contested and thus may avoid even summarization. 
In addition, the use of the limiting phrase "factual information" 
suggests that the judge may decline to reveal "soft" data, such as 
personality assessments and similar characterizations of the defen-
dant.245 
2. The Right To Require Verification 
To what extent may a judge rely upon unsupported but serious 
allegations in the pre-sentence report in imposing sentence? For 
example, once the pre-sentence report has been disclosed, the de-
fendant may discover that in addition to errors of specific fact, which 
his counsel may correct by reference to the official records, the report 
also contains vague charges of prior criminal activity. Thus, in 
United States v. W eston,246 the defendant, convicted of possession 
of a small quantity of heroin, was characterized in the pre-sentence 
report as a major regional drug supplier on the basis of information 
242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A). The provisions quoted in the text, along with 
other amendments to the Federal Rules, were to take effect on Aug. I, 1975. See 416 U.S. 
1001 (1974). On July 31, 1975, Congress revised the Supreme Court's proposed rules 
and postponed the effective date to Dec. I, 1975. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94--64, 89 Stat. 376. The Act adopted the 
Court's proposed rule 32(c)(3) with only minor revisions. See note 248 supra. 
Noting that "the consequences of any serious inaccuracy can be very serious to the 
defendant," a House report accompanying the Act stressed "that it is essential that 
the presentence report be completely accurate in every respect." H.R. Rn>. No. 94.-
247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975) (emphasis added). This statement of congressional 
intent may prevent resort to a doctrine of harmless error in cases where a defendant 
seeks resentencing upon discovering (or becoming able to prove) the existence of 
material misinformation in the pre-sentence report. 
243. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A). 
244. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(B). 
245. On the other hand, the rule makes certain diagnostic reports constructively 
part of the pre-sentence report, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(E), thus suggesting that such 
diagnostic conclusions should normally be disclosed. 
246. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972). 
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supplied by an anonymous informant.247 Although most courts have 
long been prepared to receive information from the defendant in 
mitigation of charges made in the pre-sentence report,248 the problem 
for the defendant in a situation like that in West on is that it is often 
impossible to prove a "negative" fact (for example, that one is not a 
drug supplier), particularly where the defendant's resources may 
already have been exhausted by a trial. In Wes ton, the trial court 
gave defense counsel 120 days to disprove the charges made in the 
pre-sentence report. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit decided that this 
burden could not fairly be placed on a defendant and remanded the 
case with instructions that the accusations made in the pre-sentence 
report could not be relied upon unless "amplified by information 
such as to be persuasive of the validity of the charge there made."249 
Weston then appears to fashion a two-pronged rule: first, serious 
criminal charges may not be made in the pre-sentence report solely 
on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of an undisclosed in-
formant; and, second, when the defense challenges the accuracy of the 
charge, the burden of corroboration must fall upon the prosecu-
tion.250 
247. The court of appeals vacated the sentence, Cases reaching similar results 
include Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Powell, 
487 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1972), 
248. Generally, courts today will receive affidavits and even testimony from qualified 
sources. See United States v. Holder, 412 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1969). CJ. United States v. 
Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1973). Congress has added to rule 32(c)(3)(A) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a provision authorizing the defendant "at the 
discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any 
alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence report." Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 3(33), 89 Stat, 376. 
The right of the defendant to present such evidence is traceable to the narrower 
common-law right of allocution, which permitted the defendant only to state reasons 
why sentence should not be rendered against him. See Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. 
REV. 115 (1944). In Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961), a plurality of the Court 
indicated that rule 32(a) was intended to embody this right in expanded form. See 
365 U.S. at 304. However, the Court subsequently ruled in a five-to-four decision that 
the failure of a sentencing judge to offer the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement in his own behalf was not, though contrary to the Federal Rules, an error 
of constitutional stature. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). Hill can be nar-
rowly read to bold only that the judge need not ask the defendant if he wishes to 
speak. If read more broadly to hold that the right of allocution is not constitutionally 
protected in any form (i.e., that the defendant bas no right to address the court), the 
Hill decision would appear inconsistent with the Court's later holding in Mempa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), that the right to counsel at sentencing is constitutionally 
protected. 
249. 448 F.2d at 634. CJ. Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 860 (1st Cir. 1969) (re• 
quiring the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence charges contained in a 
document submitted by the prosecution to the sentencing judge). Compare Shelton v. 
United States, 497 F.2d 156, 160 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant must bear the "initial 
burden" of showing the challenged facts to be untrue). 
250. In Nickens v. State, 17 Md. App. 284, 301 A.2d 49 (Ct. Spec. App. 1973), a 
Maryland court adopted an even stricter rule with respect to the use of hearsay allc• 
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A recent Second Circuit case, United States v. Needles,251 hai dis-
tinguished Weston on its facts, but agreed in principle with its 
broader holding. The defendant in Needles pleaded guilty to · a 
charge of possession of an unregistered submachine gun. While the 
defendant styled himself an inventor engaged in research for the 
United States Army, the pre-sentence report described him as a 
major gun dealer. At sentencing, the defendant engaged in an 
extensive colloquy with the court in which he acknowledged several 
prior meetings with undercover agents at which gun purchases were 
discussed and apparently arranged.252 This enabled the court to 
distinguish Weston on the ground that the "key facts" in the pre-
sentence report were corroborated by inconsistencies in the defen-
dant's mm testimony and by the seizure of a significant quantity of 
firearms on his arrest.258 The court added, however, that in instances 
where the defendant totally denied a significant charge on which the 
sentencing court sought to rely, "[t]he probation office or prosecution 
should be requested to provide substantiation of challenged informa-
tion submitted to the judge. Likewise in appropriate instances the 
defendant ought to be allowed to present evidence in the form of 
affidavits, documents, or even oral statements by knowledgeable 
persons on matters the court deems material to its decision on the 
severity of sentence."254 
gations. The court ruled that before hearsay allegations could be used, the prosecution 
must establish "informational reliability" to the satisfaction of the sentencing judge 
and make "some showing of the credibility of the source.'' 17 Md. App. at -, 301 
A.2d at 52. Of particular interest in Nickens is the fact that the court looked in part 
to fourth amendment "probable cause" cases in evaluating the degree of corroboration 
that must be shown to justify the use of hearsay allegations; to the extent that other 
courts are similarly willing to draw analogies to fourth amendment standards, a wealth 
of precedent could become applicable requiring independent factual corroboration of 
material hearsay allegations. 
251. 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1973). 
252. 472 F.2d at 656-57. 
253. 472 F.2d at 657-58. 
254. 472 F.2d at 658. The court further distinguished Weston on the grounds that 
Needles received a relatively short sentence of three years, and the challenged informa-
tion in Needles had been acquired by FBI agents, not outside informants, in "face-to-
face" encounters with the defendant. 472 F.2d at 659. 
With the subsequent case of United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973), 
the Second Circuit appears to have moved closer to the position of the Ninth Circuit 
in Weston-at least where the challenged information is supplied by the prosecution 
rather than by the probation office. In Rosner, the prosecution submitted a lengthy 
memorandum containing numerous detailed charges involving "possible misrepresenta-
tions ••• and unethical behavior" on the part of the offender, 485 F.2d at 1229, which, 
the prosecution later conceded, could not have been proved at trial. The memorandum 
was disclosed to defense counsel only on the day of sentencing. On appeal, the Second 
Circuit held that the lower court had abused its discretion in not adjourning the 
sentencing until defense counsel had had "sufficient time for useful examination and 
rebuttal in view of the one-sided and potentially devastating disclosures of asserted 
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Three essential questions remain to be resolved under the rule 
fashioned in West on: What kinds of misinformation are of sufficient 
magnitude to trigger its remedy?256 To what extent must the sen-
tencing judge explicitly rely upon the asserted misinformation in 
imposing sentence?256 What kinds of adversarial tactics may be uti-
lized at a contested sentencing hearing? The answer to the first of 
these questions may emerge as courts make increasing use of predic-
tive aids, such as the Board of Parole's Salient Factor Score. To the 
extent that such rating systems attach numerical weightings to cer-
tain items of information, they provide at least a partial definition of 
materiality in the sentencing context. In addition, by providing 
standards and a scale by which appellate courts can constructively 
presume that certain items of information must have been of ma-
terial importance in the determination of a sentence, such prediction 
devices also supply a relatively objective substitute for the present 
requirement of actual reliance. 
The final question of the appropriate procedural remedies at re-
sentencing is more difficult to resolve. Although most courts have 
been extremely reluctant to order evidentiary hearings, the Third 
Circuit has held that where a defendant denies a damaging confession 
allegedly made to the investigating probation officer, the sentencing 
judge should either disregard the purported confession or "permit 
the defendant to confront and cross-examine the investigator in open 
court."251 Similarly, the First Circuit has ordered a federal district 
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the accuracy of 
serious charges contained in an ex parte report submitted by a state 
bad conduct." 485 F.2d at 1231. Although the Second Circuit did not order an evi-
dentiary hearing, it indicated considerable skepticism toward the use of unsubstantiated 
hearsay allegations in the pre-sentence report and directed the lower court to permit 
defense counsel to participate extensively in the process by which the sentencing judge 
"separate[d] the wheat from the chaff." 485 F.2d at 1230. Cf. Cardaropoli v, Norton, 
Civ. No. 75-2005 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 1975); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D, 
Conn. 1973). 
255. In United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit 
commented that not all forms of misinformation would rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation, but held that misinformation concerning the offender's degree of 
participation in the crime did rise to constitutional proportions. 487 F.2d at 238. 
256. See Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156, 160 (5th Cir. 1974) (defense entitled 
to rebut only information "explicitly relied upon"); cases cited in note 239 supra, 
257. United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir, 1969). See also 
United States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 384 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1967). The court indicated 
in Brown that the obligation to verify statements of facts through in-court testimony 
would arise only when the purported statements were of compelling significance and 
were explicitly denied by the defendant. 417 F.2d at 285, 
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prosecutor to a state court sentencing judge.258 These decisions sug-
gest that Williams v. New York might ultimately be read narrowly 
to authorize the receipt of hearsay evidence without foreclosing 
the issue whether the defendant should be entitled, in appropriate 
instances, to the use of some adversarial tactics at sentencing. 
Although the extent of the defendant's emerging right to chal-
lenge the validity of factual information (and require corroboration 
of material charges) contained in the pre-sentence report remains far 
from settled, the courts appear to be heading toward a requirement 
of an informal hearing at which the sentencing judge will resolve 
specific factual disputes. There are even signs that such a hearing 
might be subject to a limited form of appellate review to determine 
if, on the record below, "some evidence" underlay the lower court's 
factual findings.259 Even if such a right is recognized in principle, 
further questions, such as the defendant's right to challenge unsup-
ported diagnostic evaluations, still remain. Consider the not infre-
quent case of the damaging one-sentence psychiatric evaluation. In 
such a case, the need still exists to fashion some procedure by which 
the diagnosing psychiatrist can be called upon to defend and elab-
orate his conclusions. 
3. The Right To Exclude Unreliable Information 
Are there kinds of information that are so unreliable or mislead-
ing that they should never be included in the pre-sentence report? 
The defendant who wishes to advance this argument in order to 
obtain a re-sentencing faces serious obstacles.260 Indeed, if Williams 
258. Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1969). Haller, United States v. Rosner, 
485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973), and United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970), appear effectively to have foreclosed the prosecution 
from submitting ex parte reports to the sentencing judge, on the theory that the 
prosecution cannot be expected to present a neutral, balanced portrait of the offender. 
259. See United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1973) (requiring re-sentencing 
where "no evidence" supported the judge's conclusion that the offender had acted as 
ringleader of a conspiracy). At least two other decisions appear to have adopted such 
a standard in reviewing parole board factual determinations. See Kohlman v. Norton, 
380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 
1973). Cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). 
260. Not the least of these obstacles is 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970), which provides: "No 
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States 
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." How-
ever, this provision, part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, seems unconsti-
tutionally overbroad under the doctrine of United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 
(1972), discussed in the text at notes 262-69 infra. In the only decision to have construed 
section 3557 to date, the Seventh Circuit has commented that, notwithstanding the 
provision, in some situations consideration of "unproved charges" may invalidate a 
criminal sentence. United States v. Haygood, 502 F.2d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1974). · 
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has any continuing validity it would seem to stand for the proposi-
tion that few limits should be placed on the relevancy of the informa-
tion available to the sentencing judge.261 Yet "relevancy" can and 
should be distinguished from "reliability'' if Williams is to be read 
as not overruling Townsend's principle that inaccurate information 
may not be relied upon. 
A potential counterprinciple to Williams is discernible in the 
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Tucker262 that prior 
convictions in which the defendant was not represented by counsel 
may not be considered in rendering sentence. The approach in 
Tucker is of particular interest because it fashions a per se rule: an 
entire class of information-prior uncounseled convictions-is 
banned from the pre-sentence report. The theory underlying Tucker 
was that because prior uncounseled convictions lack the probative 
value of convictions obtained in a constitutionally permissible 
manner, they are misleading and should not be considered by the 
sentencing judge. It is arguable that the principle of Tucker should 
be extended to other prior convictions that, in the light of the retro-
active application of the major precedents of the Warren Court, 
must also be seen as having been unconstitutionally obtained. For 
example, convictions resulting from inadmissible confessions, illegally 
seized evidence, or racially biased juries might also be subject to 
exclusion.263 On the other hand, it remains uncertain exactly what 
261. For an intelligent exposition of this argument, see United States v. Schipani, 
315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.), affd., 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 
(1971). 
Indeed, in United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972), the court of appeals 
upheld the sentencing judge's right to rely upon charges of which the defendant had 
been acquitted. Surprising as such a result is, given the axiomatic presumption of 
innocence, it must at least be noted that the information relied upon was presented 
at an open trial, was subject to the laws of evidence and to cross-examination, and 
would thus seem to be of a higher standard of reliability than much of the hearsay 
information contained in pre-sentence reports. See also United States v, Doyle, 348 
F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir. 1965). 
262. 404 U.S. 443 (1972). Tucker was preceded by Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 
(1967), in which the Court ruled that uncounseled convictions could not be considered 
in determining the applicability of recidivist statutes. 
263. The basic question, however, is the probative value of the conviction rather 
than its legality. It is therefore arguably possible to distinguish between uncounseled 
convictions and convictions that would be overturned today on the basis of the exclu-
sionary rule; the latter, unlike uncounseled convictions, are not intrinsically untrust• 
worthy, and may provide sufficient assurance that the offender actually did commit the 
prior illegal act. But see Tarlton v. United States, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir, 1974) 
(making no distinction between these arrest records and allegedly unconstitutional 
prior convictions in ruling that the FBI must take reasonable steps to assure the 
accuracy of records that it disseminates). In Tarlton, the plaintiff had relied upon 
Tucker to challenge the disclosure to his parole board of allegedly unconstitutional 
prior convictions. 
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"misinformation" is proscribed by Tucker. For instance, may the 
sentencing judge still be informed either that the defendant was 
previously convicted of a specific charge, but did not have counsel, or 
that he was indicted on such a charge?264 
If Tucker is not to be distinguished to death, one area where its 
applicability should be acknowledged is the case of arrest records not 
followed by a conviction. Arrest records possess even less probative 
value than an uncounseled conviction, and in decisions outside the 
context of corrections, courts have been quick to deny their use to 
support a deprivation.265 It can be argued, however, that the sen-
tencing judge has not received "misinformation" within the Tucker 
rule unless the defendant can prove he was unconstitutionally 
arrested. Although it is generally believed that a significant per-
centage of arrests not followed by a conviction lack probable cause 
and therefore are "unconstitutional,"266 few defendants could meet 
the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a specific arrest that 
occurred years earlier. These factors, and the impact of arrest-record 
data at sentencing,267 make it possible to assert that even if Tucker 
does not directly control the case of the prior arrest record, it is at 
least an indication that the use of such unreliable information im-
pinges upon constitutional values.268 It is thus arguable that before 
a naked accusatory label such as an arrest record is called to. the 
264. While allowing the sentencing judge to receive this information would effec-
tively negate the principle of Tucker, it is arguable that the judge would not have 
been "misinformed" since he would have been told of the unconstitutional nature of 
the prior conviction. The Ninth Circuit opinion, which was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Tucker, however, instructed the sentencing judge to proceed without "con-
sideration" of prior uncounseled convictions. Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292, 
1294 (9th Cir. 1970), afjd., 404 U.S. 443 (1972). This would seem to bar all references 
to the fact of the prior conviction. But see United States v. Haygood, 502 F.2d 166, 
171 n.16 (7th Cir. 1974). 
Another evasion of Tucker that undoubtedly will be attempted would be to sum-
marize testimony or evidence offered at the prior trial. To prevent such evasions, it is 
necessary to read Tucker, in light of its underlying rationale, to proscribe consideration 
of any information relating to impermissible considerations. In other words, a prior 
uncounseled conviction should be deemed constitutionally irrelevant, and hence any 
reference to it should be forbidden. 
265. See Schware v. 13oard of Examrs., 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (use of arrest records 
hanned in determining admission to the bar); Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1184 (6th 
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. April 14, 1975) (No. 74-891). 
266. See note 71 supra. 
267. See Comment, supra note 84, at 869-71. 
268. Even prior to Tucker, the Third Circuit held that records of a defendant's 
prior appearance before a magistrate "have no place in determining sentence." United 
States ex rel. Jackson v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707, 708 (3d Cir. 1967). Cf. United States r• 
ffingst, 477 F.2d 177, 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973). But cf. Catalano v. 
United States, 383 F. Supp. 346 (D. Conn. 1974). 
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attention of the sentencing judge, the state should bear the burden 
of proving at least some indicia of reliability.269 
That this result is correct is demonstrated by the incongruity 
achieved in Menard v. Mitchell.210 There, Judge Gesell, on remand 
from the circuit court, distinguished between the dissemination of 
FBI arrest records for "employment or licensing purposes," which 
he enjoined, and their dissemination for "law enforcement pur-
poses," which he permitted after expressly noting that arrest records 
play a significant role in determining sentences. This distinction 
269. It can, of course, be asserted that arrest records should never be used at sen-
tencing. While this article would favor such a restriction, Tucker probably cannot be 
read so broadly as to prevent any reference to unproved charges of prior criminal 
activity. See cases cited in note 261 supra. But a basic distinction can be drawn between 
unsupported arrest records and specific charges of prior criminal activity such as those 
that might be contained in the prosecutor's file. Arrest records are a far less reliable 
source of information than specific charges because of the infrequency with which 
their ultimate dispositions are reported and the problems associated with "suspicion" 
arrests. See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Tarlton v. Sa.\:be, 507 
F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974). To the extent that these two cases forbid governmental 
agencies on constitutional grounds to circulate arrest-record data in an incomplete 
fashion or without reasonable efforts to update and verify such data, the Tuclier 
principle should forbid the probation officer to include such data in his pre-sentence 
report without similar efforts. 
In some very recent instances, courts have begun to express reservations about the 
consideration at sentencing of unproved criminal charges that the defendant has not 
admitted. One court has commented that there is an "element of unfairness" in such 
practices, and speculated that in some instances the defendant might be "entitled 
to a presumption of innocence ••• unless the facts are examined •••• " United States 
v. Haygood, 502 F.2d 166, 169, 171 n.15 (7th Cir. 1974). 
270. 328 F. Supp. 718, 727 (D.D.C. 1971), revd. sub nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 
1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Judge Gesell's acceptance of the use of arrest records in tho 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and in sentencing was qualified: "When arrest 
records are used for such purposes, they are subject to due process limitations within 
the criminal process, and misuse may be checked by judicial action." 328 F. Supp. at 
727. Unfortunately, this caveat overlooks the absence, at present, of any meaningful 
due process limitations on sentencing data, unless the defendant is able, on his own, 
to obtain disclosure and prove the existence of a material error. 
To date, while many recent cases have been willing to expunge or to enjoin 
dissemination of arrest records, they have generally done so on nonconstitutional 
grounds, invoking either the general equity power of the court at the conclusion of a 
criminal trial, see, e.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (C,D. Cir. 1969); 
United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967), federal anti-discrimination 
legislation, see Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cal. 1970), aff d,, 
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1973), or special circumstances abridging first amendment or other 
protected freedoms. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United 
States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 
(W.D.N.C. 1969). However, the first Menard decision at the court of appeals level 
contains a suggestion that expungement may be constitutionally required, at least 
where probable cause for the arrest is not apparent. See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 
486, 495 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Sixth Circuit has recently ruled that it is a denial 
of the civil liberties protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to circulate arrest records 
and mug shots to private parties based only on the fact of arrest. Davis v. Paul, 505 
F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. April 14, 1974) (No. 
74-891). 
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creates a bizarre disparity: Once the incomplete nature of arrest 
records is acknowledged, the greater potential injury faced by a de-
fendant awaiting sentence would seem to present the stronger case 
for exclusion. 
On appeal from Judge Gesell's decision, the District of Columbia 
Circuit again faced the issue of arrest records not followed by a dis-
position, and ordered that the FBI expunge any arrest record from its 
files when it learns that the subject has either been acquitted or re-
leased without charge.271 A subsequent case in the same circuit, 
Tarlton v. Saxbe,212 went even further, ordering the FBI to take 
reasonable steps to verify, update, and correct the criminal-history 
information it collects before circulating such information.273 Two 
aspects of Tarlton are of special relevance. First, the plaintiff was an 
imprisoned felon who, relying on Tucker, claimed that he had been 
injured at both sentencing and parole by the use of inaccurate law 
enforcement records. Second, Chief Judge Bazelon's majority opinion 
announced that the "gravest constitutional issues" would arise if 
the statute authorizing the FBI to maintain criminal records274 were 
construed to permit their dissemination without adequate precau-
tions against inaccuracy.275 
Tarlton, however, declined to address directly the question of 
what precautions are "reasonable," remanding this question to the 
district court. Given the unique deprivation facing the offender 
awaiting sentence, a minimal precautionary effort would seem to 
include inquiring of the law enforcement agency submitting the 
report as to whether the offender is still suspected of having com-
mitted the alleged crime in question, and requesting a brief summary 
271. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revg. Menard v. Mitchell, 
328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971). 
272. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
273. The court left for subsequent determination the precise steps that the FBI 
should be required to take, but suggested that the Bureau might be required to 
expunge arrests after a specified time if no subsequent disposition has been recorded, 
to give citizens a right of access to their FBI records, or to respond to requests only 
after checking with the agency from which the information was received for an updated 
report on the dispositions. 507 F.2d at 1129-30. The court emphasized that mere 
disclaimers of completeness would not be sufficient and that the principal responsibility 
for ensuring accuracy must fall upon the state since the "subject of the files, often 
imprisoned and more often without the intellectual or financial capacity to conduct 
a personal investigation into the facts of distant arrests or convictions, will seldom 
be able to effectively challenge the accuracy of information distributed by the FBI 
before a parole board or sentencing judge." 507 F.2d at 1127. 
274. 28 u.s.c. § 534 (1970). 
275. 507 F.2d at 1123-24. Chief Judge Bazelon carefully added, however, that the 
FBI was under no obligation "to guarantee the accuracy of records" it maintains. 
507 F.2d at 1129. 
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of the evidence that supported the arrest.276 While the extent to 
which unproved and unadmitted criminal charges should be allowed 
to influence sentencing remains open to serious question, the direc-
tion in which Tarlton points would at least serve to distinguish be-
tween specific allegations of prior criminal involvement and bare 
accusatory labels that contain no corroborative details.277 
Another approach to the problem of exclusion from the pre-
sentence report of certain classes of data was taken by the Fourth 
Circuit in Baker v. United States.218 There the court, relying on its 
supervisory powers over district courts within its circuit, concluded 
that allegations of criminal conduct not referable to an "official 
record" should not be considered by the sentencing judge.270 If fol-
276. For example, a short statement that a police officer or other eyewitness had 
observed the offender commit the crime would serve to distinguish such a case from 
the far less persuasive case of a "suspicion" arrest. 
:Beyond these minimal informational requirements, some form of temporal limi• 
tation also seems essential. At some point, an arrest entry for which no subsequent 
disposition is entered should "self-destruct" and be automatically expunged, An ad• 
visory committee within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has re• 
cently recommended that arrest records in national databanks be expunged if an 
indictment does not follow the arrest within one year and a conviction within two 
years. See R.EcoRDs, COMPUTERS, supra note 75, at 245. Similarly, in Cucvas v. Leary, 
Civ. No. 70-2017 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 21, 1970), the New York City Police Department 
entered ·into a final stipulation under which certain juvenile records known as "Y,D. 
cards" (which essentially resembled arrest records) were to be destroyed as the subject 
juvenile reached his seventeenth birthday. Cf. YD Study, supra note 71, at 79. 
277. Police records, of course, constitute only one class of "accusatory" records. 
Labels such as "potential drug abuser" (the characterization involved in Mcrrikcn v. 
Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973), discussed in note 82 supra) can also be 
pejorative. Although the basis for the holding in Merriken is open to various inter-
pretations, the case did enunciate a general rule that, from the standpoint of social 
policy, has equal relevance whether the label arises from law enforcement or other 
records: "When a program talks about labeling someone as a particular type and 
such a label could remain with him for the remainder of his life, the margin of 
error must be almost nil." 364 F. Supp. at 920. 
Another case dealing with the use of unsubstantiated accusatory labels is Masiello 
v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973). There, plaintiff had been denied parole 
in part because of a pre-sentence report that the court found to be "replete with 
hearsay, inferences, and conclusions concerning alleged connections" between plain• 
tiff's family and organized crime. 364 F. Supp. at 1136. Concluding that the parole 
board had wrongly "accepted at face value some loosely-worded, unsupported asser-
tions" in the pre-sentence report for which "no identifiable sources" were cited, Judge 
Zampano ordered a new parole hearing on the ground that there was "no basis in 
fact" for the assigned classification. 364 F. Supp. at 1136. 
278. 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968). 
279. 388 F.2d at 934. The court added, however, that information as to the de• 
fendant's "general conduct and behavior, as well as his reputation in the community 
••• may be treated in the report." 388 F.2d at 934. 
There have also been several suggestions in recent cases that certain records per-
taining to investigatory contacts should either be expunged or curtailed in their 
circulation outside the recording agency. See United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 
192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973) (dictum); United States ex rel. Jackson 
v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707, 708 (3d Cir. 1967). Outside the context of sentencing, courts 
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lowed, this restriction to "official records" would limit much of the 
hearsay allegations of past criminal behavior currently found in pre-
sentence reports. Yet another ground for exclusion has bee_n estab-
lished by cases that have required re-sentencing where illegally seized 
evidence or inadmissible confessions were relied upon at the initial 
sentencing. 280 
In summary, cases such as Tucker, Baker, and Tarlton may fore-
shadow a new approach to sentencing reform-the exclusion of 
certain classes of information on the ground of insufficient reliability. 
Inevitably, delicate balancings will be needed to determine whether 
the probative value of a challenged class of information outweighs 
its questionable reliability. Once appellate courts have made the 
initial balancings, however, a major attraction of this exclusionary 
approach is that it would generally spare the sentencing court the 
obligation of conducting hearings or making ad hoc decisions as to 
challenged items of information in the pre-sentence report. Instead, 
a body of appellate law would develop to ensure consistency in the 
kinds of information that would be presented to the sentencing 
judge. Thus, the objection raised in every sentencing reform case 
since Williams-that the courts would become entrapped in a thicket 
of technicalities-would be substantially avoided by, for example, a 
per se rule that arrest records cannot be cited in pre-sentence reports. 
4. Appellate Review of the Decision-Making Process 
Although substantive review of a criminal sentence remains an 
extraordinary event in the federal courts, the occasions on which 
federal appellate courts have carefully scrutinized sentences, some-
have generally found records of investigatory contacts easier to expunge than actual 
arrest records. See, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1974) (expunge-
ment of record schoolgirl acquired by seeking information from Socialist Workers 
Party for high school report). Presumably, a case such as Paton follows the general 
principle enunciated in Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that criminal 
history records cannot be circulated once it has become clear that the subsequent 
investigation has proved inconclusive. 
280. See, e.g., Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
402 U.S. 961 (1971). But see United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970). 
Federal legislation may have supplied another unexpected limitation on the use 
of certain information in the pre•sentence report. In People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 
379, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502, 298 N.E.2d 651 (1973) (4-3 decision), the New York Court of 
Appeals ruled that the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236, 42 U.S.C. § 242a (1970), and certain regulations thereunder 
(see 37 Fed. Reg. 26790, 26800, 26806 (Dec. 15, 1972)), established a standard of abso-
lute confidentiality with respect to the records of federally-financed methadone clinics. 
Such records, the court held, could not be subpoenaed by law enforcement authorities 
even on the showing made in that case that the records sought (certain photographs 
of patients) would be used to identify a homicide suspect. 
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times requiring re-sentencings, have increased significantly within 
recent years. A partial list of the circumstances in which this review 
has been granted would include cases of reliance on misinformation 
of a constitutional magnitude,281 cases where impermissible criteria 
involving race or sex have been used,282 situations in which the court 
has failed to receive and consider mitigating circumstances,283 cases 
in which it is sho·wn that the court used a "fixed and mechanical" 
sentencing policy (generally meaning that the court has assigned the 
same sentence for a specific crime to all offenders),284 sentences that 
have been influenced by the judge's "revulsion" at the defendant's 
"social or political views,"285 sentences that reflect punishment im-
posed by the court for the defendant's failure either to plead guilty286 
or to accept a judicially approved plea bargain,287 sentences in which 
281. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 746 (1948); United States v. Weston, 
448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971). Cases following United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 
(1972), would constitute a sub-category under this heading. 
282. See, e.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974). 
283. See United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172-74 (2d Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1970). The most typical instance of 
this type of case may be the refusal of the court to respond to the prosecution's 
request for a lesser sentence. 
284. See, e.g., United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974); United States 
v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Baker, 487 F.2d 360 (2d 
Cir. 1973); United States v. Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971). The theory of these cases, best expressed in 
Daniels, is that Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), mandates a policy of 
individualized sentencing that is violated by fixed sentences for any offense, since such 
a settled policy ignores the character of the defendant. 
A close reading of these cases suggests that courts have sometimes employed this 
standard to engage covertly in substantive appellate review. For example, in Schwarz, 
the Second Circuit appears first to have determined that the sentence imposed in that 
case was disproportionate to the circumstances of the offender and from this deter-
mination concluded that the sentencing judge must therefore have employed a "fixed 
and mechanical" policy. 
285. See United States v. Brown, 497 F.2d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Mitchell, 392 F.2d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kaufman, J., concurring). 
286. See United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 948 (1973); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). While 
appellate courts have ruled that the defendant may not be punished for insisting 
"in good faitli" on going to trial, they have also ruled that the defendant who 
forgoes trial may properly receive special credit for pleading guilty. See Gollaher v. 
United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969). The 
dividing line between these two lines of decision is, to say the least, obscure. 
For the special case of an increased sentence imposed upon a retrial following 
reversal of a conviction, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), discussed 
in note 302 infra. 
287. See United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 948 (1973). For the related situation in which the sentencing judge seeks to 
extract a confession of guilt from the offender at sentencing, see Thomas v. United 
States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) (re-sentencing required where circumstances indi-
cated that sentencing judge had increased the sentence imposed because of defen-
dant's refusal to admit guilt at sentencing). 
August 1975) Sentencing Reform 1437 
the judge was improperly influenced by a belief that the defendant 
committed perjury at trial,288 and, rarest of all, sentences that "shock" 
the appellate court and yet are within the statutory maximum.289 
For the most part, these cases have confined the role of the ap-
pellate court to a procedural rather than substantive review of the 
trial court's sentencing decision. Thus, of particular interest are 
those few cases (generally involving first offenders or youthful draft 
evaders) where appellate courts have blended procedural and sub-
stantive review and suggested that the sentence was excessive in rela-
tion to the offense. In McGee v. United States,290 the Second Circuit 
instructed a trial judge either to alter the two-year sentence given a 
convicted draft evader or provide "at least a summary explanation of 
his reasons for declining to do so."291 In United States v. Daniels,292 
another Selective Service case, the Sixth Circuit ordered a reduced 
sentence where the sentencing judge noted on the record that he 
always gave the maximum sentence to draft-evaders. In both cases, 
unusual mitigating circm;nstances were clearly present.298 While 
288. See United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974) (judge must believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that perjury occurred before he may consider it); United 
States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 
264 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Contra, United States v. Wallace, 418 F.2d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 
1969); Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1951). This rule, premised 
on the belief that the accused should not be dissuaded from testifying at trial by 
fear of an increased sentence, constitutes a significant inroad upon the traditional 
rule that the sentencing judge is free to consider any evidence of criminal behavior, 
whether or not it resulted in a conviction. 
289. See Woolsey v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (en bane) (five-
year sentence given to Jehovah's Witness in draft-evasion case). Citing Woolsey, the 
Second Circuit has commented that "cracks in the wall [of appellate nonreview) are 
beginning to develop •••• " United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d ll70, II72 (2d Cir. 1973). 
290. 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J.). 
291. 462 F.2d at 247. The subsequent history of McGee is less encouraging. On 
remand, the sentencing judge disdained the Second Circuit's clear suggestion that a 
reduced sentence would be appropriate, and, in an obviously annoyed opinion, again 
imposed the same sentence with a perfunctory explanation of his reasons. United 
States v. McGee, 344 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). On appeal, the Second Circuit 
affirmed, after noting that in certain circumstances a statement of the reasons could 
"be so perfunctory or otherwise inadequate as to amount to a failure to provide a 
reasoned explanation." McGee v. United States, 465 F.2d 357, 358 (2d Cir. 1972). 
292. 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971). 
293. Defendant Daniels was a member of Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to per-
form alternate service on religious grounds; he was sentenced to a maximum five-year 
term by a judge who noted on the record that he always assigned the maximum 
penalty to draft evaders. Defendant McGee's conviction on the principal charge (refusal 
to report for induction) had been overturned on appeal; nevertheless, the trial judge 
had rejected a motion made pursuant to rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to reduce the sentence on the subordinate counts, which involved inci-
dental matters such as failing to file an information questionnaire. The Second Circuit 
noted that it was the policy of the Selective Service System not to prosecute on such 
counts alone. 462 F.2d at 246. 
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such decisions constitute at best slight inroads on the general rule of 
nonreview,294 McGee's insistence on a reasoned explanation and 
Daniel's refusal to tolerate sentences based on a fixed sentencing 
policy suggest that the federal courts can find procedural objections 
when they wish to suggest their displeasure with disproportionate 
sentences. 295 
Precedents for substantive review of basically dispositional deci-
sions now exist in analogous areas of the law. For example, in one 
intriguing but terse per curiam decision,296 the Supreme Court exam-
ined the record before a parole board and then overruled the board's 
determination, which had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, find-
ing that mere on-the-job contacts between a parolee and fellow 
employees with "police records" constituted an insufficient basis for 
parole revocation.297 
The importance of these developments, however, is overshadowed 
by the failure of the federal courts to take the next logical procedural 
step in sentencing reform: the imposition. of a requirement that the 
sentencing judge support his determination with findings of fact or 
at least a statement of reasons. As Judge Frankel has stressed,298 
without such a statement, appellate courts lack a reviewable record. 
Ideally, to create a record the sentencing judge would cite those 
specific sections of the pre-sentence report relied upon, as well as 
other policy factors considered in reaching his decision. 
Nevertheless, when confronted in Dorszynski v. United States299 
294. In his dissenting opinion in McGee, Judge Timbers noted that the Second 
Circuit had never previously reversed or modified a decision on a rule 35 motion 
for the reduction of sentence. 462 F.2d at 247. 
295. It has been suggested that some of these cases, notably United States v. 
Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974), that proscribe a "fixed and mechanical" ap-
proach, might support the use of prediction tables. Project, supra note 58, at 870-71 
(outlining, analyzing, and rejecting the argument). 
296. Arcinega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971). 
297. While the decision was not based on constitutional grounds, it appears to 
represent an initial instance of substantive review of a parole board determination 
by the Supreme Court. Other instances of review by a federal court include Kohlman 
v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 
(D. Conn. 1973). Recently, federal courts have also shown a willingness to evaluate 
the reasonableness of punishments imposed upon prison inmates for disciplinary vio-
lations. See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972); Dabney v. Cunningham, 
317 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Va. 1970); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962), 
298. Judge Frankel has emphasized the need for a statement of reasons both to 
facilitate appellate review and to increase the perceived equity in the sentencing 
process in the eyes of the offender. See Frankel, supra note IO, at 9-14, Judge 
Frankel's position has recently been endorsed by Judge Kaufman, Chief Judge of the 
Second Circuit. See Kaufman, Foreword: The Sentencing Process and ]ttdicial Inscrttt• 
ability, Second Circuit Note, 1973 Term, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 215, 220-22 (1975). 
299. 418 U.S. 424 (1974). 
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with an opportunity to require such findings,300 the Supreme Court 
reiterated its traditional position that the "sentencing function" is 
vested "exclusively in the trial court."301 Not only is the result in 
Dorszynski disappointing,302 but its reasoning seems self-contradic-
300. The immediate issue before the Court involved whether a specific statutory 
provision (section 5010(d) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 
(1970)) required a statement of reasons by the sentencing judge as to why an eligible 
juvenile defendant would receive "no benefit" from being sentenced under certain 
special provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act. In construing the statute, 
the Court determined that it was not intended to abrogate the traditional rule that 
no explanation of a sentence is required. In dicta, the Court added, in a lamentable 
overstatement of the law: "We begin with the general proposition that once it is 
determined that a sentence is within the Iinritations set forth in the statute under 
which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end." 418 U.S. at 431 (footnote omitted). 
See also United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973) (characterizing 
a statement of reasons as a "most salutary practice" but declining to order such a 
statement); United States v. Phillips, 479 F.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Brown, 479 F.2d II70, II72-73 (2d Cir. 1973). 
301. 418 U.S. at 440. However, the Court expressly reserved the constitutional 
issue whether the due process clause required a reasoned explanation of a refusal 
to sentence under the special provisions of the Act. 418 U.S. at 431 n.7. Instead, 
the majority focused on the broader question whether an appellate court has au-
thority to engage in substantive review of a sentence imposed by the trial court 
where there is no allegation of "inaccurate or improper" information. See 418 U.S. 
at 431 & n.7. In so doing, they exposed themselves to Justice Marshall's criticism 
that there are other reasons why an explanation should be required besides that of 
facilitating appellate review. 418 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., concurring). Cf. note 304 
infra. 
302. Prior to Dorszynski, several federal courts had begun to edge perceptibly 
toward the imposition of a requirement of written findings. The fountainhead of this 
movement was North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 7II (1969), in which the Court 
reasoned that, since the threat of increased sentences on retrial might deter a de-
fendant from protesting constitutional violations at his initial trial, a sentencing 
judge who imposed a harsher sentence upon retrial would be required to give rea-
sons for the increase and to set forth the factors upon which he relied. While Pearce 
fashioned an essentially prophylactic rule to protect constitutional rights at the trial 
stage, and applied only with respect to increased sentences, the Ninth Circuit had 
subsequently extended Pearce's "chilling effect" rationale to plea-bargaining situations: 
[OJnce it appears in the record that the court has taken a hand in plea bar-
gaming, that a tentative sentence has been discussed, and that a harsher sentence 
has followed a breakdown in negotiations, the record must show that no improper 
weight was given the failure to plead guilty. In such a case, the record must 
affirmatively show that the court sentenced the defendant solely upon the facts 
of his case and his personal history, and not as punishment for his refusal to 
plead guilty. 
United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d ll86, ll87-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 4II U.S. 
948 (1973). 
In addition to reciting the "chilling effect" rationale of Pearce, Stockwell also 
suggested that appellate courts must intervene to protect against the "appearance of 
abuse or vindictiveness": "[C]ourts must not use the sentencing process as a carrot and 
stick •.• , and they must not create an appearance of such a practice." 472 F.2d 
at II87. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the Pearce rule requiring a statement 
of reasons might be invoked any time the likelihood of an abuse of judicial discre-
tion could be shown. Berkowitz, The Constitutional Requirement for a Written State-
ment of Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentendng Decision: A Due Process 
Proposal, 60 IowA L. REV. 205, 231 (1975). 
Although Dorszynski left open the constitutional issue, currently the most likely 
route to the adoption of such a requirement for a statement of reasons would appear 
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tory. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority distinguishes 
procedural review of the "judicial process" by which the sentence is 
imposed, which it encourages, from substantive review, which it finds 
impermissible,303 but ignores the fact that in requesting a statement 
of reasons appellant was fundamentally seeking only a procedural 
remedy. The net effect of Dorszynski is to perpetuate an unjusti-
fiable anomaly: Although the due process clause now entitles prison-
ers denied parole to a written statement of reasons, 804 that same 
clause is apparently not applicable when an identical request is made 
at the sentencing stage. 
B. The Future of Procedural Reform 
Since Williams v. New York,805 a fundamental assumption of the 
law of sentencing has been that the rehabilitative purposes of modern 
correctional philosophy justify a relaxation of the procedural for-
malities that surround virtually every other form of judicial pro-
ceeding. 306 Long criticized and increasingly eroded, this rehabilita-
tive model has now been substantially abandoned by the United 
States Board of Parole. With the adoption of a "national paroling 
policy"307 that utilizes a static and statistically derived classification 
to lie in an appeal to the general supervisory powers of federal circuit courts. In 
both United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1973), and United States v, 
Brown, 479 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit appears to have considered 
seriously such a rule, refusing to adopt it in Velazquez in part because the defendant 
failed to make a timely request for a statement of reasons. See 482 F.2d at 142, 
Indeed, there would now seem to exist compelling reasons for the adoption of such 
a rule in the Second Circuit in order to achieve consistency with the treatment now 
afforded offenders seeking parole under United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of 
N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974). For an interesting discussion of the 
parameters on the supervisory powers of the circuit courts in reviewing sentencing 
decisions, see Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966), 
303. 418 U.S. at 443, quoting United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
304. See Cardaropoli v. Norton, Civ. No. 75-2005 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 1975); United 
States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 
1974); Monks v. Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971): Solari v. Vincent, 46 
App. Div. 2d 453, 363 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1975). The Johnson majority gave several reasons 
why a statement of reasons by the parole board should be required: (1) to facilitate 
judicial review, 500 F.2d at 930; (2) to promote "thought by the decider" and "compel" 
him "to cover the relevant points and eschew irrelevancies," 500 F.2d at 931, quoting 
M. FRANKEL, supra note I, at 40-41; (3) to prevent arbitrary denials of parole, 500 F.2d 
at 932; (4) to promote rehabilitation by relieving prisoner frustrations created by a 
failure to explain decisions, 500 F.2d at 932-33; and (5) to establish a uniform body of 
rules to minimize disparities. 500 F.2d at 933. This summary of justifications needs only 
the word "sentence" substituted for "denials of parole" to constitute an intelligent 
statement of the need for similar sentencing reform. 
305. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
306. Kadish, supra note 11, at 905. 
307. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1974); text at notes 187-92 supra. 
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system for the determination of parole eligibility, the Board of 
Parole has essentially chosen an "incapacitation" model: By using 
criteria that focus almost exclusively on the relative risk of recidivism 
that certain classes of offenders represent for society, the Board has 
implicitly acknowledged that it is unable to judge or measure re-
habilitative progress808 and so will confine its efforts to seeking to 
incapacitate offenders in terms of their marginal level of dangerous-
ness. To a considerable degree, this change of policy has foreclosed 
the ability of the federal trial judge to sentence on the traditional 
assumption that the period of incarceration actually served will be 
a function of the offender's progress toward rehabilitation.309 
For two reasons, this change of policy has also substantially under-
cut the rationale for appellate court deference to the sentencing 
judge. First, it is now increasingly difficult to assert that the benevo-
lent intent of the correctional system justifies procedural informality. 
Second, the claim that the sentencing judge is more familiar with, 
and thus better able to evaluate, the offender is substantially vitiated 
when the Board of Parole (as the administrative agency possessing the 
greatest expertise in such matters) acknowledges that it is unable to 
evaluate offenders on an ad hoc individualized basis, notwithstanding 
its greater opportunity to study the offender. In short, if the Board 
of Parole believes that it can best deal with offenders through the use 
of generalized demographic criteria as set forth in formalized rules, 
the case for unfettered discretion at the sentencing stage becomes 
increasingly tenuous. 
Given this backdrop, it seems likely that the pace of procedural 
reform of the sentencing process will soon accelerate.310 Ultimately, 
308. Project, supra note 58, at 826-28. 
309. The question of how authority should properly be allocated between sentenc-
ing judge and parole board is beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent anal-
ysis of this issue, see id. at 886-97. While federal judges may, to a limited extent, 
succeed in "overriding" the Guidelines, id. at 883, the Yale Project concluded that 
"judicial sentencing purposes" and "judges' expectations" have been impeded by the 
Board of Parole's action. Id. at 894. 
310. Subsequent to the Board of Parole's adoption of its guidelines, several courts 
have held the Board to be within the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970), and have subjected it to a variety of procedural require-
ments previously thought inapplicable. See Pickus v. Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1974); King v. United 
States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974). While the Administrative Procedure Act is not 
applicable to courts, the point here is that once formal rules and standards are pro-
mulgated (or recoguized) by courts or agencies, the standard of judicial review applied 
to their subsequent decisions inevitably becomes more strict because appellate courts 
then have manageable guidelines against which to test whether the lower court or 
agency has complied. Thus, to the extent that the sentencing courts come to use or 
consider guidelines such as those proposed by the Board of Parole (as some already 
have, see Project, supra note 58, at 878 n.334), appellate courts can, with considerably 
greater case, enforce a higher degree of procedural fonnality. 
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the only rational course this reform can take is to integrate into the 
sentencing stage the standards applicable to parole. Regardless of the 
allocation of authority between the trial courts and the parole 
boards, a disparity between the procedural rights the offender has at 
sentencing and those he possesses at parole can seldom be justified 
when both processes vitally affect the offender's interest in his liberty. 
C. Substantive Reform: The Roads Not Yet Taken 
Procedural reform has its inevitable limitations. In particular, it 
is only indirectly related to the tw'O most frequently voiced criticisms 
of the contemporary correctional system: the excessive severity of 
the sentences imposed,311 and the tendency for the system to discrimi-
nate against members of minority groups.812 This section will ex-
amine the degree to which legal theories intended to redress these 
two deficiencies have been accepted. 
I. The Concept of Proportionality 
On rare occasions federal courts have found the length of a 
criminal sentence to be so excessive as to constitute "cruel and un-
usual punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amendment.818 
These decisions have generally been predicated on a finding that the 
statutory minimum sentence was excessive in relation to the offense; 
thus construed, these cases have constituted a limitation on the legis-
lative rather than the judicial sentencing determination. 
A 1972 California supreme court decision, In re Lynch,814 boldly 
reversed this rule, holding that the comparison must be between the 
maximum sentence and the offense. Even assuming that courts must 
look to the maximum rather than the minimum penalty, how does 
a court derive standards by which to judge whether a sentence is dis-
proportionate? Lynch offered three tests: First, the court must evalu-
ate the dangerousness of the offense and the offender to society,811l 
second, the court must compare the "challenged penalty with the 
311. See note 8 supra. 
312. See W. GAYLIN, supra note 6, at 28-33; Comment, supra note 84, at 861 n.1'/. 
313. The leading case in this area is Weems v. United States, 21'1 U.S. 349 (1910), 
in which the Supreme Court invalidated a sentence of 15 years imprisonment at hard 
labor plus certain civil penalties on the ground that even the minimum sentence 
provided in the statute (12 years) would have been grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the offense (a fraudulent embezzlement involving falsification of govern-
ment records). For a discussion of cases following or distinguishing Weems, see Singer, 
Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the 
Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 
58 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 51, 64-71 (1972), 
314. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1972). 
315. 8 Cal. 3d at 425-26, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27, 503 P.2d at 930-31. 
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punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different of-
fenses which ... must be deemed more serious,"316 and, third, the 
court must make an inter-jurisdictional comparison, examining the 
severity of the penalties imposed on other jurisdictions for the same 
offense.317 
Without discounting the significance of Lynch, it seems likely 
that it will provide a remedy primarily for offenses that are only 
316. 8 Cal. 3d at 426, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227, 503 P.2d at 931 (emphasis original). 
317. 8 Cal. 3d at 427-28, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35, 503 P.2d at 938-39. Lynch is 
analyzed in Dershowitz, supra note 8, at 328-31. 
Lynch has been extended by the California supreme court in several subsequent 
cases. In In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 519 P .2d 1073 (1974), it 
held that a sentencing condition that the offender not be considered for -parole for 
a minimum of 10 years, which was required by a California recidivist statute that 
an earlier conviction had made applicable, constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
as applied to the individual circumstances of a narcotics addict convicted of selling 
heroin, primarily because the restriction ignored the extent to which the repetition 
of the earlier illegal behavior was attributable to addiction. 10 Cal. 3d at 920-21, 112 
Cal. Rptr. at 655-56, 519 P .2d at 1081. Thus Foss seems to shift somewhat the focus 
of Lynch's first criterion from the dangerousness of the offender to the question 
whether there exist exculpatory factors. See also People v. Schueren, 10 Cal. 3d 553, 
111 Cal. Rptr. 129, 516 P.2d 833 (1973). 
In People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 534 P.2d 1015 (1975), the 
California supreme court applied the Lynch rule for the first time to a violent crime 
(aggravated assault on a 72-year old man). In Wingo, the offender had received a 
term of from six months to life imprisonment. The court ordered the California Adult 
Authority to make an initial determination of the maximum sentence to enable the 
courts on review to determine whether the term would be disproportionate to the 
offense, Finally, in In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 539 P.2d 384 
(1975), the court required the Adult Authority to fix promptly the actual maximum 
term of all prisoners subject to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, allowing reviewing 
courts to apply the Lynch criteria to the actual terms. The case may well constitute 
the coup de grace £or the California variety of indeterminate sentencing. 
For decisions in other states comparable to Lynch, see Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 
815, 818-19 (Alas. 1968), and People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 177-79, 194 N.W.2d 
827 (1972). But see People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 
338 (1975). At the federal level, the Sixth Circuit has recently applied what appears 
to be the Lynch criteria in holding in the case of a first-time offender that the 
imposition of consecutive sentences of 10-20 years for possession of marijuana with 
intent to sell and 20-40 years for the sale of marijuana constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Downey v. Perini, 44 U.SL.W. 
2034 (6th Cir. July 3, 1975). The Sixth Circuit noted first that the Ohio statute in 
question imposed more severe minimum penalties for the sale and possession of 
marijuana than existed in any other state and, second, that such penalties exceeded 
the minimum sentences in Ohio for more severe crimes such as rape, kidnapping, 
and armed robbery. In contrast to Lynch and Wingo, however, the Sixth Circuit 
refused, in measuring the proportionality between the crime and the sentence, to 
consider either the maximum sentence imposed or the discretionary decision of the 
sentencing judge to make the sentences consecutive (thus ensuring an effective 30-60 
year sentence). Rather, the court announced that the scope of its review was limited 
to "an attack on the constitutionality of the statute itself." 44 U.S.L.W. at 2034. Thus, 
although Downey constitutes one of the first federal decisions to find a sentence un-
constitutional solely on the basis of the length of sentence imposed, it limits the 
Lynch approach by reviving the Weems limitation that the statute itself impose a 
minimum punishment that is unconstitutional. 
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moderately serious.318 At issue in Lynch was an indeterminate sen-
tence of up to life imprisonment for the relatively innocuous charge 
of indecent exposure.319 The court was thus able to compare the 
severe sentence imposed upon the defendant to both the lesser sen-
tences imposed for more serious crimes in California and to sen-
tences imposed for indecent exposure in other states. 
When, however, the reviewing court is confronted with a severe 
sentence imposed for a more serious crime, appellate courts have 
shown little willingness to intervene, even in relatively appealing 
circumstances. This reluctance is illustrated by the recent case of 
Rogers v. State,320 in which a seventeen-year old Black received a 
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the 
crime of rape, notwithstanding the fact that he had no prior criminal 
record.321 In a case like Rogers it is unlikely that a court will find 
support for a determination that the sentence imposed is excessive 
by looking either to punishments prescribed within the same juris-
diction for different offenses deemed more serious or to the sentences 
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime. If a court is to 
grant relief in such a case it must rely exclusively on the first test in 
Lynch and say that neither the offense nor the offender was so 
dangerous as to necessitate life imprisonment.322 Despite inviting 
318. But cf. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 534 P.2d 1015 (1975). 
319. Defendant Lynch was subject to such a sentence because of a prior conviction 
on the same charge several years earlier. Mitigating the severity of this second con• 
viction, however, was the fact that the "indecent exposure" had occurred late at night 
in the supposed privacy of defendant's own parked car. 
In general, courts seem to have been the most aggressive in imposing substantive 
limitations upon the sentencing power in the area of recidivist statutes. In addition 
to Lynch, see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 
(1974); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073 (1974), and 
People v. Morton, 48 App. Div. 2d 58, 367 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1975). Since the sentence 
imposed under such recidivist statutes is often a mandatory one (or at least one not 
fully the product of the sentencing judge's own unfettered discretion), these cases 
necessarily constitute a lesser incursion upon the citadel of judicial discretion. 
320. 257 Ark. 144, 515 S.W.2d 79 (1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. 
April 21, 1975). 
321. 257 Ark. at -, 515 S.W.2d at 87. Counsel for the defendant also stressed 
that the victim had not been otherwise injured. 
322. Such a finding could also be couched in the language of the "less drastic 
means" doctrine. In his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 
375 U.S. 889 (1963), Justice Goldberg advocated testing the constitutionality of a 
punishment by ascertaining whether it went beyond what was necessary to achieve 
the expressed legislative intent of the governing statute. 375 U.S. at 889-91. From 
this perspective, a court could say that society's legitimate interests in creating an 
adequate deterrent to rape and in incapacitating recidivists could be satisfied by 
measures less drastic than life imprisonment: Certainly, release of the offender at some 
point would be possible (even if only at middle age) without him posing a danger 
of repeating the same offense. A few cases have approached such a result in fact 
situations similar to Rogers. See Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968). 
Cf. Singer, supra note 313, at 67. See generally Morris, supra note 16, at 1162-64. 
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circumstances-a youthful offender, the absence of a prior record, a 
relative lack of violence, and the possibility that the severity of the 
sentence was attributable to racial bias-the Arkansas supreme 
court refused to consider the claim of "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment, citing instead the traditional doctrine that sentences between 
the statutory minima and maxima will not be disturbed. 323 On 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari without 
a dissenting opinion. 324 
In short, the immediate outlook for expansion of the doctrine of 
proportionality is limited.325 Courts are reluctant to confront the 
most difficult issues and appear willing to intervene only when, as in 
Lynch, they can compare the sentence imposed with relatively ob-
jective standards.326 
2. The Problem of De Facto Discrimination 
To date, courts have summarily rejected equal-protection-based 
attacks on sentencing disparities.327 In response to the claim that 
Blacks tend to receive longer sentences than Whites, they have 
replied by citing the ancient tradition of judicial discretion and the 
benevolent intent underlying the policy of individualized sentences. 
But, as courts come to use formalized prediction tables,328 these argu-
323. 257 Ark. at -, 515 S.W .2d at 87. 
324. 43 U.S.L.W. 3571 (April 21, 1975). 
325. For example, the New York State Court of Appeals, although ostensibly 
espousing the Lynch doctrine, refused to find the mandatory maximum life sentence 
for ,the sale of heroin unconstitutionally disproportionate. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 
100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338 (1975). With the Lynch approach in mind 
the court found that, "[c]ompared both 'internally' to punishments for other crimes 
under [New York l]aw, and 'externally', to punishments imposed elsewhere for the 
same or similar offenses, the narcotics laws are relatively severe, but not irrationally 
so, given the epidemic dimensions of the [drug] problem." 37 N.Y.2d at 117, 371 
N.Y.S.2d at 480-81, 332 N.E.2d at 345. Rejecting the defendant's arguments that a 
life sentence could not serve a rehabilitative function, the court found that the legis-
lature could reasonably have designed the penalty with the purposes of isolation 
and deterrence in mind. This analysis, even if one accepts its premise that the harm 
inflicted by drug trafficking exceeds that of almost all violent crimes, fails to consider 
why a lifetime of isolation is needed to incapacitate the individual or to deter ade-
quately potential offenders, given their principal interest in risk of apprehension 
rather than sentence length. 
326. An exception may exist, however, to the extent that the offender can show 
disparities in the length of sentences imposed that adversely affect members of mi-
nority groups. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 
363-66 (Marshall, J., concurring) (1972). 
327. See, e.g., Andrus v. Tucker, 421 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1970); Morrison v. Walker, 
404 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1968). 
328. For example, it is now reported that pre-sentence reports in the Southern 
District of New York contain the estimated results that would be achieved under 
the Board of Parole's Salient Factor Score. Project, supra note 58, at 878 n.334. To 
the extent that courts rely on such information, it is logically inconsistent for them 
to assert the defense of "rehabilitative purpose" in reply to an equal protection based 
challenge. 
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ments may have less force: Such tables present a far more inviting 
subject for scrutiny than does the institution of judicial discretion. 
Assuming that the use of prediction tables has a material adverse 
impact on the opportunities of members of minority groups to 
obtain probation or reduced sentences, what standard of judicial 
review should an appellate court apply to an offender's claim that the 
use of such tables is discriminatory? On the one recent occasion that 
the Supreme Court decided a case involving an equal protection 
based attack on sentencing-classification procedures, it held that a 
"rational basis" test would apply.' Yet, that case, McGinnis v. 
Royster, 829 dealt only with the relatively narrow issue whether pris-
oners must be granted credit against their sentences for pre-convic-
tion "jail time." In reply to the argument that the denial of this 
credit prejudiced minority group members (since they were less able 
to obtain bail), the Court responded, in part, that the purpose of 
incarceration was to rehabilitate offenders; thus, because pre-trial 
detention facilities were generally not equipped to offer rehabilita-
tive programs, it was not unreasonable for the state to consider only 
time served in a rehabilitation-oriented setting, such as prison.880 
This justification, however, would seem unavailable when the sub-
ject of judicial scrutiny is a prediction table that disregards the 
question of rehabilitation. 
Attacks on the constitutionality of prediction tables might be 
framed by arguing that they violate the constitutional prohibition 
on punishment of "status,"881 that they constitute irrebutable pre-
sumptions because they ignore redeeming information,882 or that 
they constitute a "fixed and mechanical approach" to sentencing, 
which violates the constitutional policy in favor of individualized 
discretion.ass While each of these arguments may be disputed on 
its respective merits,884 the context of sentencing is not yet ripe 
for the assertion of these particular theories, since the sentencing 
329. 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973). 
330. 410 U.S. at 270-73. 
331. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating punishment for 
"crime" of being narcotics addict); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972) (vagrancy statute invalidated); Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 
1110 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("Statistical likelihood that a particular societal segment will 
engage in criminality is not permissible as an all-out substitute for proof of indi• 
vidual guilt" (footnote omitted)). 
332. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Specifically, prediction tables ignore 
any facts-whether good or bad-that have not been given an assigued rating based 
upon sufficient prior experience. 
333. See note 284 supra and accompanying text. 
334. See Project, supra note 58, at 863 n.266, 870-77. 
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judge continues to exercise discretion and receives an abundance 
of information in addition to prediction-table rankings. 
In other recent Supreme Court cases involving the equal protec-
tion clause, commentators have discerned the development of an 
intermediate "reasonable means" standard of judicial scrutiny that 
lies between the "mere rationality" test of McGinnis and the strict 
scrutiny test that the Warren Court applied when it discovered a 
"fundamental interest" or a "suspect classification."335 Essentially, 
the emerging test focuses on the legislative means employed to reach 
a permissible end and requires that the end be substantially fur-
thered by the means chosen.836 Given the relatively greater efficiency 
of the prediction table in comparison with other techniques, there 
seems little doubt that prediction tables could survive this inter-
mediate form of judicial scrutiny. 
As a result, the offender seeking to challenge a prediction table 
employing factors relating to race or economic status would seem to 
be forced back upon the argument that use of these factors involves 
a "suspect classification" or infringes upon a "fundamental in-
terest."887 Under traditional equal protection analysis, a state attempt-
ing to utilize a suspect classification bears the burden of proving 
that the classification is necessary to promote a "compelling" state 
interest and that no less drastic means exist to further the interest.338 
335. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972). Compare Note, Boraas v. 
Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 508 (1974). 
336. See Gunther, supra note 335, at 18-27. Professor Gunther cites James v. Strange, 
407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 
U.S. 504 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (all the foregoing being unanimous 
decisions); and Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) as among the 
decisions employing this standard. 
The decisions employing this standard in the context of alleged de facto racial 
discrimination bear a marked resemblance in their reasoning to Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the leading Supreme Court case dealing with federal anti-
discrimination legislation. Compare Griggs with Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified 
School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the disproportionate 
adverse impact on racial minorities of special academic high schools required the 
state to demonstrate that its legitimate ends were substantially furthered by the classi-
fication technique employed). Thus, it seems possible that the Griggs method of anal-
ysis, which in effect permits the plaintiff to make a prima facie case by a statistical 
demonstration of a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected class, subject to 
rebuttal by the employer if it can demonstrate that the challenged means are suffi-
ciently closely related to its legitimate ends, may also provide an influential model 
for a court in search of appropriate standards. See note 340 infra. 
337. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
338. Chief Justice Burger has criticized the linked use of compelling state interest 
and less drastic means, stating that it represented an "insurmountable standard" and 
an absolute bar to legislation. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (dis-
senting opinion). 
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Although application of this test would probably prevent the use 
of the "suspect" factors, there are signs that unless one of the tradi-
tionally suspect classifications-race, alienage, or national origin-
are involved, the Supreme Court will not invoke the "suspect classi-
fication" form of constitutional analysis.339 Even for the minority 
group offender, a significant barrier remains in demonstrating to a 
court that the use of criteria that on their face appear racially neu-
tral, but that substantially overlap with racial status, constitutes the 
use of a suspect classification.340 Thus, the relevance of the suspect 
classification doctrine to the problem of sentencing classifications is 
limited. 
Yet, to the extent that prediction tables are given material weight 
in the determination of sentence, some standard of judicial review 
must be found that can balance the strong interest of the state in 
utilizing an accurate system for the identification of recidivists 
against the constitutional imperative that invidious classifications 
not be made on the basis of race. In such situations, courts are 
traditionally expected to accommodate both values to the maximum 
extent possible. Here, an accommodation seems best effected by a 
limited use of the less drastic means doctrine. A court could utilize 
this approach by asking the following questions with respect to each 
racially linked predictive factor: What loss of predictive efficiency 
would the state sustain if it were required to omit the factor from 
its prediction table? Would the state still possess an adequate and 
efficient means for the differentiation of offenders according to their 
future risk of recidivism if a specific factor or factors shown to be 
closely racially linked were eliminated? Thus framed, the issue would 
not be whether prediction tables could be used, but to what extent 
the state should sacrifice a degree of predictive efficiency to other 
considerations. 
To the extent that the prediction table's efficiency is not ma-
terially reduced by the elimination of the racially tainted factor, it 
could be said that the state possesses a less restrictive means of obtain-
339. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 43 U.SL.W. 4449 (U.S. April 15, 1975); San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (holding in part 
that wealth and poverty need not be "suspect classifications"); Geduldig v. Aiello, 
417 U.S. 484- (1974). 
340. Some degree of overlap between criteria racially neutral on their face (e.g., 
"receipt of public assistance," "single parent household," "urban living environment," 
and "juvenile police record") and racial status must realistically be acknowledged as 
generating a "suspect classification." The issue is how great a degree of overlap 
must exist before a court will recognize that such seemingly neutral criteria in fact 
mask racial status. It is in this area that a case such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co,, 
401 U.S. 424 (1971), with its emphasis on statistical correlations, may supply a useful 
precedent, notwithstanding its nonconstitutional origins. 
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ing its legitimate objective-use of the same table minus the tainted 
factor.841 Even where the loss of predictive efficiency is material, the 
doctrine might be used to claim that the state must nevertheless 
demonstrate that the tainted factor cannot be replaced by other 
equally accurate criteria.842 
341. To illustrate how such a test might be employed, assume a prediction table, 
similar to the Board of Parole's Salient Factor Score, that classifies offenders into three 
risk categories: "good" (meaning an 80 per cent chance of "success" over a specified 
period after release on parole), "fair" (meaning a 65 per cent chance), and "poor" 
(meaning a 50 per cent chance). Next assume that a given criterion (such as failure 
to obtain a high school diploma) is racially -linked in that it is disproportionately 
present among Black offenders. Finally, assume that ·the elimination of this racially-
linked factor would reduce the predictive efficiency of the table such that the "good" 
rating would signify only a 75 per cent chance of success and the "fair" rating only a 
60 per cent chance (the residual "poor" rating would remain at 50 per cent). What 
injury would the state suffer by being forced in such a context to use the revised 
table without the tainted factor? The state is not being required to release any offender 
at any risk level; rather, the only restraint imposed is upon its ability to identify a 
select group of "good" risks through the use of a discriminatory criterion. 
One limitation must be noted on the concept that racially-linked criteria should 
not be used in determining sentence: Factors showing personal culpability or in-
stability (for example, prior convictions) should always be seen as a permissible basis 
for differentiation regardless of their disproportionate presence in minority group 
populations since such factors relate to individual status, not group status. While the 
argument can be made that prior convictions should not affect the length of sentence 
where the offender has already been punished for the prior conviction (since, according 
to this argument, enhanced punishment because of the prior conviction constitutes a 
species of "double jeopardy" with regard to the first conviction), courts have been 
quick to reject this argument summarily. See United States v. Haygood, 502 F.2d 166, 
168 n.4, 169-70 (7th Cir. 1974). This result seems correct to the extent that it is reasonable 
to infer from the prior conviction that the offender poses a marginally greater risk of 
recidivism than othenvise similarly situated offenders. 
342. For example, the Board of Parole's Salient Factor Score does not employ s~me 
factors that are generally agreed to possess a high correlation with recidivism. An 
example is the age of the offender, young offenders being much more likely to engage 
in subsequent illegal acts than middle-aged offenders. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 36-37 (1964). In a sense then, a middle-aged Black 
offender whose risk-rating is affected by racially sensitive criteria may be held hostage 
within a risk category that his individual circumstances do not justify, given the lower 
prospect of recidivism that his age creates. A problem exists with this argument, how-
ever, which becomes evident when we consider the case of a white offender who 
clainls that he also is held hostage within an overly severe risk category unless 
he is permitted to demonstrate through the use of racially sensitive variables that 
he poses a lesser risk of recidivism than minority group offenders. For, if we allow 
each offender to demonstrate, by adducing additional criteria, the extent to which 
he poses a lesser risk than other persons assigned to the same risk category, the 
problem of discriminatory criteria re-enters by the back door: The offender who 
is the beneficiary of a racially sensitive factor can be expected to point out that 
he should be treated more leniently than othenvise similarly situated offenders 
who do not share the racially sensitive factor. Consistency then requires that an 
offender not be permitted to use for exculpatory purposes factors that applicable 
standards of fairness bar the state from using. 
On the technical level, use of additional criteria not considered by the prediction 
table may not be generally feasible without a new validation study. Thus, as a 
practical matter, the offender may be limited to showing either that omission of the 
tainted factor would not materially reduce the table's efficacy or that other tables 
employing less objectionable criteria could be used without a material loss in predictive 
capacity. 
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It is generally agreed that the doctrinal precondition for the use 
of the less drastic means doctrine is the presence of either a "funda-
mental interest" or a "suspect classification."343 Furthermore, it 
would seem clear that the offender's interest in his own liberty and 
in freedom from unnecessary incarceration represents his penulti-
mate fundamental interest, exceeded only by his interest in avoiding 
capital punishment.344 Does this mean then that the nonminority 
group offender can also utilize the less drastic means doctrine to 
object to differentiation in treatment on the basis of prediction 
tables that make punishment -effectively depend upon his status? 
While there is merit in this position,345 it faces the problem that 
prediction tables arguably already represent the use of less drastic 
means (except to the extent that they utilize "suspect classifications" 
for which no "compelling" state interest can be shown), because such 
tables undeniably relate punishment to the future risk of recidi-
vism;346 in this light, such tables can be said not to in~inge unneces-
343. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 335, at 8-10, 24. 
344. This is the point at which Professor Singer begins his analysis of what he 
terms the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine. See Singer, 'supra note 313. 
In Speiser v. Randall, 35'7 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court described the criminal de• 
fendant's interest in his liberty as an "interest of transcending value." 35'7 U.S. at 
525-26. Clearly, the interest in one's own liberty must be seen as of greater interest 
to the individual than such recognized fundamental interests as voting, see Harper 
v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), criminal appeals, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956), and the right to travel. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), 
In addition, because of the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual 
punishments,'' it has clearer constitutional origins than such unenumerated rights as 
the right to travel interstate. 
345. In one of the first modem Supreme Court decisions to subject legislative 
classifications to a "strict" equal protection scrutiny, Justice Douglas seemed to suggest 
that the offender's fundamental interest in avoiding the unequal application of a harsh, 
punishment (sterilization) justified use of the same "strict scrutiny" standard as is 
applied when a suspect classification is involved: "When the law lays an unequal hand 
on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes 
one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a 
particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). At issue in Skinner was a punishment that was 
prescribed for the crime of grand larceny, but not for the equally blameworthy crime 
of embezzlement. By analogy, one can argue that the same "invidious" classification is 
made when two offenders convicted of the same crime are treated unequally because 
of factors unrelated to blameworthiness. Note, however, that the Skinner decision 
emphasizes the absence of a scientific justification for the disparity in treatment, 316 
U.S. at 542. Thus, prediction tables, to the extent that they have been cxperimentaUy 
validated, present a somewhat different issue. 
346. As noted earlier, prediction tables are more accurate and produce a lower 
total number of "false positives" than other techniques. In this sense, they represent a 
less intrusive infringement upon the individual's liberty. However, as discussed earlier 
at notes 196-201, if we define the offender's fundamental interest to comprehend 
the concept of "fairness between offenders" (i.e., freedom from unequal application of 
punishment in a manner unrelated to blameworthiness), then prediction tables no 
longer constitute less drastic means. 
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sarily upon the offender's fundamental interests. While constitutional 
prohibitions on the punishment of status exist, courts have not yet 
connected this concept with that of "suspec~ classifications." Thus, 
if courts continue to apply a relaxed scrutiny test to cases not in-
volving suspect classifications, it is unlikely that prediction tables 
will be found to violate the equal protection clause on the theory 
that they involve a punishment of status. 
Yet, ultimately such a resolution is unsatisfactory. Since the 
judicial revolution of the New Deal, the minimal scrutiny test has 
been based on the assumption that courts should permit the legis-
lature to experiment with respect to economic and social problems 
that the courts themselves are not competent to solve and that 
require democratic compromises. However, use of the minimal scru-
tiny standard is not justified in an area, such as the administration 
of justice, in which courts have both a special competence and a 
special role to play.347 Indeed, in the context of sentencing and 
parole, few legislative classifications ( other than statutory sentence 
ranges) have actually been made; instead, the normal pattern is for 
the operative classifications to be made by administrative decision 
makers exercising unfettered discretion. Given the absence of au-
thoritative legislative approval of such administrative practices as 
the Board of Parole's Salient Factor Score, judicial deference to any 
presumed intent of the legislature seems inappropriate. Thus, use 
of the less drastic means doctrine would remand to the legislature 
the critical choices that it has the initial option to make and remind 
it of the possible constitutional implications involved.848 
In short, a functionalist justification for strict scrutiny of dispo-
sitional classifications can be formulated-that is, that courts have 
a special duty to supervise classifications made within the criminal 
justice system-that is independent of the "suspect classification" 
and "fundamental interest" rationales. If this premise is accepted, 
then the less drastic means doctrine presents a useful device for 
avoiding a direct constitutional confrontation between the state's 
interest in accuracy and the individual's objection that his status, 
347. See Gunther, supra note 335, at 30-31. As Professor Gunther points out, 
decisions such as James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 
715 (1972), and Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), illustrate that the current 
Court is relatively more willing to invalidate statutes on equal protection grounds in an 
area, such as criminal procedure, in which it has a special competence and responsibility. 
348. See Gunther, supra note 335, at 44-48. Use of the less drastic means doctrine 
in effect remands an issue to the legislature and does not preclude further legislative 
action. This seems particularly appropriate where the indications are that the legisla-
ture has never consciously focused on the basic policy and constitutional issues in-
volved. 
1452 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:1361 
rather than his conduct, has become the chief determinant of the 
length of his incarceration. 
D. A Summary and Evaluation 
While the prognosis for procedural reform seems favorable, the 
likelihood of short term substantive reform of the sentencing process 
is at best speculative. Substantive appellate review of sentences is still 
at an embryonic stage. Similarly, the doctrine of proportionality can-
not develop to its full potential as long as the philosophy of cor-
rections remains in a transitional stage: Without agreement within 
the correctional system as to whether the purpose of confinement is 
rehabilitation or incapacitation, the proportionality of the punish-
ment to the offense and the offender cannot be measured. Moreover, 
even if standards of proportionality can be agreed upon by courts, 
such standards will establish only maximum boundaries on the sen-
tencing power. There remains then the secondary but substantial 
issue of fairness among offenders-the problem of ensuring equitable 
classifications and gradations within the outermost limits set by the 
concept of proportionality. In this area the courts have yet to take 
the first steps toward subjecting sentencing classifications to an equal 
protection analysis. 
At the procedural level as well, important issues have simply not 
yet been addressed-for example, the problem of finding a mech-
anism by which diagnostic information and opinions can be re-
viewed, questioned, and challenged. Although Wes ton and its prog-
eny have now clearly established a right to challenge and demand 
verification of material charges in the pre-sentence report, the move-
ment toward procedural reform of the sentencing process in other 
important areas has been slow. One such area still awaiting judicial 
attention is the establishment of ground rules to preclude the use of 
inherently unreliable classes of information in the pre-sentence 
report. 
Assuming then that courts will continue to individualize sen-
tences on a case-by-case basis in the foreseeable future, and that the 
remedies foreshadowed in the emerging case law offer at best only 
a partial answer to the problems of individualization, what should 
be done? The answers that will next be considered involve a basic 
restructuring of the means by which dispositional information is 
presented to the decision maker. 
V. RESTRUCTURING THE SENTENCING PROCESS 
Recent proposals for sentencing reform have tended to view sen-
tencing disparities as primarily the result of either idiosyncratic 
prejudices or differences in judicial philosophies. Thus, in order to 
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standardize the process by which sentencing information is assessed, 
reformers have generally advocated either adoption of sentencing 
councils or substantive appellate review of criminal sentences.349 
The sentencing council is an advisory mechanism that requires 
the sentencing judge, before passing sentence, to discuss the of-
fender's case with two other judges of the same district court who 
have reviewed the pre-sentence report. It is anticipated that this 
interchange of judicial views will lead the sentencing judge to mod-
erate his own opinions and will result in the development of a 
general consensus. While proponents of the sentencing council be-
lieve that its use has led to greater leniency, researchers at the Federal 
Judicial Center have recently questioned the assumption that sen-
tencing councils produce greater uniformity and have reached the 
preliminary conclusion that judges seem to persist in applying their 
own individual philosophies.350 
Another attempt at standardization, analogous to the sentencing 
council, involves a variation on the numerical grading scale' used in 
the prediction table. Judge Frankel has recommended that each 
sentencing judge grade the defendant before him on a numerical 
scale with respect to such factors as severity of the offense, emotional 
stability, and prior criminal involvement. His assumption is that 
judges share a relatively objective perception of the facts before 
them, but apply different judicial philosophies.351 
349. One of the most forceful advocates of both reforms has been Judge Frankel 
of the Southern District of New York. For his views on the sentencing council, see 
M. FRANKEL, supra note I, at 70-71. At the time of his writing of Criminal Sentences, 
the sentencing council had been adopted in only three judicial districts in the United 
States. See Zavatt, Sentendng Procedure in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York, 41 F.R.D. 469 (1966). Those skeptical of the value of 
the sentencing counsel have suggested that its use may produce a diluted "committee" 
decision in which no judge has to face the ultimate responsibility of making a personal 
decision. Moreover, they have pointed to the generally poor performance of parole 
boards, which function along the same lines as sentencing councils. See W. GAYLIN, 
supra note 6, at 223-24. Another problem has been raised by Judge Frankel: that 
adoption of the sentencing council could unfortunately become an "ersatz" substitute 
for true appellate review and thus would inhibit the necessary development of a 
substantive body of sentencing law. See Frankel, Who's To Review Federal Sentences?, 
N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1974, at 1 (criticizing an advisory committee proposal to amend rule 
35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a post-sentencing review 
by a sentencing council of any sentence in excess of two years). See also NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMN, ON CRIMINAL JUsrICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS 
C-120 to -122 (1973) (recommending the creation of sentencing appeals boards as an 
alternative to appellate review to achieve equality among offenders convicted of 
similar crimes). 
350. A. PARTRIDGE&: w. ELDRIDGE, supra note 12, at 33. 
351. M. FRANKEL, supra note I, at 113-14. Conversely, Professor Hogarth concluded 
in his monumental study that, once judges share relatively common perceptions of 
facts before them, they then tend to behave similarly in sentencing. The problem, Ho-
garth found, was that judges do not generally share such common perceptions of the 
operative facts: "The difficulty arises from the fact that different magistrates tend to 
perceive similar cases differently." J. HoGARm, supra note 6, at 380. The Second 
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While these suggestions are useful, they share the common as-
sumption that the fundamental problem in sentencing lies in differ-
ing judicial philosophies and attitudes among judges as to the proper 
penalty to be imposed. These critiques overlook the possibility that 
the information reaching the judge may be seriously distorted, pre-
sented in a manner that is susceptible to selective interpretation, or 
affected by the institutionalized biases present in current record-
keeping procedures. As a result, similarly situated offenders may be 
made to appear dissimilar. 
Any program for sentencing reform must deal with two basic 
assumptions of the current system: the concept of the probation 
officer as a neutral investigator, able to gather and assess the available 
information about the offender with detached impartiality, and the 
belief that an all-inclusive approach to data collection best serves 
the decision maker by providing him with an in-depth understand-
ing of the offender. If (as we have seen) these premises are no longer 
viable, then one is left with a procedural structure from which the 
theoretical keystones have been removed. In their place, two basic 
proposals will be made: first, that the system reduce its dependence 
on the probation officer as the conduit of information and evaluation 
by using defense-conducted pre-sentencing studies, and, second, that 
unnecessary data collection be circumscribed in candid recognition 
of the fact that the goal of total understanding of an individual is 
dangerous and illusory. 
A. Increasing the Conduits of 1nformation: The Case for 
a Parallel Pre-Sentence Study by Defense Counsel 
The contemporary pre-sentence investigation is essentially an 
"inquisitorial" rather than an "adversarial" process. Social scientists 
have used the foregoing terms to distinguish legal procedures in 
which a single-skilled factfinder is relied upon to make the relevant 
determinations from those in which factual issues are resolved after 
competing presentations by counsel.852 The relevance of this distinc-
tion for sentencing purposes becomes obvious when experimental 
findings comparing the relative efficacy of the two techniques are 
examined. Recently, a team of psychologists and lawyers at the Uni-
Circuit Sentencing Study prepared by the Federal Judicial Center also casts doubts 
on the idea that disparities result because some judges are "tough" and some "soft" 
on sentencing, concluding that most judges tend to behave in a highly individualistic 
manner, sometimes assigning severe sentences and sometimes lenient ones. A. PAR• 
TRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, supra note 12, at 37. According to this view, even if each judge 
is highly consistent in terms of his own pattern, the aggregate results will remain 
erratic. 
352. Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision-
making, 86 HARv. L. REv. 386, 388 (1972). 
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versity of North Carolina published the findings of experiments 
designed to test the impact of adversarial presentation under con-
trolled laboratory conditions.353 As a hypothesis for their research, 
they adopted the observation of the legal philosopher, Lon Fuller, 
that only an adversarial presentation can effectively counteract the 
"natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar 
that which is not yet fully known."354 Fuller's thesis was that in most 
legal proceedings in which evidence is heard, a point is reached at 
which the facts begin to suggest a familiar legal label; at this point, 
without the safeguard of an adversarial presentation, a danger exists 
that hasty stereotyping will occur with the result that "what starts 
as a preliminary diagnosis designed to direct the inquiry tends, 
quickly and imperceptibly, to become a fixed conclusion .... "355 
The findings of the North Carolina study confirmed Fuller's thesis,356 
and added an additional finding: decision makers tend to avoid ex-
treme judgments when subjected to an adversary presentation.357 
Laboratory experiments are, of course, open to the criticism that 
they do not adequately recreate the reality of the courtroom. It is 
noteworthy that in the one sentencing proceeding in which attorneys 
have historically been permitted to participate, the juvenile court dis-
positional hearing, a team of social scientists has noted that the 
presence or absence of counsel has a significant effect on the severity 
of the sentence imposed.358 What puzzled these scientists was that 
even where the attorney did not actively participate at sentencing, 
the client still received a less severe sentence than where an attorney 
was not present. These two sets of experiments suggest that the 
presence of an attorney, even in a passive role, may inhibit the ten-
dency that exists in an "inquisitorial' proceeding to pigeonhole the 
subject too quickly. 
The findings of these studies point toward a highly unorthodox 
conclusion: some role for adversarial tactics at the dispositional stage 
may be essential. This modification of the sentencing procedure 
would not only reduce the probation officer's monopoly over dispo-
353. Thibaut, Walker &: Lind, supra note 352. 
354. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 34, 44 (H. Berman 
ed. 1971), quoted in Thibaut, Walker &: Lind, supra note 352, at 390. 
355. Fuller, supra note 354, at 43. The result, Fuller adds, is that "all that confirms 
the diagnosis makes a strong imprint on the mind while all that runs counter to it is 
received with diverted attention." Id. at 44. In this respect, Fuller's thesis bears a strong 
resemblance to the theory of cognitive dissonance and Professor Hogarth's findings. 
See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text. 
356. Thibaut, Walker &: Lind, supra note 352, at 401. 
357. See id. at 399. 
358. Ferster &: Courtless, Pre-Dispositional Data, Role of Counsel and Decisions in a 
Juvenile Court, 7 L. &: Soc. REv., Winter 1972, at 195, 206-07. 
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sitional information, but would also begin to rationalize the basically 
subjective attempt to gauge human character by ensuring that the 
dispositional authority was made aware of alternative evaluations 
and of the latitude of possible interpretations. In particular, defense-
initiated pre-sentence reports may offer a solution to the tendency 
toward overprediction that appears to be inherent in clinical and 
diagnostic information. Except in extreme cases, it is unlikely that 
the alternative of courtroom cross-examination of the psychiatrist 
would prove feasible.350 Instead, reciprocal disclosure of psychiatric 
reports and evaluations between the probation office and defense 
counsel would permit commentary and criticism by each side's ex-
perts without ensnarling the psychiatrists in a full-scale hearing.Boo 
In addition, there is reason to believe that this type of adversarial 
procedure would place strong role pressure on the clinical expert to 
avoid extreme characterizations of the offender.361 
As prediction tables and similar rating devices come into greater 
use at the sentencing stage, the case for allocating a greater role to 
defense counsel is strengthened. Because prediction tables by defi-
nition focus on a few pre-selected variables and ignore other data, it 
becomes more feasible to permit defense counsel to contest the accu-
racy of the critical facts that under such rating systems would have 
a demonstrable impact on the risk level assigned the offender.Boll 
At the same time, because these tables are incapable of giving effect 
to information for which no pre-determined value has been assigned, 
they tend to create irrebutable presumptions, unless defense counsel 
359. A number of arguments have been advanced as to why the psychiatrist should 
not be cross-examined, many of which overlap with the reasons underlying the excep-
tion in rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permitting the sen-
tencing judge not to disclose diagnostic opinions in certain circumstances. In addition 
to the standard arguments that the psychiatrist would be inhibited in his future 
communications to the court and that the doctor-patient relationship would be im-
paired, Judge Dembitz of the New York Family Court has argued persuasively that 
such a step would consume the very scarce supply of forensic psychiatrists available 
to the courts. See In re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 256-57, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359, 367 (Fam. 
Ct. 1967). 
360. Also, asking the court psychiatrist to reply in writing to the questions or 
criticisms of another clinician or to consult and produce a joint evaluation seems less 
likely to provoke a defensive reaction than subjecting him to cross-examination. 
361. Thibaut, Walker, and Lind discuss "attribution" theory as a possible explanation 
of their results. The theory suggests that the legal decision maker is under strong "role 
pressure" to avoid any manifestation of bias, and will therefore be reluctant to react 
negatively to information or views which oppose his bias. The authors suggest that 
the adversarial process intensifies this pressure, with the result that the decision maker 
will be more likely to balance his judgment. 
362. Put simply, as the scope of the information that could have a material impact 
on the sentence assigned is reduced, it represents less of a procedural burden to permit 
greater use of adversarial tactics (such as the presentation of witnesses and cross-
examination) in order to rebut challenged facts. Conceivably, the use of such tactics 
could be restricted to situations in which defense counsel could show that rebuttal 
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is given an opportunity effectively to present any redeeming infor-
mation that has been ignored by such tables.363 
In one sense, the idea of a defense conducted pre-sentence study 
represents only an extension of the defendant's common-law right 
of allocution-the ancient, but limited, right to address to the sen-
tencing judge any reasons why the sentence should be mitigated. 
The President's Commission has recommended that defense counsel 
have access to auxiliary services resembling those available to a mod-
em and well-equipped probation oflice.364 Nor is the idea of a defense 
conducted pre-sentence study unprecedented: In the English sen-
tencing system, the defense counsel typically presents extensive infor-
mation to the court, occasionally calling witnesses and developing 
arguments at considerable length.365 The success of this idea, how-
ever, hinges upon the answers to two basic questions. First, will 
sentencing judges be willing and able to rely upon the accuracy and 
candor of defense-conducted studies? Second, would the defense's 
clinical experts be able to protect the integrity of their findings 
from overzealous attorneys? 
Preliminary experience with defense-conducted studies suggests 
that both questions can be answered affirmatively. The Washington, 
D.C. Legal Aid Agency conducted experimental studies on these 
questions for several years, using a staff that included a psychiatrist, 
social workers, and investigative paraprofessionals.366 In overview, 
three points seem significant about the Washington experiment: 
first, dealing with randomly assigned defendants and approaching 
of the challenged information would result in a different classification under the rating 
system being employed. 
It is, of course, essential to such a procedure that the nature and mechanics of 
any prediction table or other rating system be fully disclosed to defense counsel. Re-
vised rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can be narrowly read not 
to require disclosure of such information, since it is not literally a part of the pre. 
sentence report. The purposes underlying the revisions to rule 32 would, however, 
be substantially frustrated if such a restrictive interpretation were followed. 
363. Prediction tables inevitably are limited to the factors incorporated in the valida-
tion tests upon which they are based. To the extent that they are assumed by the 
dispositional authority to represent a summary evaluation of all the relevant informa-
tion about the offender, they create a misleading impression, which defense counsel 
should be permitted to correct. 
364. CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 65, at 151. 
365. Meador, supra note 14, at 108-09. Dean Meader noted that defense counsel's 
presentation is basically adversary in form. Id. at 108. Indeed, under English sentencing 
procedures, the role played by defense counsel far exceeds that of the prosecution. 
Symposium, A Criminal Case in England: From Arrest Through Appeal, IO AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 263, 315 (1971). See Meador, supra, at 107-09. 
366. Dash, Medalie &: Rhoden, Demonstrating Rehabilitative Planning as a Defense 
Strategy, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 408 (1969). See also Medalie, The Offender Rehabilitation 
Project: A New Role for Defense Counsel at Pretrial and Sentencing, 56 GEO. L.J. 2 
(1967). 
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their cases as a social worker would a client, the defense team 
apparently was able to acquire substantially more information 
than were the probation officers conducting the official pre-sentence 
study (who alone had access to the official records);867 second, the 
defense attorney's participation in the process was limited by strict 
ground rules, and no editing of the defense report was permitted;868 
:finally, a high level of judicial acceptance of defense recommen-
dations was obtained, in part because probation was not automati-
cally recommended.869 
Equipping public defender agencies with the resources to prepare 
separate pre-sentence reports will obviously be costly. In return, it 
introduces into the dispositional process the important element of 
adversarial persuasion without adding the trial-type standards that 
courts since Williams v. New York have sought to avoid. 
B. Circumscribing Data Collection: The Case for Less Knowledge 
In summary, this article has argued that the pursuit of com-
plete understanding of the offender has led to three adverse conse-
quences. The first of these consequences is a Gresham's law effect: 
"Bad" information drives out the "good" because the pre-sentence 
inquiry degenerates into a search for previously recorded adverse 
labels. Faced with a constant need to classify a large number of 
individuals quickly, the decision maker often seizes upon any re-
corded information that will provide him with a basis for differen-
tiation, regardless of how remote in time or tenuous in its sig-
nificance it may be. 
The second adverse consequence is the problem of sensory over-
load-more information is assembled than can be meaningfully put 
to use. A consequence of this excessive accumulation of data is the 
tendency for the decision maker to make selective use of individual 
items bf information so as to confirm his initial attitude toward the 
offender. Superfluous detail thus blinds the sentencing judge to the 
basic similarities between offenders and thereby multiplies the possi-
bilities for sentencing disparities. 
367. Dash, Medalie &: Rhoden, supra note 366, at 424. In part, this ability was based 
on longer association of the defense team with the defendant (beginning shortly after 
arrest) and the defendant's resulting greater confidence in the team. 
368. Id. at ·425. The attorney was permitted to use or not to use the report on an 
all-or-nothing basis, but not to quote selectively from it. Id. Failure to use this report 
in such a procedure would probably have signaled to the sentencing judge that the 
report's findings were adverse. 
369. Probation was recommended in slightly more than half the cases handled, 
with a 75 per cent rate of judicial acceptance, Id. at 426. In addition, the defense team 
undertook a plan of total rehabilitation strategy for the offender, often finding him 
employment or locating educational programs. Id. at 427, 
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Finally, the pursuit of complete understanding of the offender 
results in the problem of unevenness. While ideally it might be 
desirable to understand the offender in complete idiosyncratic detail, 
the practical consequence of this attempt in a world inhabited by 
decision makers who must act on the basis of comparative appear-
ances is the differentiaton of offenders on the basis of their vulnera-
bility to institutional record-keeping. Because of the great disparities 
in the probability that prior misconduct will result in an accessible 
record, the attempt to find all records relating to the offender's past 
life ensures that those individuals who are "record-prone" will be 
prejudiced. 
In the last analysis, these and other deficiencies can be sum-
marized by saying that in the attempt to gather information about 
most individuals there exists a point of diminishing returns, which, 
once passed, leads not to greater clarity, but only to confusion and 
false comparisons. The assiduous gathering of speculative hunches, 
stale data, and other random fragments of information in the name 
of total knowledge, benefits few and may injure many. 
Few images of the law in action are more chilling than the 
relentless, unending pursuit of Jean Valjean in Victor Hugo's Les 
Miserables for the petty crime of stealing a loaf of bread. This image 
frightens us because it shows the law to be unforgiving, implacable, 
and, above all, pointlessly obsessed with preventing the individual 
from escaping his past misdeeds, however trivial.370 This same ob-
sessive concern is present in the current sentencing ideology, which 
insists that the offender's past life be fully portrayed from the time 
of his first juvenile encounter with law enforcement authorities. Not 
only is this effort disproportionate to the results that can be achieved, 
but this initial error is compounded by the further insistence on 
extrapolating an impressionistic portrait of the offender from such 
isolated facts. 
An appropriate starting point for the reform of present systems 
of data collection would be to refocus dispositional criteria on those 
classes of data that are available on a relatively equal basis for· all 
offenders in order that each pre-sentence inquiry might employ a 
uniform threshold level of attention. Rules should be formulated 
to exclude from the pre-sentence report unreliable data, such as 
370. Historically, American society has placed a high value on the idea that every 
individual should be entitled to a "second start." As a number of American social 
critics and historians, beginning with Frederick Jackson Turner, have pointed out, 
by escaping to the frontier or the city, the individual could discard the limitations of 
the past and start anew. For an analysis of the impact of modern record-keeping on 
this theme of the second chance see C. Lister, The Confidentiality of Pupil's School 
Records 69, (1969) (unpublished; available on request from the R..~~11 Sage Foundation, 
230 Park Ave., New York, New York). ' 
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arrest records, most pupil records, and pre-delinquency predictions, 
that may be distorted by the subject's exposure to record-keeping. 
Similarly, a standard must be established by which the inclusion of 
stale data is proscribed.871 Such rules need not bar all information 
that falls short of a criminal conviction,872 but they must protect 
the principle that a mere encounter with the law, such as an arrest, 
is a neutral event without legal significance.378 
More difficult questions arise when we turn our attention from 
law-enforcement and similar accusatory records to the broader prob-
lem of the attempt made during the pre-sentence inquiry to under-
stand the "whole person" of the offender. At a minimum, most 
recent critics would agree that the current attempt to portray each 
offender at full length fails to provide a sufficient degree of standardi-
zation. Some critics would go farther and argue that it is beyond 
the competence of the criminal justice system to consider any factors 
other than the offender's criminal act.874 In their favor, it must be 
observed that the judging of innate character is a task for which 
novelists and historians, not lawyers, have the appropriate training, 
temperament, and control over their subjects, as well as the ultimate 
371. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 168l(c) (Supp. I 1971) (barring the reporting of credit informa-
tion older than seven years). See also sources cited in note 239 supra. Although certain 
items of information (such as a prior conviction) might be useful regardless of age, 
it seems clear, for instance, that at some point an ancient arrest record no longer 
possesses probative value. 
372. Thus, information in the prosecution file of other serious crimes that were 
not prosecuted because of the instant conviction could be included if the prosecution 
is prepared to introduce corroborative testimony. The important point is that 
unsupported allegations of prior criminal activity should not be considered, both 
because of the axiomatic principle of presumed innocence and because of the dis-
criminatory impact of the use of such data. 
373. Opponents of such a reform can argue that the judge, unlike the jury, has 
traditionally been permitted to consider at a voir dire incompetent or inadmissible 
evidence. Yet a major difference exists between the situation of the defendant at trial 
and at sentencing: at trial, he is protected by the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt; at sentencing, he may be subjected to years of additional imprison• 
ment based on nothing more than speculation. 
374. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 144-45. Although the view• 
point in Struggle for Justice, that discretion should be completely eliminated, has 
gained few adherents, an increasing number of judges and academics have begun to 
support the idea of requiring mandatory, short, fixed sentences for most crimes. A 
variety of justifications for such a policy have to date been advanced: the need for 
increased deterrence, the desirable effect of a "sudden short sharp shock" (namely, 
prison) upon the offender, the need to reduce both sentencing disparities and the 
"revolving door" aspects of the criminal justice system, and the advantages of ending 
prisoner uncertainty as to the length of their sentences. For representative discussions 
of the policy of mandatory fixed prison terms, see L. ORLAND &: H. TYLER, JR., 
JUSTICE IN SENTENCING 75 (1974) (comments of Judge Constance Baker Motley and 
Dean Abraham Goldstein); J. WILSON, THINKING AlloUT CRIME 162-82 (1975); Cover 
Story: The Crime Wave, TIME, June 30, 1975, at IO, 21-24 (cataloging recent experi-
ments with mandatory, short, fixed sentences). At a minimum, this trend shows that 
the concept of individualization is at least on the defensive and subject to critidsm. 
Salutary as such a transition seems, it must, however, be noted before the pendulum 
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responsibility if they fail. Yet, the total elimination of discretion 
from sentencing would also extinguish discretion's corollary, com-
passion. Moreover, even if discretion were denied judges, it would 
still remain in the hands of the prosecution and police, who would 
continue to decide which offenders were to be charged and for what 
offense. While this article will not attempt to settle the debate be-
tween the critics opposed to discretion and those who maintain that 
objective criteria do exist to differentiate among offenders,375 one 
suggestion might be made: The degree to which the pre-sentence 
inquiry should be curtailed should be a function of the degree to 
which defense counsel is permitted to assume an advocate's role in 
the presentation and rebuttal of dispositional information. To the 
extent that defense counsel is denied this role, the case for curtailing 
the pre-sentence inquiry becomes stronger.376 
Over the past few years, the idea of appellate review of criminal 
sentences has received considerable support,377 but relatively little 
clarification. In general, its proponents have called for the develop-
ment of a substantive body of law to determine when offenders 
should be sent to prison and for what duration.878 Although a con-
sensus has emerged that the sentencing judge should operate within 
the traditional judicial structure of precedent and established pro-
cedures, few have offered any specific rules by which to guide him. 
Nor does it seem realistic to expect appellate courts to postulate a 
laundry list of agreed-upon factors that, when properly weighed and 
balanced, will produce the correct sentence. Accordingly, it is the 
suggestion of this article that the natural starting point for the 
development of a substantive body of sentencing law is the creation 
swings back to the "tariff" sentencing system of earlier times (which prescribed fixed 
sentences for each crime) that, to the extent our interest is in _achieving equality in 
sentencing, a sentencing structure that treats dissimilarly situated persons similarly is 
as potentially open to criticism on grounds of inequality as one that treats similarly 
situated persons dissimilarly. 
375. Given the assumption that discretion cannot safely be omitted from the sen-
tencing process, one is forced back upon what are admittedly loose distinctions in 
describing how the pre-sentence inquiry might be appropriately curtailed: (1) subjec-
tive interpretations of character and motivation would be de-emphasized in favor 
of a focus generally restricted to overt behavior; (2) the concept of a novelistic presen-
tation of information would be largely abandoned to be replaced by graded scales 
and comparative rankings; and (3) predictions of future misconduct or delinquency 
would be purged from the presentence report unless (a) expressly made in order to 
describe the current status of the offender, and (b) presented in a manner that suffi-
ciently sets forth the prediction's premises so as to be "attackable." 
376. In short, it is unduly simple to suggest that there is only one ideal sentencing 
structure; the problems of misinformation and discrimination are susceptible to a 
variety of rational responses. But some degree of curtailment and some additional 
role for defense counsel seem necessary, since neither alone offers a satisfactory solution. 
377. See note 4 supra. 
378. See, e.g., ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 27-30. 
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of a framework of relevance. By this it is meant that the first task in 
the institutionalization of appellate review of criminal sentences 
should be the development of standards to govern the kinds of data 
and information that may be considered at sentencing. Traditionally, 
lawyers operate by narrowing the issues and facts involved in a 
dispute to those that can be agreed upon as having legal relevance. 
Thus, if sentencing is to follow a legal mode of decision-making, 
the first step seems inevitably to involve a narrowing of the virtually 
infinite spectrum of information that is currently deemed relevant 
at sentencing. From such a framework of relevance would come two 
advantages: first, issues would be more sharply defined for the dis-
positional authority to focus upon and resolve; and, second, such 
procedural formalization would gradually produce greater unifor-
mity and consistency in the kinds of justifications that might be used 
to support variations iil imprisonment. 
Curtailment of the pre-sentence inquiry undeniably entails risks: 
Important facts may on occasion elude discovery; the risk of identify-
ing an unacceptable level of false positives may at times inhibit the 
detection of truly dangerous offenders. But, these same risks exist at 
the trial stage, where our system of justice has prided itself on allocat-
ing the balance of advantage to the defendant. If we wish to max-
imize the perceived equity of the sentencing process, this balance of 
advantage should be extended to the sentencing stage (and to the vast 
majority of defendants who forgo trial) by the creation of a functional 
equivalent to the presumption of innocence that prevails at trial. 
This presumption--call it, perhaps, a "presumption of normality"-
would assume, in the absence of unambiguous information to the 
contrary, that the offender was at least no worse than others convicted 
of the same crime. In effect, society would abandon the hope of com-
plete knowledge of the offender in favor of a deliberate constructive 
ignorance of prior minor transgressions and speculative possibilities. 
In return, this presumption of normality would ensure that the goal 
of individualization would henceforth be pursued only on the basis 
of real differences among offenders. 
Inevitably, a tension exists between two conflicting goals of dis-
positional decision-making-individualization and equality. This 
article suggests that the balance be tipped toward equality by curtail-
ing the permissible justifications for disparate treatment. Although 
essentially conservative, this position seems at least temporarily 
mandated: In the last analysis, unless the concept of individualiza-
tion is revitalized along lines similar to those suggested above, pres-
sures seem likely to build that will lead to the abandonment of the 
concept rather than to its modification. 
